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1. Introduction 
This thesis focuses attention on whether public finances to the private sector can 
deliver public goals, explicitly development, in foreign aid interventions. I intend 
to do that by analyzing the Norwegian Investment Fund for Development 
(Norfund), a Norwegian public institution commissioned with investing public 
capital on firms with the objective to produce public goods. I will specifically do 
an evaluative case study of Norfund‘s co-investment with the Norwegian 
company TrønderEnergi in a hydropower company in Bugoye, Uganda. Through 
contextualizing a particular case, my goal is to asses if is possible to attribute the 
creation of public goods to operations based on the market rules, like Norfund 
does. With this research topic, the thesis aims at reflecting upon theories about 
the emergent role of the state as a competition one, a state that aligns industrial 
and welfare policies, in the context of economic globalization.  
Over the past decade, the Norwegian hydropower sector has experienced 
revitalization after several of decades of stagnation. Increasing global energy 
demands and climate change have created a momentum for escalating the scope 
of renewable energies. The biggest part of this rising market is in developing 
countries, which need to address energy demands for enhancing their economic 
growth. Norwegian‘s firms could be a vital source of preferred expertise in clean 
energy technologies. The Norwegian hydropower sector has to offer a complete 
value chain of products and services demanded in the countries of the South. 
Current market trends signal that the next move for this sector is 
internationalization. In fact, internationalization of the clean energy industry has 
great value for the Norwegian economy in that dependence on the Oil & Gas 
sector can be dismissed. Industrialized countries, in the center of economic 
globalization, should aspire to diversify its national economy by offering an 
international portfolio of industries and services. While the foreign markets are 
attractive, energy improvements in developing countries require commercial 
investments to bear the growth the energy sectors given that poor countries lack 
the technical expertise and the economical resources.   
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Whilst the Norwegian industry was looking abroad and the countries of the South 
demanded such services, the Norwegian state established the Clean Energy for 
Development (CEfD) in 2007. It is a foreign aid program which aims at 
increasing access to clean energy in developing partner countries (NORAD 
2007). Despite its welfare goal, CEfD can also be seen as the seek of Norway, a 
donor country, to obtain benefits for the domestic economy and firms through 
foreign aid donations. For Mr. Erik Solheim, the Norwegian Ministry of 
Development and the Environment, the CEfD is a program of commercial 
importance for both Norway and the countries of the South.  
We are doubling our efforts to promote clean energy and ensure that poor countries 
have access to clean, renewable energy. During the next 50 years, developing countries 
will account for the greatest increases in energy consumption. The enhanced focus on 
clean energy is therefore also an important element in our efforts to combat climate 
change. (Solheim, Press released Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010
1
). 
Through this aid program, Norway engages in 14 countries and 2 geographical 
locations rich in water sources. The initiative is structured in five cooperation 
areas but the Norwegian aid budgets for 2010 and 2011 have prioritized financial 
resources to one main area: public financial mechanisms (PFMs) that can attract 
private investors for projects in the South. Norfund is responsible for 
administrating the resources and for partnering with private investors. Other 
cooperation areas of the program, like rural electrification, energy efficiency or 
institutional cooperation
2
, are managed by the traditional Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD).  
The increased political support to PFMs, especially Norfund, is justified on the 
alleged success of the development fund for finding private investors ready to co-
invest in developing countries. By doing this, the institution contributes in 
materializing the goals of the foreign aid program. Besides of the partnership 
with the state-owned hydropower company, Statkraft, in the subsidiary SN 
                                              
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ―Press Release: Stronger focus on climate change in development policy‖ published on 
5 October 2010. Retrieved 20 February 2011. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2010/budsjett_klimaprofil.html?id=619025  
2 NORAD. ―Clean Energy for Development‖. Retrieved  3 October 2010. 
http://www.NORAD.no/en/Thematic+areas/Energy/Clean+Energy  
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Power, one of the most prominent examples of Norfund‘s accomplishments is the 
hydropower plant built in Bugoye, Uganda. The Bugoye hydropower plant, 
opened in 2009, was built in cooperation with the Norwegian company 
TrønderEnergi. The Bugoye plant is a great achievement for the CEfD program 
because the plant is the first commercial hydropower plant built by Norwegian 
investors in Africa
3
. For the Norwegian Minister of Environment and 
Development Mr. Erik Solheim, Bugoye is a successful contribution to improve 
energy access for Uganda, and to proving that public finances can mobilize 
private capital for foreign aid purposes. In the press release for the opening of 
Bugoye, he stated:  
The need for clean energy in Africa is enormous. This [Bugoye] project uses Uganda's 
natural resources for clean energy as an alternative to the many small diesel generators 
that now supply much of the power in Uganda, or power from oil or coal. It is therefore 
an important climate measure… This could be the start of a series of new privately-
financed power plants in Africa. Bugoye has been realized through a public private 
partnership, where the aid is used strategically to bring in private capital for investment. 
(Erik Solheim, Press Released
4
) 
The results accomplished by Norfund in partnership with the Norwegian private 
actor opened doors for future energy related investments with public objectives 
in the developing countries. According to the Administrative Director of 
Norfund, Mr. Kjell Roland, Bugoye is the first project of several that the 
institution will be supporting in Africa
5
.   
Norwegian energy-related aid can help developing countries to improve their 
energy, constrains. However, it can also help the firms of the donor country to 
penetrate new markets. Norwegian foreign aid has traditionally been aligned to 
altruistic and welfare goals (Tvedt 2009, Simonensen 2008). But during the 
                                              
3  Bistandsaktuelt. ―News: Opening of power plant in Uganda‖. Retrieved 5 September 2010. Own translation. 
http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/Nyheter+og+reportasjer/Arkiv+nyheter+og+reportasjer/%C3%85pnet+kraftverk+i+Ug
anda.136441.cms  
4 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ―Press released 12.10. 2009: Solheim opened power plant in Uganda‖  
Retrieved 3 September 2010. Own translation. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/nyheter/2009/uganda.html?id=581504 
5 Teknisk ukeblad . ―News 5.10.2009:  Big success in Uganda. Norwegian power plant opened several months before 
schedule. And more plants can come‖  Retrieved 6 October 2010. http://www.tu.no/energi/article225034.ece  
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second half of the millennium, Norway has advanced a global realist
6
 aid model 
based on the resources and capabilities existing in the country. Therefore, the 
advent of a model of aid provision, aligned with the interests of the firms of a 
donor country, raises questions about the capabilities of Norway as aid donor to 
achieve both commercial and public goals.  
On several occasions Norwegian civil society organizations (CSOs) have 
suggested that the Norwegian government should increase focus on improving 
the capacity of public institutions in developing countries, so that they manage 
their economic growth, negotiate fair agreements with energy enterprises, and 
increase the positive development effects of energy investments for the good of 
their impoverished populations (Herning 2010; Steindal and Sandanger 2008). In 
fact, the proposals of CSOs calls for more focus on the traditional way of 
providing aid: country-to-country or public actor-to-public actor (this definition 
also includes CSOs as a channel for providing foreign aid). Historical experience 
of aid provision in the energy sector through the Nordic hydropower industry has 
proven that the mixture of public and commercial interests have not always 
accomplished desired results for the benefit of the poor (Usher 1997).  
Other critics to PFMs in foreign aid policy discuss the capacity of the mechanism 
to contribute substantially to poverty alleviation. The overall goal of Norwegian 
foreign aid is poverty reduction and this should be reflected in every aid program 
(NORAD 2006), including the energy program CEfD. A report published by, the 
Norwegian CSOs, ForUM and FIVH
7
 argues that pre-requisites for poverty 
reduction effects in energy aid are related to the existence of local infrastructure 
and well-functioning governmental institutions in developing countries; 
requirements that Norfund‘s interventions do not address.  
… there exists an inconsistency in the Norwegian government‘s ambitions to realize 
poverty reduction aid with a special focus on Africa, and [Norfund‘s] economic and 
market oriented focus. (Steindal and Sandanger 2008:26)  
                                              
6 Global realism is a concept used by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jonas Gahr Støre to describe 
the rationale behind Norwegian foreign policy which has a focus on strengthening Norway‘s economic, political and 
human resources (Støre 2010).  
7 Norwegian CSOs. ForUM: Forum for Utvikling og Miljø.  FIVH: Fremtiden I Våre Hender.  
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Thus, the question becomes if market-driven instruments are powerful and 
effective tools for the achievement of foreign aid‘s ultimate goals? 
In fact, the rationale behind PFMs and Norfund is that Norway should contribute 
internationally in areas where the country posses and expertise, like, in the 
hydropower sector. Therefore, it is not rare to see the emergence of a foreign aid 
program that incorporates the elements of industrial policy through pragmatic 
market oriented approaches inclined to favor national private sector participation 
in the goals of Norwegian foreign aid. Since the turn of the millennium, scholarly 
literature that studies the mixture of public and commercial goals in international 
aid interventions have proliferated (Bull and McNeil 2007, Dalberg 2009, 
Osborne 2000). In a national political scenario, the appearing mechanisms align 
elements of Norwegian domestic policy with those of foreign policy; modus 
operandi that arguably is visible in the Norwegian foreign aid through Norfund 
and CEfD.  
1.1 Research Question  
This thesis aims to contribute to the academic debate on the use of public 
finances to private sector in the Norwegian foreign aid governance, through 
contextualizing Norfund and critically assessing the outcomes of the renomé 
project in Bugoye, Uganda. 
Do Norwegian public finances to the private sector promote development? 
This formulation suggests that public finances to private sector represent the 
institutionalization of a governmental strategy that channels public resources to 
commercial actors for the accomplishment of public goods. This element of the 
research question gains relevance when the object of study is Norfund, a 
development finance institution
8
 (DFI) invested with the mission of enterprise 
creation with public finances (from the aid budget) in developing countries. In 
this thesis ‗public‘ refers to state actors and institutions with public mandates and 
                                              
8 A DFI is a publicly mandated bilateral institutions designed to provide long-term financing to private sector 
activities which have specific value-added international development –foreign aid- objectives (Dalberg 2009:8).   
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are invested with legitimacy; whereas ‗private‘ actors embrace companies, 
industry-related bodies, publicly-owned companies which seek economic profit 
and that operate under commercial mechanisms.  
Subsequently, development is concerned with the economic and welfare goals of 
the aid recipient countries, in this case Uganda. The concept of ‗development‘ is 
rather polemical because it has several meanings according to various 
disciplines; but for the purpose of this thesis, I will refer to development from the 
significance of foreign policy. To know whether public finances to private sector 
promote development requires an assessment of achievements. I will study the 
research question on the evaluative case study of the intervention of Norfund in 
the Bugoye project. A case study of Bugoye intends to analyze the performance 
of Norfund as a development finance institution for aid provision.  
1.2 Rationale for the Choice of Topic   
Foreign aid, from the perspective of development assistance, is a domain focused 
on answering the question: what creates development and what hinders it? 
(Simensen 2008)  Historically, a myriad of shifting paradigms are present in the 
international aid discourse such as economic growth, social development, poverty 
orientation, basic needs, sustainability, good governance, and local ownership 
among others (Gunnar Myrdal in Simensen 2008:100). With globalization, the 
aid paradigm has changed. Since the turn of the millennium, international fora 
have structured a multi-dimensional agenda that calls for commitments in several 
areas simultaneously: economic growth, governance, environment, partnerships 
with private sector, and human rights (World Bank, Wolfensohn 2002). 
The topics have political sensibility because they mirror the decline of 
boundaries between national and global politics, and produce a dynamic between 
interests at both levels. Further, they advance the role of private actors in 
development through mechanisms that exploit the potential of companies to 
7 
 
deliver trickledown-effects
9
 in aid interventions. The raising paradigm informs 
national policy formation and opens opportunities to explore new ways of 
delivering aid assistance. In Norway, the emerging paradigm has given rise to, 
what I denominate, market-driven institutions
10
; they are publicly mandated 
institutions that combine both public and commercial interests and engage 
private actors in public tasks.   
I argue that Norfund is an example of these emerging aid mechanisms due to its 
mission and its task as a PFM for the energy aid program. Indeed, Norfund is a 
late comer compared with its European counterparts
11
. Despite of its young age, 
the fund is the largest among Nordic DFIs. During the last five years, the 
Norwegian fund has gained popularity among political circles; however, it has 
been argued that its approaches and achievements are little understood by the 
public stakeholders and policy makers (Dalberg 2009:1). Some see DFIs as 
beneficial for development (Dalberg 2009; Musasike 2004; Hoffmann 1998); 
others argue that aggregated economic growth does not necessarily transmit 
benefits to the poor (Steele et al 2008; Steindal and Sandanger 2008; Bracking 
and Ganho 2011; Herning 2010). Better understanding of Norfund‘s 
accomplishments is beneficial for policy making, governance models and for the 
ultimate goal of aid- serving developing countries.  
1.2.1 Rationale for the Choice of Case 
I sustain that Norfund, like other aid assistance agencies, aims at achieving 
foreign aid‘s goals; but given that Norfund‘s operational mode differs 
substantially from typical aid agencies its effects are little understood.   
Enlighten knowledge about Norfund can be done through considering the actions 
and results of the fund from its own operational terms for three reasons. First, 
                                              
9 Trickledown-effects are a concept that refers to the spill-overs that company produce in local communities where 
they operate. Examples: job creation, improving supply chains and infrastructure, by educating the work force and by 
bringing products to markets (Welle-Strand et al. 2009:29)  
10 Colin Leys (2001) uses the term market-driven to describe emergent political practices that combine traditional 
institutional features with market-based procedures and reasoning. This mixture of public and private roles, I argue, 
advances the emergence of market-driven political institutions which enhances this aid model. 
11 Examples of European DFIs are: CDC, United Kingdom; CODIFES, Spain; DEG, Germany; FINNFUND, 
Finland; FMO, Netherlands; IFU-IØ, Denmark.  For details see: EDFI ―Members‖ Retrieved 3 December 2010: 
http://www.edfi.be/members.html  
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Norfund allocates economic resources into projects or enterprises that generate 
profits and strengthen local private sector progress in developing countries. 
Second, Norfund co-invests with market actors, such as companies and 
enterprises. Or it can function as PFMs for another aid program. This leads to the 
use of private finances in aid-related projects, or the use of public funds in 
subsidizing private activities or specific companies. Third, DFIs are managed 
with a business-related focus, in this case, as an investment fund.   
Norfund in Bugoye 
As a new partner for private actors and foreign aid, the study of Norfund‘s 
intervention in the Bugoye project provides an opportunity to identify the 
interactions of the fund with public and private actors, goals and results; and how 
they are mirrored in Norfund‘s approaches. The investment of Norfund in 
Bugoye was selected given that the power plant has had large news coverage 
(Annex 1). In Norway, the results of Bugoye are presented as successful. It is 
said to be a reputational project for Norwegian hydropower companies which 
have the ability of building a commercial hydropower plant in Africa on time and 
within budget. After the opening of the plant, the private co-investor on the 
Bugoye company, TrønderEnergi, has been introduced as an example of success 
of a relatively small regional company going international for the first time. 
Norwegian agencies for export promotion have highlighted the success of the 
company as an example to follow. The acclaimed success of TrønderEnergi, in 
my view, could not have been possible without the advices and financial support 
of Norfund. Something that deserves attention in the search for the answer on 
whether Norfund can deliver public goals as well.  
1.3 Thesis Structure  
In the first chapter I have presented the research question, my explanation for the 
choice of this case, and a contextual background for this research study. In 
chapter two, I propose a theoretical framework that draws from theory formation 
in political science and in some instances within international relations. Chapter 
three is concerned with the methodological choices, including data collection 
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strategies, the assessment method to evaluate the impact of the aid intervention in 
Bugoye, and research considerations.  
Empirical findings, together with their contextualization are presented in the 
chapters four, five, and six. In chapter four, I develop on the emergent 
Norwegian foreign aid. Subsequently, I put Norfund into context as a PFM for 
the CEfD and its relation with the Norwegian commercial interests in the 
hydropower sector. The fifth chapter gives detailed attention to Norfund‘s 
mission, strategy, and operations. The sixth chapter presents Norfund‘s 
intervention in the realization of the Bugoye hydropower project. This chapter 
presents the background of the intervention, the private partner and the structure 
of the public private co-operation.  
Chapters seven and eight should be seen as analytical chapters. In chapter seven I 
provide an assessment of the equity results provided by the aid intervention and 
discuss their significance for the overall Norwegian development policy and 
stakeholders. Chapter eight serves to discuss the implications of the Bugoye 
intervention on Norwegian commercial and efficiency goals. Moreover, it 
proposes an approach to politically understand the role of Norfund in promoting 
development. Finally, the chapter closes with the presentation on how the 
findings serve to explain a competitive Norwegian state. The final chapter is 
dedicated to offer some closing reflections and conclusions.  
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2. Theoretical Framework  
This thesis examines the emergent operational models in Norwegian 
development policy that combine the achievements of public and private goals in 
development interventions. Traditionally public institutions, as an extension of 
the state, have been mandated to achieve solely public goals. However, the 
emergence of mixed goals-achievement in recent years calls for studies about the 
role of public institutions in achieving both public and private goals. This 
framework reviews theoretical literature that analyses the existence of a change 
in the role of states, and the reforms that such changes are bringing. Initially, it is 
presented as a theoretical proposal that argues for the impact of economic 
globalization on the state. Furthermore, I will present a theoretical approach for 
the study of political institutions at the national level given that they correspond 
to the main element of study.  
This thesis places political institutions at the centre of a welfare state which is 
influenced by globalization forces. Diagram No. 1 illustrates how both 
theoretical frameworks are interlinked and reflect the element of study.  
Diagram 1: Connection Between Theory and Case of Study 
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Theoretical approaches, outlined in this chapter, have a political science 
tradition; however, in some instances they get scholarly support from 
international relations.  
2.1 Embedded Neoliberalism: The Changing Role of 
the State 
The nation-state, of course, is not dead, but its role has changed.    
(Cerny 1997: 269) 
Scholarly literature dealing with globalization and political science has come to a 
consensus about the existence of a change on the contemporary welfare state due 
to the influence produced by global economic processes. As a result, 
globalization serves also to describe a political phenomenon where practices and 
institutions of the welfare state enter in a course of (re)structuration (Robertson 
1992). This transformation can be studied from two divergent academic 
positions: the openness literature and the context-contingent view (Schustereder 
2010). Given that the latter supports a weak view of globalization, this paper will 
concentrate on the former from the perspective of embedded neoliberalism.  
Embedded neoliberalism
12
 is ―an ideational concept‖ used by Philips Cerny to 
explicate the dynamics of change produced by globalization in states and to 
outline emergent public policy (Cerny 2008a:17). This approach has been 
inspired in many ways from different dimensions of neoliberalism, like, free 
market structures and regulations. However it differs from the classical revival of 
liberalism such as a pure laissez faire approach by including an active role for the 
state in designing, promoting, and guaranteeing the free and efficient operation of 
the market (Plehwe, Wlapen and Neunhöffer 2006).  It also correlates the 
dynamics of change with pre-existing configurations in national institutions, 
interest groups, and the mixture of public and private sectors (Cerny 2008a:17). 
                                              
12 The concept of Embedded (Neo)Liberalism is originally from Ruggie (1983). In international relations theory the 
concepts referrers to an approach that explains an international system politically founded on the influence of 
economic changes. In this system, there is interplay between the compromises of free trade abroad, the welfare state 
at home, and the citizens of industrial democracies looking for a multilateral system that could assure a prosperous 
and secure world. In this thesis, I will use the concept from the proposal of Cerny which is focused on national level 
of analysis.   
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Therefore, it can be said that there are not uniformed effects of embedded 
neoliberalism in states because change depends on the shape given by national 
actors (Cerny 2008a:32).  
Embedded neoliberalism is in many ways what Birdsall and Fukuyama have 
called the ―Post-Washington Consensus‖ which describes a renewed focus of 
public policy on the flexibility and efficiency of national enterprises and the 
delivery of social benefits (Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011). This approach is of 
particular interest for this thesis for three reasons. First, because it places 
institutional responses together with policy transformation, articulation of non-
states actors, and the discourse of ―political entrepreneurs‖ as the promoter 
factors that drive this change (Cerny 2008a:29-35). Second, it serves to explain 
―institutional behavior, political processes and understandings of socioeconomic 
realities‖ engendered by globalization in the nation-state (Cerny 2008a:2). 
Finally, this framework argues that embedded neoliberalism is concerned with 
―the evolving art of governamentality in a globalizing world‖ (Burchell, Gordon 
and Miller 1991; Cerny 2008b).  
Embedded neoliberalism takes for granted that the welfare state needs to be 
adapted to global realities. In this process, Cerny (2008a) supports that four main 
lines of reform can explain the ―core dimensions of embedded neoliberalism‖. 
They are: 1) reduction of trade and capital barriers and internationalization of 
production; 2) embedded financial orthodoxy, such as fiscal and monetary policy 
3) competition state; 4) reinvent ―governance‖ (Cerny 2008a:18-28). This 
literature framework gives focus to the dimensions of embedded neoliberalism 
that illustrate political change: regulation and governance processes. Thus, the 
financial element is no addressed by this study. Given that the 
internationalization of production gains importance in a globalized market, 
political change reflected in policies impacts institutions‘ mandates and 
operational frameworks. In other words, political processes relate directly to the 
international dimensions of the state, including development assistance provided 
to other countries and the internationalization of national firms.  
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In this thesis, it is assumed that through understanding the general direction of 
change at the nation-state level, it is possible to understand the emergence and 
evolution of particular political institutions placed at lower levels within the 
nation-state boundaries. In order to increase the understanding of the competing 
versions of the nation-state, the predecessor welfare state will be shortly 
explained, followed by further presentation of the embedded neoliberalist 
approach. 
2.2 Welfare State, Main Characteristics.   
The modern form of the nation-state in industrialized Western democracies 
corresponds to the post-war national welfare state (Cerny 1997:258).  The 
welfare state is commonly known as a state that has the capacity to promote 
economic growth and to achieve welfare or public goals at the same time. This 
means that the core functions of the welfare state are commonly divided into 
―efficiency‖ as the economic goal, and ―equity‖ as the social goal (Schustereder 
2010:14).  In a broad sense, the welfare state is based on a fundamental division 
of functions, one of the state, and one of the markets, which seem to interact in 
order to expand welfare benefits and to maximize market-oriented growth (Ibid).  
The welfare state produces the equity goal by creating an ―equitable society‖, 
which means reducing the levels of insecurity faced by citizens in a capitalized 
world (Barr 2004:10; Briggs 2006:16).  In sum, citizens of the welfare state 
expect: price regulation of goods, the existence of a contractual framework to 
protect private property, job-security legislation, environmental policies 
(Lindbeck 2006:2), and the provision of cash or in-kind social welfare benefits 
(Pierson 1998).  Close to this goal is the concept of ―common goods‖ or ‖public 
goods‖ which refer to ―goods where it is not possible for the individual to 
exclude others from using the good‖ (Rothstein 2001:215). Examples of this are, 
among others, the commons
13
 and public services. In other words, the society 
expects that the welfare state provides common goods. Finally, the creation of an 
                                              
13 The commons in political science refers to the resources that are collectively owned or shared by the population. 
They are classified as tangible assets like natural resources, and intangible assets like public knowledge not privatized 
by copyright law. For broader discussion see Bollier (2003).  
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equitable society is mainly debated due to the existence of various perceptions of 
the concept of equality (Bell 1973; Flora & Heidenheimer 1981) which leads to 
generalized confusion on the type of demands that societies have of the state. 
However, despite this social dilemma, Barr (2004) argues that a central social 
function of the welfare state is based on granting minimum living standards for 
all citizens.  
2.3 The Competition State 
Welfare states at the center of globalization, argue Cerny, have evolved into a 
competition state, which seeks to enhance wealth by market-based approaches 
(Cerny 1997, 2008a).  The main focus of this type of state is the promotion of 
economic activities in order to remain competitive relative to other states; thus, 
actors seek to reinvent the state as a semi-enterprise association for common ends 
(Ibid).  In this context, the dynamics of competition take place on three different 
levels: business looking for markets; states looking for economic activities; and 
one that places factors of production in a competition arena. Within this three-
level model, non-state actors (like market actors, businesses and civil society 
organizations) have increasingly gained places in the political arena where the 
state plays the role of commodifying agent or as a (quasi-) market actor itself 
(Cerny 1997). 
In the effort to reach competition goals, national politics become subordinated to 
the global economy (Stopford and Strange 1991) because state-based activities 
increasingly turn into marketized ones.  In terms of regulation, the predominant 
form is based on the arms‘ length regulation which focuses on founding and 
implementing general rules applicable to particular sectors (Cerny 1997, 2008a).  
The resulting pro-market regulatory agenda of the competition state encompasses 
a framework that provides rules and procedures in a semi-legal environment for 
(market) actors to operate. This approach is the product of a generalized idea that 
―governments should steer but not row‖ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). According 
to Cerny (2000), this idea suggests that regulation becomes more intrusive, 
increasingly based on contractualization and a posteriori enforcement. Summing 
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up, the regulation tendency of the competition state is based on alternative 
regulation forms rather than enhancing deregulation (reduction of rules and state 
intervention).  
2.3.1 Industrial Policy 
In the competition state, policy transformation is visible in trade, industrial, 
monetary and fiscal policies (Cerny 1997). In line with the purpose of this paper, 
solely the industrial policy type will receive closer attention.  
Industrial policy is concerned with ―a country‘s strategy to develop specific 
industrial sectors‖ (Birdsall & Fukuyama 2011:49). This is of particular interest 
because the interventions of a state become increasingly targeted towards 
providing assistance to specific sectors of the economy, so that they can be 
developed.  Following this course, states assume some of the cost of adjustments 
and can facilitate conditions that determine competitive advantage, like:  
…encouraging mergers and restructuring; promoting research and development; 
encouraging private investment and venture capital, while providing or guaranteeing 
credit based investment where capital markets fail, often through joint public/private 
ventures; developing new forms of infrastructure; pursuing a more active labor market 
policy while removing barriers to mobility, and the like. (Cerny 1997:264)  
In this context, the contribution of the competition state in productive sectors is 
associated with the task of addressing coordination problems that inhibit the 
growth of a strong private sector. Some such failures are produced either by the 
failure of market forces or the incapacity of states. Therefore, the state intervenes 
in order to deal with financial or other risks related to promoting the development 
of a healthy national industry (Birdsall & Fukuyama 2011:49-50) which can also 
compete in the global markets.  
2.3.2 Governance 
The competition state approach also suggests a change in governance practices. 
Governance refers to the forms of how the state uses its authority and resources 
to interact with the market and society. In this regard, Cerny suggests that 
transformation of the modus operandi of the government is reflected on the tasks 
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of bureaucracies that now monitor and supervise the production of public goods 
and services in-line with performance indicators (Cerny 1997: 66). Institutions of 
a competition state would contract out services, undertake public-private 
partnerships (PPP), or use jointly private capital for public purposes (Cerny 
2008a:27). As a result special-purpose bodies, that engage markets actors in the 
allocation of resources and values, have come to materialize in the nation-state 
(Cerny 2008a). Colin Leys (2001) uses the term market-driven to describe 
emergent political practices that combine traditional institutional features with 
market-based procedures and reasoning. This mixture of public and private roles, 
can be said, advances the emergence of market-driven political institutions that 
progress this governance model.  
Embedding neoliberalism as a process of liberalization, privatization and market-
oriented practices, is argued to have reduced the capacity of states to achieve 
common or public goals (Lipschutz and Rowe 2005). Previous studies of market-
driven mechanisms in an international context have suggested difficulties to 
make generalizations about the achievement of public goals; however, it seems to 
be determined by the type of interests of the private partners, the nature of the 
collaboration between actors, and in targeting long-term goals (Bull and McNeil 
2007). In fact, embedding neoliberalism as a theoretical proposal identifies a 
need to promote social integration and to balance the trade-offs resulting from 
the mixture of public and private interests (Cerny 2008a). Current theoretical 
gaps are reflected in the quest on how balance public-private interests in manner 
that permit effective collaboration of mixed parties and the delivery of ultimate 
public goals.  
At an international level, the global governance
14
concept has advanced a 
neoliberalist governance model that explain rule-making, exercise of authority 
and practice of compliance by actors that are not invested by nation-sate 
sovereign authority. Recent theory development, in that field, suggests that the 
                                              
14 Global Governance is a political model concerned with mechanisms of control and the systems of rule without the 
existence a defined sovereign authority. This concept does not refer to systems of governance applied by international 
organization i.e. United Nations, it rathers defines a system where state and non-state actors can exercise control at 
transnational levels. For a broader discussion see Rosenau and Czmpiel 1992; Whitman 2009) 
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types of inquiries in the global approach are also relevant to national political 
debates (Sending 2010:437-438). The global governance approach is useful to 
explain the presence of non-state actors in political arenas and their emerging 
responsibilities given by states to advance public interests. While the welfare 
state is an important actor in world politics, it is not the only one. Non-state 
actors, like business and civil society organizations (CSOs), have emerged at 
national level as well. They have increasingly been involved in ―traditional 
government tasks‖ concerned with ―the organization and control of economic, 
political, and social activities by means of making rules, implementing, 
monitoring, and enforcing [them]‖ (Mattli and Woods 2009:1). Cerny (1997) 
supports that the competition state lays in the center of a governance triangle
15
. 
This model explains a negotiation arena where the state, business actors and civil 
society organizations interact to regulate, set standards and undertake 
accountability procedures (Abbott and Snidal 2009; Cerny 1997). As a result, 
new governance models arise. 
In the case of a competition state concerned with business promotion, the 
involvement of civil society organizations has come to be understood as a 
balancing force. First, because they bring to the negotiation table topics of public 
interest such as social and environmental issues, often absent from market-driven 
operations (Lipschutz and Rowe 2005). Second, for Cerny, CSOs operate under a 
―flexible market-like—yet socially aware‖ position, they can reconcile the 
strategies of market-driven institutions (Cerny 2008: 35-36). Third, some of their 
actions have resulted in challenging and complementing regulation in the 
competition state. CSOs can produce ―regulatory standard setting‖ which 
advances public interest in state interventions (Abbott and Snidal 2009:44). 
CSOs can serve a balancing force in competition state operations.  
In summary, at the national level a complex form of governance emerges. It puts 
neoliberal politics together with raising interest groups and political 
                                              
15The Governance Triangle depicts a transnational regulatory space where States, firms and CSOs have direct 
participation in regulatory (standard setting) and accountability processes (Abbott and Snidal 2009) 
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entrepreneurs in an arena where domestic social
16
 issues are being reinvented 
(Cerny 2008a:36-37; Cardoso 2001) in a manner that marks a growing political 
imperative to structure the equity dimensions of politics in a globalized world. 
This additional feature of embedded neoliberalism illustrates a link between trade 
opening and social and environmental standards (Cerny 2008a:39). It does, as 
well, calls for new governance models that include both several types of actors 
and interests.  
2.3.3 Taking the Competition State Further 
In this order of ideas, the welfare state in the center of globalization is 
experiencing a process of change, denominated embedded neoliberalism. This 
change might bring within itself new roles for a competition state, as argued 
during this chapter.  Other scholars argue that a forthcoming model is the 
relational state. In this approach, the role of the state will be focused on social 
and environmental dimensions of the commons, and yet still maintain the 
emphasis on business promotion and market forces (Middtun 2005; Mendoza and 
Vernis 2008). In fact, both conceptual propositions of the emerging role of the 
state points towards market-driven politics.   
2.4 Political Institutions – The New Institutionalism  
Further, this thesis intends to analyze the type of involvement and the outcomes 
produced by an emergent category of market-driven institutions in the 
Norwegian Aid sector. To approach this object of study, I will apply the 
theoretical foundations of the New Institutionalism. Despite the existence of 
economic, political and sociological institutions; the political approach to New 
Institutionalism is founded on political science and it has been used in recent 
theoretical and analytical debates on this field (Scott 2008). March and Olsen 
(1984; 1989; 2008) have tradition within this theory. They have advanced the 
analysis of regimes and governance mechanisms that constrain and empower 
                                              
16 Here the term social can be understood as common or equity goals (in the view of welfare state) or public interests, 
for a more general approach.  
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behavior. This approach fits well my study because it explains institutions from a 
normative perspective giving emphasis on their missions, routines, and norms.   
Institutionalism is a term used to indicate the general approach of the study of 
political institutions based on the relations between institutional characteristics 
political agency, performance and change (March and Olsen 2008:4). By 
explaining institutions as ―collections of structures, rules and standard operating 
procedures‖ (Ibid), this approach goes beyond the rational actor perspective 
which focuses on rule systems structured by individual‘s self interests. Moreover, 
it emphasizes that norms are the source for understanding how institutions 
function and shape members‘ behavior.  
According to March and Olsen, an institution is:  
A relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in 
structures of meaning and resources…and [are] relative resilient to the idiosyncratic 
preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances. 
(March and Olsen 1898; 1995 in March and Olsen 2008:3) 
From this perspective, institutions give order to social relations and limit 
individual‘s chances to pursue self-interest (Weber 1978:40-43). Thus, actors‘ 
decisions are determined by rule-following. It is therefore expected that the 
members of institutions act in conformity to the guiding principles and as the 
guardians of those established norms (March and Olsen 2008).   
From this approach, the concept of institution is central to political analysis as it 
focuses on: ―a) the nature of institutions, b) the processes that translate structures 
and rules into political impacts, c) the processes that translate human behavior 
into structures‖ (March and Olsen 2008:4). Something useful for the purpose of 
this thesis that, empirically, places Norfund as a political institution aiming at 
analyzing its nature, its mission and its operational form. Additionally, new 
institutionalism also fits well the first theoretical approach –the competition 
state- because it describes change in political institutions as a process where an 
institution gets adapted to the shifting environment in order to survive and 
prosper. It is argued that through identifying the alterations of institutional roles, 
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change can be prescribed, proscribed, sped up or delayed (March and Olson 
2008:11). If this is true, it is possible to say that changes in institutions can be 
indicators of bigger processes of change within a nation-state or a society. 
2.4.1  How To Approach Institutional Studies 
The concerns of political institution scholarship are ―to what extent, in what 
respects, through what processes, under what conditions, and why institutions 
make a difference‖ (Weaver and Rockman 1993; Egeberg 2003). Critics have 
pointed out that a great deal of the institutionalists‘ work focus too much on 
details of a single and complex case of study (Scott 2008:32). Single case study 
as methodology is useful for giving close attention to the factors of study, as I 
will explain in chapter three. Even though I do not intent to overcome this 
criticism by applying a different method of research, I find possible to contribute 
with this challenge by attempting to incorporate theoretical elements and to 
contextualize them in my case of study.   
Neo-institutionalists have traditionally focused on a social-constructionist 
position and have dedicated attention to institutions as a larger framework of 
thinking (Krasner 1988:72; Scott 2008). These types of analysis have been 
valuable at accounting for diverse institutional forms and their effects. 
Nevertheless, the process that ―translates structures and rules into political 
impacts and the factors that impinge upon them under different conditions‖ are 
lesser known (March and Olsen 2008:10). Consequently, the increasing interest 
in describing and studying the effects of institutions advances our understanding 
about new forms of goal-accomplishment (March and Olsen 2008). In other 
words, analysis of institutional processes and results can serve to enlarge our 
understanding of market-driven institutions.  
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Embedded neoliberalism describes a process of change where states increasingly 
promote market-enabling mechanisms. This thesis intends to contribute to better 
understanding of the transformations occurring in Norway from studying one 
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case in the Development Aid Sector. By analyzing what forms market-driven 
interventions have, and what kind of outcomes are resulting from them, we can 
enhance our understanding of international manifestations of the competition 
state through foreign aid policy. 
Institutionalism offers a theoretical platform for the study of political institutions, 
and is well suited for the case study of this thesis, as this approach, in the centre 
of political science, is based on analyses within the state system. This means that 
non-state actors are excluded from the reach of this approach. Nevertheless, as 
the proponents of this theoretical approach have acknowledged this limitation,  
and have left open questions regarding the need to develop a framework that goes 
beyond markets or hierarchies (March and Olsen 2008: 16).  This thesis will 
include the presence of both institutions with political authority and emergent 
non-state actors in an analysis based on institutionalism‘s prescriptions.  
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3. Method  
This chapter presents the research methodology applied to this study. The design 
of a research study is ―a logical model of proof that allows the researcher to draw 
inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation‖ 
(Nachmias & Nachmias 1992:77-78, emphasis added). Such a design should deal 
at least with four problems: what questions to study, what data are relevant, what 
data to collect, and how to analyze the results (Philliber, Schwab, & Samsloss 
1980). For answering my research question of ―do Norwegian public finances to 
private sector promote development?‖ I chose a flexible qualitative method that 
allowed me to include several elements useful to analyze the academic inquiry. 
Basically the research has been guided by single case study methodology because 
it is useful at capturing ―the wholeness of a phenomenon‖ (De Vaus 2006a:xlix). 
As my case study refers to a political institution and its results, I have elaborated 
a framework to define the goals against which results are measured.  So that 
analysis could be possible in the three major levels of study, from the narrow to 
the most general, assessment of the Bugoye Hydropower Project;  the role of 
Norfund in this intervention; and Norfund- a market-driven institution for 
delivering aid in the Norwegian competition state context.  
3.1 Qualitative Method  
The overall case study is based on qualitative research method. A qualitative 
method is a general approach that applies a range of research strategies in real-
world settings, and is well suited for fields where there is little pre-existing 
research (Robson 2002). This method seemed to be a good approach to analyze 
Norfund due to the nature of an emergent market-driven institution. Quality 
studies are also well suited for study ―topics that do not fall under well-
established boundaries‖ (Yin 2011:25). To study Norfund as market-driven 
institution (concerned with development finances for development and public 
finance mechanisms for clean energy) is challenging because the institution is 
placed among a plurality of mandates, goals, strategies, actors, expectations and 
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operational forms. The qualitative method further encourages the researcher to 
use multiple sources of evidence to explain a current reality through pre-existing 
or emerging concepts (Ibid:3). To work with emerging concepts might be 
difficult, especially when there are no clear meanings in the reality. However I 
found the qualitative method helpful to overcome this challenge because it 
allowed me to use several sources of evidence to give insights about the three 
levels of the research and their connection to the research question. I believe that 
multiple sources of evidence are important to bear in mind in situations where 
stakeholders have diverse expectations about the type of results which an aid 
intervention should deliver.  
3.1.1 Flexibility of Design 
Applying a qualitative research method demands rigor but at the same time it 
allows flexibility by permitting the in-depth design emerge during the course of 
the study (Creswell 2007). This was particularly important during my research 
because in some instances I saw a need to conduct additional interviews or to 
search for more data whenever the initial data collection strategy did not provide 
me with sufficient information for analyzing the relationship between the data, 
the objects of study, and the theoretical links. A flexible design usually puts 
together several techniques of data collection such as interviews, observations, 
and literature analysis (Ibid). In this thesis, I used interviews, analyzed 
documents, and observed public debates about Norwegian foreign aid. On the 
whole, the design of this research is qualitative; however, the case study method 
is used as a particular form to conduct the research.  
3.2 The Case Study 
To date there is no scholarly agreement of what constitutes a case study; 
academic literature has defined it as an explorative stage of various research 
methods (Hoaglin et al 1982). However, this thesis sees case study as an ―all 
encompassing method covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, 
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and specific approaches to data analysis‖ (Yin 2009:18). Within this approach, a 
case study is defined as:  
An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident. (Yin 1994:13) 
In case study research, the researcher tries to construct an understanding about 
the object of study informed by the context within which the case exists (De 
Vaus 2006b: 6).  In this thesis the empirical inquiry is the research question and 
the contemporary phenomenon that gives context to the case study is the 
influence of globalization in states, as reflected in the emergence of market-
driven institutions in the Norwegian foreign aid sector.  
3.2.1 Theory Testing 
Case studies are particularly useful for theory testing (Yin 1989a). On the basis 
of a theory it is possible to predict that a case with a particular set of 
characteristics will have a particular outcome (De Vaus 2006b:8). The major 
objective of this thesis is to enhance the competition state‘s theoretical approach. 
Based on the competition state theory presented in chapter two, my main 
argument is that both equity and efficiency goals of a welfare state can be 
achieved through market-driven institutions situated within the competition state 
through emerging governance models. The results of the analysis will allow me 
to affirm or negate the proposed theory.  
An initial assumption is that the case of Norfund fits well to test a competition 
state theory because the rationale and operational forms of this emerging 
institution have elements explained by that theory set. Additionally, the context 
provided by the Norwegian foreign policy goes in line with political phenomenon 
suggested by embedded neoliberalism. Thus, the case of study that provides the 
real life situation matches the conditions under which the theory proposes 
particular outcomes. Through ―pattern-matching‖ process, the researcher can 
analyze and test a theory with empirical evidence collected from a single case 
study (Yin 1989b:109-113). To analyze theory testing in case studies I applied 
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theory to identified pattern of events, which then become the benchmark against 
the collected data was tested. 
3.2.2 Trustworthiness in a Case Study 
Trustworthiness is an important element for producing research, and the most 
important tools for achieving this element are validity and reliability (Robson 
2002, Yin 1989a). Validity relates to the accuracy of the findings. Reliability 
concerns with the consistency of interpretations and results. Through fulfilling 
those elements in a satisfactory manner, a case study can increase its ability to 
generalize from findings. Case studies are supposed to capture both the 
uniqueness of the object of study and its wholeness. Usually they depend on non-
standardized research methods, so it is often a question among researchers 
whether it is possible to generalize from case studies (See i.e. Robson 2002, 
Kennedy 2006). Generalization refers to the extend of which findings can be 
understood as general results delivered by specific processes and missions of a 
defined type of institution, in this case.  Generalization is possible if the findings 
can be are applied outside the specific context of the situation studied in a 
particular case and whether they serve to explain other similar cases.  
Research methodologies have a tradition of elaborating upon assumptions for 
statistical validity, reliability, and generalization from quantitative data. The 
debate about whether such methods can be applied in qualitative research design 
is extensive. Yin (1994) has written that the means of generalization in case 
studies is of analytical or theoretical representativity, instead of as a statistical 
one. Therefore I have proposed that my research will aim at providing theory 
testing. To enhance a study‘s ability to construct validity, the use of multiple 
types of evidence is suggested (Yin 1989a:23, Gerring 2007:173) and through the 
specifying of theoretical relationships from which generalizations can be made 
(Yin 2006:88). For building reliability, similar case study protocols should be 
developed to support the procedures that were followed (Ibid). In the event of 
evaluative case studies, generalizations should be grounded on the individuals 
that would apply the evaluation findings in similar situations (Kennedy 
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2006:101). To avoid this shortcoming I present a method of assessment which 
guided the evaluation of the studied intervention in my case study.  
Generalization of case studies should be guided by the aim to understand the case 
itself (Stake 1995). Thus much effort is directed through the complete thesis to 
explain the case as a wholeness that comprise a contextual background, the 
speficiness under which a particular institution operates, the expectation of 
stakeholders, the analyzed intervention and the significance of the results 
provided by the intervention to the institution, the context and the theory.  
3.2.3 A Three-Level Case Study 
I describe this case study as hourglass-shaped, as it approaches the topic of study 
from a broad theoretical and contextual level, narrows it down through 
examining the institution until focused upon the details of a particular 
intervention, and then again more broadly assessing whether the intervention 
achieved the proposed goals. Diagram No. 2 shows the hourglass-shaped that 
represents the reasoning model used in this thesis. 
Diagram 2: Reasoning Model for Case Study   
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Within this reasoning model, the unit of study can be analyzed in a particular 
setting according to an established assessment method. Resulting data should 
draw on general conclusions about the role of Norfund in the broad settings or 
within the above mentioned case context. The framework of reasoning is in line 
with the various levels of analysis proposed in the diagram No. 1, found in theory 
chapter  
This thesis intends to analyze the object of study from three levels. The level one 
is the context; level two is the institution; and level three is the intervention. An 
analysis of Norfund in Bugoye focused on these three factors permits this 
research to draw conclusions about Norfund‘s role in promoting development by 
injecting public finances through private sector. 
3.2.4 Unit of Analysis 
A case is the object of this study, so empirically this means that the main unit of 
analysis is the Norwegian market-driven institution Norfund. This case study 
involves the review of the working procedures applied by Norfund in order to 
achieve the goals of Norwegian foreign aid, namely ‗development‘. Thus, 
Norfund is studied from the theoretical approach of new institutionalism from 
which the institution is understood as a collection of rules to follow and not as an 
organization affected by individual‘s choices.  
Norfund’s Intervention: Bugoye HPP 
To be able to analyze whether Norfund is fulfilling its mandate and delivering 
development results, an analysis of investments is required. In order to inform a 
study of the work of this institution and its results, I have selected to one 
particular intervention in Norfund‘s energy portfolio, the investment of Norfund 
in Trønder Power Ltd to construct a hydropower plant in Bugoye, Uganda. This 
specific company and project were selected because the Bugoye project has had 
widespread media coverage and it has been referred as a reference project for 
Norwegian finances supporting hydropower companies building clean energy 
sources in Africa in the name of foreign aid.  
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3.3 Assessment Method for the Bugoye Intervention 
To give answer to the research question, it was necessary to define an assessment 
method that oriented the sub-question on whether Norfund‘s intervention 
provided ‗development‘. To elaborate a conceptual framework, an intervention is 
a standard term used to indicate the subject of an evaluation, which could be an 
activity, project, program, strategy or policy (OECD/DAC 2006:6). Specifically, 
I will be looking an investment channeled through a project; which is ―an 
exceptional, delimited task with a predetermined objective which requires a 
certain amount of resources and a coordinated human effort‖ (Jessen 2002:30).  
Further, the practice of assessments is found in literature about evaluation 
methods. Broadly speaking, an evaluation is seen as a ―structured process that 
creates and synthesizes information intended to reduce the level of uncertainty 
for stakeholders about a given program‖ (McDavid and Howthorn 2006:3). In 
other words, an evaluation may collect useful data to inform stakeholders about 
an intervention. Case study serves evaluation research in several ways: it helps to 
explain the presumed causal links in real-life interventions; it describes the 
intervention within a given context; it can be used to enlighten interventions with 
no clear or a single set of outcomes (Cronbach 1980; Patton 2002).  
To select the applied assessment method a number of evaluation methodologies 
were considered. The method applied is a flexible approach with three elements 
which were decided on the needs of the study. First, the data collection of the 
Bugoye intervention was guided by the terms of a DFIs institution, where I used 
the IFC‘s Development Outcome Tracking System (IFC DOTS).  Second, results 
needed to be assessed according to stakeholders‘ expectations and their 
considerations of what was a good and desirable ‗development‘ result, for which 
I collected interviews from several Norwegian stakeholders.  Third, the results of 
development interventions are difficult to assess because there are usually 
different positions of what contributes to the ultimate goal. Based on, the 
institutional mission and the applied concept of ‗development‘, I have selected 
two benchmark models to analyze social and environmental effects produced by 
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the intervention. One of them is the benchmark-based Livelihoods Framework, 
broadly used by other social sciences disciplines, for assessing the goal of 
poverty reduction, given that the background of this case study presupposes that 
socially related results of DFIs are little understood. The other, is based on 
contrasting the environmental results with the statements of the institutional 
mission, the stakeholder‘s positions and Goodland‘s (1998) concept of 
Environmental Sustainability which has been broadly used in scholarly about 
sustainability of the natural environment.  
3.3.1 The IFC’s Evaluation Framework for Investments- DOTS 
The IFC‘s Evaluation Framework for Investments was designed to capture the 
overall impact of the contribution of market-driven interventions: public 
investments in private companies with developmentally sound goals. In their 
words ―to be considered a development success, every project has to make a 
positive contribution to the host‘s country development‖ (IFC a: 1).  The IFC set 
has a Development Outcome Tracking System (IFC DOTS) that permits a more 
comprehensive assessment of project‘s contribution to development (IFC b).  The 
IFC DOTS organizes the ‗development outcomes‘ of an investment into four 
areas that are supposed to cover projects many-sided contributions to developing 
countries. The four performance areas are financial performance, economic 
performance, environmental and social performance (ESP), and private sector 
development (PSD) (IFC a). Annex 2, provides detailed information about the 
rationale behind each performance indicator. The form of how a project 
contributes to a country‘s development varies by industry sectors. For the 
infrastructure sector, the IFC considers that ―society at large is the main 
beneficiary of infrastructure projects‖ (IFC c). The rationale behind this 
assumption is that the lack of sufficient infrastructure is often a symptom and 
cause of poverty.   
3.3.2 Norwegian CSOs’ Expectations 
From the perspective of Norwegian CSOs, measuring the success of public 
financial mechanisms to energy infrastructure projects, that should have an 
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impact in a country‘s ‗development, have additional implications. Their vision of 
the concept of ‗development‘ varies according to the orientation of their 
missions. It is not the plurality of meaning what makes important to survey this 
type of organizations, but their contribution to a Norwegian model. CSOs have 
historically helped to legitimate the Norwegian model of aid delivery (Tvedt 
2009). Understanding their positions is a source to enhance public stakeholders‘ 
considerations about Norfund‘s achievements. It also opens doors to interpret the 
‗development‘ effects of a market-driven intervention. I surveyed Norwegian 
CSOs concerned with the topics of hydropower aid, energy investments in 
developing countries, and Norfund. Data acquired for the Bugoye project is 
assessed here against CSOs positions about what they consider best practices 
regarding hydropower-related aid financed by public funds.  
3.3.3 Social and Environmental Effects  
To enhance understanding of the Bugoye intervention I will use the Livelihood 
Framework to consider the impact of the power plant on the local population and 
the Environmental Sustainability concept to judge the contribution of the project 
to nature. 
Livelihood Framework  
The Livelihood Framework has been used widely in contemporary poverty 
writing. UNDP‘s researchers have identified the livelihood framework as a good 
approach for illustrating poverty reduction studies (Steele et al 2008). It also 
suggests a way of organizing policy analysis by identifying five components.  
For Chambers and Conway a livelihood refers to the means of living of people 
and it comprises capabilities, assets, and activities required to obtain such means. 
A livelihood contains five essential asset components: natural, physical, human, 
financial, and social capitals (Chambers and Conway 1992:7, Scoones 1998).  
Annex 3 introduces each asset in detail. Policy analysts are required to find 
evidence of the reduction of poverty if the five key assets bases were increased 
(Steele et al. 2008:xxiv). Therefore, this general assumption will be critically 
tested in the evaluation of this case study.  
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Environmental Sustainability 
To avoid providing a biased assessment of the concept of ‗development‘ by 
giving it a social emphasis, I also have applied Goodland‘s (1998) concept which 
revindicates the value of nature per se and it‘s utility for sustaining humankind.  
Environmental Sustainability is concerned with the maintenance of the natural 
systems that support life i.e. atmosphere, water and soil (Goodland 1998). Thus, 
the analysis is guided by the rationale that market-driven aid interventions 
preserve such systems.  
3.4 Data Collection 
Case study‘s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence.              
(Yin 2009:11) 
Data collection methods concern the modes of obtaining specific information. In 
order to reduce potential bias in a case study I designed the process of data 
collection based on triangulation, a strategy used for drawing information from 
multiple sources to leverage the rigor of research (Robson 2002). Fieldwork in 
qualitative research refers to ―the attempt to capture real-life conditions, 
embracing the perspective of the people who are part of these conditions‖ (Yin 
2011:66). As the strategy of my case study was from general to particular, so 
does the method. Data collection started with analysis of documents, exploration 
of the context through attending public meetings and realization of interviews.  
3.4.1 Analysis of Information 
In the first stage of data collection I reviewed Norwegian news papers 
concerning with to foreign aid, the publications of the aid institutions Norfund 
and NORAD and the WebPages of civil society organizations that followed 
Norwegian aid. Through exploring the initial documents, I encountered 
references of books, magazines or related articles that were relevant to the topics 
of models of aid that engaged commercial actors, aid evaluation, evaluation 
methods and significance of results for aid policy.  As I did my field work in 
Oslo, Norway, I had access to public libraries of universities and those connected 
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to other research institutions. Additionally, public institutions as NORAD, 
Norfund and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have publications 
available in paper due to request. Those sources were valuable in exploring the 
initial broad topic. They also deserved a second or third revision accordingly my 
research was getting a narrower shape.  
Other important source of data collection for information such as articles in news 
papers and access to Ugandan information was the Internet. I used the source as a 
mode to obtain information that was either published on web-sites or through 
contacting organizations by electronic mail. In early stages of the research, I 
discovered that much information about Ugandan national plans was available 
online and I used this to my advantage. To some extend, online information 
eased my research in terms of transportation, I did not need to visit Uganda 
physically to obtain general information about the country and its policies. 
Internet, however, is a very demanding source because as a researcher I always 
needed to be cautious about the source of the information. I decided to use data 
only from selected sources such as public organizations that I was familiar with 
or from organizations that were referred in other reliable articles or books.  
Analysis of documents was an important tool at studying the intervention of 
Norfund in Bugoye. I am very thankful to Norfund, TrønderEnergi and Trønder 
Power Ltd for allow me access to information for ‗internal‘ use, so that I could 
have a better understanding of both Norfund processes and how they were 
applied specifically in the Bugoye project. Detailed information on the case will 
not have been possible without having access to this type of documents.  
3.4.2 Direct Observation 
In participant observation, a traditional methodology for doing fieldwork, the 
researcher is the ―research instrument‖ (Yin 2011:122).  During the explorative 
phase I attended public
17
 conferences and debates about energy-related 
Norwegian aid, DFIs, neoliberalist approaches in Norway, and public-private 
                                              
17 With ―public‖ arrangements, I refer to events organized by state-agencies, academia, or open forums for the 
general pubic. 
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investments from February 2010 to June 2011 in the cities of Oslo and 
Trondheim (Norway), in order to give shape to my research question and topic.  
After the research question was clarified, the second part of direct observation 
had a more concrete purpose: outlining the contextual background of my case 
study. For an overview of the attended meetings, see Annex 4. The emphasis 
between participating and observing can produce several variants (Gold 1958). In 
the initial phase of the field work, my role as researcher was solely observant, 
intending to absorb as much information as possible about the object and unit of 
study. During the second phase, with my knowledge augmented, I faced the 
challenge of making more strict tools to avoid playing the double role as a 
participant and as an observer. So, I prepared in advance notes about the topic of 
interests of the meeting; something useful at taking notes on concrete aspects for 
the research. Moreover, I elaborated questionnaires that I could use to start 
informal conversations with speakers and other participants after the conference 
was over. Preparation in advance helped me to develop a critical understanding 
of the observed context and the presented discourses and informal conversation 
allowed a context where I could explore more concrete issues for the research.  
Direct observation was crucial for better understanding the trends in the 
Norwegian aid system and its connections with this case study. During the study 
period I did not find a conference organized directly by Norfund, instead 
representatives of the institutions were presenters in different arenas. Attending 
all possible conferences where Norfund‘s employees were present helped me to 
get familiar with the fundamental positions, concepts, and contacts of the 
institution. It also provided me with a network within CSOs‘ representatives, 
something that eased the arrangement of interviews. 
3.4.3 Interviews 
Interviews help to obtain unavailable information by asking questions and 
receiving answers. During the preparation for interviews I contacted the 
informants through e-mails. I introduced me and my research, explained my 
reason for contacting the person, and described the potential questions I would 
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like them to address in an interview. Before the meeting, I prepared a list of 
questions based on the institution, the background of the person and the type of 
information that he or she said that they could provide. Interviewing involves 
intuition, creativity, and improvisation (Brinkmann and Kvale 2009:86). I believe 
that my previous experience as a young journalist developed skills of listening, 
following a conversation, and to extract the core of it while considering my aims 
and available time with the informant. Further, the praxis of an observation 
method strengthened on me such skills. During the interviews I prepared my 
questions, but was also ready to create new questions, ask for further 
explanations, descriptions and meanings.  
The interviews were realized in Oslo and in Trondheim, Norway between 
January - May 2011 (See Annex 5). Previous notification to informants made the 
dialogue smooth. While interviewing CSOs I experienced that such organizations 
had diverse approximations to the same topic. This raised a permanent concern 
for summing up and to provide an explanation in my own words, so that the 
informant could confirm if my understanding was right or wrong. This allowed 
an opportunity for clarifying inputs. My strategy was to interview Norfund last to 
make of it a more analytical interview. Interviewing Norfund in two phases was 
advantageous. With the initial interview I gained an insight about the persons 
who possessed diverse information that I required; consequently, during the 
second stage I targeted questions to the informants. The lack of time caused an 
absence of a secondary meeting with informants. However, it is possible to claim 
for the validity of the data due to the realization of a quality control process while 
interviews were conducted.  
3.5 Considerations of the Research  
Case studies often examine contemporary events that cannot be manipulated (Yin 
2009:11). The main role of the researcher, therefore, is to observe closely and 
directly the phenomenon and to collect information from actors involved in it. 
During my fieldwork, I considered how I could affect the events or the position 
of informants. I found that if I shared my personal opinions with informants their 
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position was affected somehow; therefore I decided to avoid that. This practice 
required training and high consciousness about my role as researcher. As a 
foreigner living in Norway, I experienced that most of the informants provided 
additional information in areas where they considered that a person with my 
background might not be familiar with. This was advantageous because it gave a 
deeper insight of how people working in different institutions understood their 
own reality and missions.  
Storage and Analysis of Data 
Other consideration for the research was the data management. I kept record of 
all data collected on an Excel spreadsheet with references and notes. For 
interviews, I initially used a tape recorder; then, I transcribed the interviews 
adding my reflections. During analysis, I used all the formats of data collected 
during the fieldwork process. At times I felt the need to go back to the interviews 
or to review documents to listen or read carefully again in order to compare 
findings with my understanding, so, that my analysis was based accurately on the 
collected information. Dealing with multiple source of evidence was a 
challenging task but manageable with a system for keeping track of all data.  
3.5.2 Ethical Considerations 
As a researcher I was conscious of my responsibility with regard to how I treated 
my informants and the data they provided, and how I used it. Ethics become 
important when the topic of study is politically or business sensitive. I followed 
ethical routines by telling all my informants how the data would be used and 
asked for permissions of confidentiality whenever necessary. My informants 
demonstrated open attitudes. At times I had access to confidential information; 
useful at increasing the understanding of the case. Such documentation was 
treated as requested. Some documents are not disclosed; while with others I had 
the choice to wait until official publication. After considering the trade-offs of a 
delayed delivery and the incidence of such source of evidence I followed the 
requirement in view of the data gave analysis quality; serving my readers as well.   
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4. Realist Norwegian Foreign Aid   
In chapter one I formulated my research question, and in chapter two I outlined a 
theoretical framework for this analysis. In chapter three I argued that the case 
study has three levels of inquiry, and explained that the data will be presented 
from the general to the particular. The contextual case background is delineates 
the transformation of the Norwegian foreign aid policy from a humanitarian 
perspective towards a realist approach.  
Political realism emerges in the foreign aid policy. It is reflected in policy 
formation, budget allocation, and types of interventions that combine Norwegian 
interest with the ideals of foreign aid. The Clean Energy for Development 
Program is an outstanding example of this change. It shows how the interests of 
the Norwegian energy sector are incorporated on interventions that aim at 
helping poor countries to develop their energy sectors through projects that 
include the participation of the private sector.  
4.1 Norwegian Development Assistance Policy 
The Norwegian Official Development Assistance (ODA) Policy, hereunder 
foreign aid, manages the long-term bilateral cooperation and multilateral aid 
given by Norway. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the entity with 
political responsibility for the overall ODA. It delegates responsibility to 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD); its task is to 
―contribute to effective management of aid funds, and ensure quality and 
evaluations for Norwegian development assistance
18‖.  Other institutions, such as 
Norfund, also assist in concrete aspects of foreign aid delivery. Norfund is an 
ODA instrument concerned with the tasks of development finances and it is the 
Norwegian equivalent of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) –topic that 
will be expanded in chapter five-. 
                                              
18 NORAD. ―What is NORAD?‖  (Own translation). Accessed on on 23 April 2011.  
http://www.NORAD.no/Om+NORAD/Kva+er+NORAD%3F.122607.cms  
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The overall purpose of Norwegian ODA policy is to combat poverty and to 
ensure social justice. Additional goals are organized into key priority areas; areas 
where Norway can make the greatest contribution (Chart 1). 
 
 
These goals are the result of the political goal setting actions. During the last few 
years a series of policy proposals have made evident changes in policy 
orientation. The Norwegian system is founded on a humanitarian basis (White 
Paper 23, 1961-1962) under which there was a general tendency to consider 
development under ―modernization thinking tempered with welfare state ideas‖ 
(Simonensen 2008:106). In other words, foreign aid generated ‗development‘ if 
the equity tasks of the assisted states were improved. In recent times, political 
regulation is more inclined towards aid frameworks concerned with the 
efficiency task of the state: economic growth, private sector development, 
provision of development finances, and partnerships (See Annex 6); topics that 
conventionally were outside the foreign aid agenda.  
The Foreign aid   Budget  
The Norwegian government finances ODA Policy by allocating 1% of gross 
national income (GNI) on an aid budget; this amount is significant given that 
Norway is a high-income country. The total budget for foreign aid is 
administered by the MFA
19
. During the last years the budget has increased 
steadily (See Annex 7) despite of the finance crisis that led to the reduction of 
                                              
19 NORAD. ―Norsk Utviklingspolitikk‖. Retreived 3 February 2011. Own translation. 
http://www.NORAD.no/Om+bistand/Norsk+utviklingspolitikk  
Overall goal: Reduce poverty and ensure social justice 
 
The Environment and Sustainable Development 
Peace Building, Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance 
Oil and Clean Energy 
Women and Gender Equality 
Good governance and the fight against corruption 
Health-related Millennium Development Goals 
Particular emphasis on Climate Change 
 
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ―Development Cooperation. Retrieved 25 May 2011.  
URL: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/development_cooperation.html?id=1159 
Chart 1: Priority Areas of Norwegian Aid 
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committed resources in many other rich countries. In the last two budgets (2010-
2011) the discourse of ―supporting areas and initiatives were Norway can make a 
difference
20‖ has outstand; so does the financial arrangement for those programs. 
The emphasis on climate change stated on the policy goals has been reflected on 
the budget as well. In 2010, the government allocated NOK 650 million out of 
NOK 27.4 billion (total aid budget) to the Climate and Forest Initiative
21
.  In the 
following year, the budget demonstrated a strong political signal to prioritized 
renewable energy efforts in Norwegian aid policy. In 2011, the funds to the 
promotion of renewable energy were doubled from approximately NOK 800 
millions to NOK 1,6 out of NOK 27.1 billions
22
 (of total aid budgets for this 
year). Further, the highest financed topic in the Clean Energy for Development 
Program was the mobilization of Public-Private Partnerships with an allocation 
of NOK 425 millions which will be channeled through Norfund. Consequently, it 
is possible to see the emergence of the use of public finances to incentivize 
private sector investments for energy related aid projects.  
4.1.2 Clean Energy for Development Program 
The Clean Energy for Development (CEfD) program started in 2007, with it‘s 
main objective being ―to increase access to clean energy at an affordable price 
based on the long-term management of natural resources and efficient energy 
use‖ (NORAD 2007:3). It is also intended to contribute to sustainable economic 
and social development in selected partner countries and to international efforts 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions‖ (Ibid). The objective thus describes 
Norwegian aid‘s intent to support the development of the electricity sector in 
partner countries when it comes from clean and renewable sources of energy 
such as hydropower, solar, and wind, among other.   
                                              
20 Department of Finances. ―Statsbudget 2010‖. Chapter 7.2: ―Fokus på områder der Norge kan gjøre en forskjell‖. 
Retrieved 5 October 2010. Own translation  URL http://www.statsbudsjettet.no/Statsbudsjettet-
2010/Dokumenter/Fagdepartementenes-proposisjoner/Utenriksdepartementet-UD/Prop-1-S/36140/36147/  
IIbid. Chapter 7.1: ―Globale utfordringer i kampen mot fattigdom‖.  
22 Department of Finances. ―Statsbudget 2011‖. Chapter 7.1: ―Sikrer framtid, grønnere vekst‖. Retrieved 3 May 2011. 
Own translation.  URLhttp://www.statsbudsjettet.no/Statsbudsjettet-2011/Dokumenter/Fagdepartementenes-
proposisjoner/Utenriksdepartementet-UD/Prop-1-S/48306/48313/  
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When it comes to sustainable economic and social development, the policy 
supports that sustainable poverty reduction can be achieved by private sector 
development, but reliable energy is required for this to happen.  Yet, new energy 
installations should not contribute to worsening living conditions of communities 
or climate problem, thus energy sources projects that have minimal or zero 
greenhouse gasses will be favored by the CEfD.  Finally, because energy 
infrastructure is costly and ODA alone cannot fund the energy needs of the 
South, partnerships with the private sector must be included in the agenda. Being 
said that Norwegian ODA will focus on programs where the country have 
expertise, the rationale for getting involved in clean energy activities can be 
explained in the light of the Norwegian Cleantech sector where the know-how of 
the industry can be exported as a mode of providing foreign aid.  
Public Finance Mechanisms for CEfD 
An important element of the program‘s strategy concentrates on bringing in 
private investors to co-invest in energy projects in the South. Something possible 
according market rules because the existing energy demand in developing 
countries can be commercially addressed, so as a result, Public Financial 
Mechanisms (PFMs) are brought into the scenario. A PFM is an instrument that 
uses public finance to stimulate private investments (NORAD 2010a:14).  
To find private investors willing to co-invest in energy-related projects, the 
Norwegian Government has written a guide on how public institutions can scale 
efforts up through PFMs.  The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), 
one of the international promoters of PFMs, notes that:  
… in less mature financial markets, including most developing countries, public funding 
mechanisms are absolutely necessary, both to make up for a lack of private capital 
providers and to compensate for imperfect and evolving policy environments. Private 
investors seeing the commitment of national governments or multilateral institutions 
will then often follow suit and join a project or a nascent market, knowing that some of 
the early policy and commercial risks will be shared by other players. (UNEP 2008:19)  
The rationale behind PFMs is that because developing countries have inefficient 
states and imperfect markets private actors are less willing to invest in high risk 
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markets, but if a public actor takes the initiative, then private actors are more 
likely to follow. Typical vehicles for supporting PFMs are public-private 
investment companies, carbon finance schemes, and guarantee instruments; 
however development funds, i.e. Norfund in Norway, are mostly popular 
NORAD 2010a:16). 
Operational Form 
To mobilize private sector investments, the PFM need to estimate how much 
public money is necessary to leverage a desired amount of private money. Such 
estimations are not only simple ratio arithmetic but also imply a qualitative 
assessment of concrete cases. The leverage effect can be measured in two ways: 
direct leveraging effect and indirect leveraging effect (NORAD 2010a). The 
latter type referrers to the work done by the World Bank as provider of 
demonstration effects and reform driver. Direct leveraging can be exemplified by 
the operations of Norfund, which provides risk capital, mitigates risks, and 
assists in resolving market‘s bottlenecks that hinder the provision of finances in 
developing countries. Norfund has a tradition of leveraging private sector 
investments in high risks markets, and in fact, Norfund is the most important 
Norwegian tool for achieving this task (Dalberg 2009). Emergent ODA policy 
shows a tendency towards market-driven approaches that intend to engage 
private sector in the delivery of public goods while public resources may enhance 
private sector interest to expand into new markets.  
4.2 Towards a Realist Norwegian Foreign Aid 
Norwegian foreign aid policy is in transformation. The formation of the 
Norwegian foreign aid policy goes back to 1960‘s and it was concerned with a 
humanitarian aid basis (Tvedt 2009). Then, the objectives and programs of 
foreign aid were autonomous from the Foreign Policy ones. International 
Relations literature considers that both policy sets are complementary; this places 
Norway in a sui generi position. Contrasted with other nation-states, Norwegian 
national interests did not play a role in laying the foundations of foreign aid 
policy, and that absence allowed Norwegian ODA to be justified under an 
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idealistic ethical basis. Tvedt defined this institutional form as the Norwegian 
model; an ―optimal tool to achieve altruistic goals‖ in which various state actors 
interact for the provision of public goods (Tvedt 2009:42), and in this context aid 
related goods. Over time, Norway reflected two images in international fora –
diplomatically talking- one created by the altruistic foreign aid discourse and the 
other developed by strategic handling of foreign affairs (Tvedt 2009). As issues 
concerning with the international profile of a state falls under the domain of 
Foreign Policy, (re)structuration was necessary. As a consequence, during the 
end of the 90‘s a political maneuver set together the two policy areas that 
traditionally stayed separated.  
4.2.1 Global Realism 
The fusion of these two policy areas resulted, among others, from the need to 
present a national consistent discourse in the global fora. International practices 
of states create a situation that reflects cross-level interplay of factors. For Tvedt 
(2009), the subordination of Development Assistance to the MFA represented the 
emerging form of external politics in the globalization era where the general 
tendency is the reduction of boundaries between national and international 
politics. If this argument holds true, embedded neoliberalism processes in 
Norway are a reflection of the adaptation to global conditions. During the course 
of the last five years, political discourses have proliferated to elucidate the shape 
of this emergent operational model.  
The debate about how globalization forces shape Norwegian politics has been 
active, however one discourse stands out. Current Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jonas Gahr Støre, published an article in the journal of 
Norwegian Foreign Affairs: ―Samtiden‖ during the fall of 2010 that intended to 
defend the position of how globalizing forces have encouraged new questions 
and methods regarding the Norwegian role in the world (Støre 2010). For him, 
the contemporary orientation of foreign policy becomes informed by national 
interests and on priority areas in which the Norwegian contribution to the 
international society could have greater impact (Støre 2010). In his words:  
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Well long term prioritization in the foreign policy should be about having a direction to 
strengthen the economic, political and human resources. For me, the guiding way is to 
find an honest answer to the following two questions: 1) Is this important for 
Norwegian interests?;   And,  2) Can Norway make a difference?  Our goal is to manage 
our [Norwegian] resources towards strategic areas where the answer is yes to both 
questions. (Støre 2010:17).  
Since the publication of the controversial article, a Norwegian global realism 
approach to the Foreign Policy can be visualized, as defined by Støre, who  
concentrated on explaining how Norwegian actions in the international arena are 
guided according to national priorities. On one hand, the selection of strategic 
areas where Norway can make a difference can be understood as a commitment 
to offer what Norway can do best, and therefore contribute to raising quality of 
global problem-solving. On the other hand, an increased focus on national 
interests might result in biased responses to the international society. On the basis 
of the Norwegian aid project, this realist tendency has informed new aid policies 
based on the combination of both Norwegian interests and capabilities. National 
policy formation is also influenced by the global agenda for aid provision that 
seems informed by a new coming paradigm, echoing the operational forms and 
goals of a more globalized context.   
This organizational change has impacted ODA policies so that the surfacing 
frameworks go in line with Norwegian national interests instead of solely 
altruistic goals. This is pictured in recent ODA policies, the last two budgets, and 
in the studied policy program of the CEfD where the Norwegian expertise in 
renewable energies is key for answering the questions of Støre.  
4.3 The Norwegian Cleantech Sector  
Cleantech is a concept defining the economic sector that put together businesses 
that offer renewable energy and environmental technology services, products, 
and their respective value chains (Intpow 2011). The growth of this sector is 
responding to the increased demand for environmentally friendly solutions in the 
marketplace and the Norwegian tactic to reduce the country‘s economic 
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dependence on the Oil & Gas sector by structuring alternative competitive 
industries (Heide et al. 2002). In fact, this strategy fits in well with the proposed 
industrial policies of the competition state theory.  
The Cleantech sector in Norway is organized in four categories: the renewable 
energy, environmental technology services, traditional environmental services, 
and power distribution and trading. The renewable energy category unites 
companies that have the experience to best utilize renewable forms of energy like 
the hydroelectric power, solar energy, wind energy, and bioenergy (Intpow 
2011). While the renewable energy cluster comprises these various types of 
technology, attention is provided only to the hydroelectric segment for the 
purposes of this thesis.   
4.3.1 Norwegian Hydropower, a History of Wealth Creation 
Norway has harnessed the power of water for more than hundred years. Today, 
Norway is the world‘s sixth largest hydropower producer, has developed 70% of 
its total potential
23
, and provides almost 98% of the national electricity
24
. What is 
of greater value however, is that as of 2009 the sector registered 779 companies 
that provided 10 897 full-time jobs, an amount that increased 62% since 2003 
(Intpow 2011).  Employment is provided across the whole value chain where 
power producers and technology suppliers divide in the areas of planning, 
engineering, and construction (Ibid).  
The relatively large size of the energy sector and the Norwegian tradition in 
hydropower have made possible to accumulate valuable expertise over time. The 
historical legacy of Norwegian hydropower technology is connected to the 
national pride because it has contributed to the development of Norwegian 
industry since 1850s
25
.  From early periods, Norwegian legislators anticipated the 
importance the resource and secured those benefits for the society at large. The 
political concept of ―benefit sharing‖ assured local communities of the 
                                              
23 International Energy Agency. ―Renewable Energy Essentials: Hydropower‖. Retrieved 20 March 2011. 
http://www.iea.org/papers/2010/Hydropower_Essentials.pdf  
24 Statistics Norway. ―Energy‖. Retrieved 28 April 2011. Own translation. URL: 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/01/03/10/energi/  
25 Energifakta. ―Vannkraft og elektrisitet i et historisk perspektiv‖. Retrieved 26 April 2011. Own translation. 
http://www.energifakta.no/documents/Miljo%20og%20velferd/Samfunn/Historie.htm  
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substantial economic benefits from hydropower development and indirectly of 
the gains for all local industries
26
.  Legal frameworks were also established to 
protect the environment and local communities, such as legislation regarding 
stakeholder consultations, licensing that includes conditions for environmental 
protection, and rules that lay the foundations for sound management of natural 
resources
27
.  
Historically, most of the hydropower companies in Norway have been utility-
based companies publicly owned by the national government or by the 
municipalities. The companies have cared basically for providing home markets 
with electricity. As publicly owned companies their shareholders were mainly 
concerned with ‗having enough revenue‘ to invest in other important public 
goods. Consequently, utility companies did not have incentives to go abroad 
because they were focused on covering the demands from their public 
shareholders (Hagen: interview 05.05.2011).  
4.3.2 Value Creation in the Norwegian Hydropower Sector 
In the last decade a revitalization of the Norwegian hydropower sector has been 
taking place after several decades of stagnation (Hagen, interview 05.05.2011). 
Climate change and global energy needs created the momentum for increasing 
the scope of Norwegian exports in hydropower services (Elsebutangen2010:10). 
The largest Norwegian hydropower producer, Statkraft, predicts a growth of the 
industry from projects in emerging markets due to swelling energy demands and 
the augmented willingness from global financial institutions to support renewable 
energy projects (Andresen
28
2010:30)
 29
. Such projections encouraged the 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy to form a non-profit business 
organization that could assists companies interested in going abroad. The 
organization of Norwegian Renewable Energy Partners is known as Intpow, and 
                                              
26 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Speech: ―Hydropower and Sustainable Development‖. Retrieved 18 October 
2010. http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/aktuelt/taler_artikler/politisk_ledelse/anita_utseth/2006/hydropower-
and-sustainable-development-j.html?id=420736  
27 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Speech: ―Hydropower and Sustainable Development‖. 18 October 2010. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/aktuelt/taler_artikler/politisk_ledelse/anita_utseth/2006/hydropower-and-
sustainable-development-j.html?id=420736 
28 Øistein Andersen is SN Power Chief Executive. SN Power is the international branch of Statskfrat.   
29 Geir Elsebutangen is Managing Director at Intpow. 
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is structured as a non-profit PPP between the Norwegian Renewable Industry and 
the Norwegian Government
30
.  
Intpow was established to ―strengthen long-term value creation and employment 
in the Norwegian renewable energy industry through partnering and international 
expansion‖ (Brochure, courtesy Intpow).  The main goal of the organization is to 
assist in the internationalization of the renewable energy sector. Having success 
in this task requires augmenting the volume of exports and companies abroad and 
improving the quality of exports (Hagen: interview 05.05.2011). To do that, 
Intpow‘s strategy is to build and fortify the concept of a Norwegian hydropower 
cluster that can supply all kinds of services. In practice this signifies that 
hydropower-developer firms are willing to purchase supply products and services 
from their Norwegian counterparts (Hagen: interview 05.05.2011). This could 
only be secured through an operational form where the whole industry cluster is 
internationally active in value creation, in terms of quality exports, employment, 
and various source of revenues.  
While a Cleantech sector in Norway is strengthened, most of the companies are 
still small- and medium-sized enterprises. To consider internationalization, 
regional hydropower companies with long traditions and financial maturity could 
meet the challenges of starting operations in foreign markets. However, the 
financial knowledge about market penetration and strategies on such markets are 
scare, especially when it comes to developing countries who account for a fair 
portion of the total energy demands. Thus, industry leaders will require partners 
with unconventional commercial focus if the Norwegian hydropower industry is 
to become international and finally a competitive one for carrying the demands 
of the national economy.  
4.4 CEfD - Realist and Market Driven 
Globalization has challenged Norwegian policies and the growth of the national 
economy. Politically, Norwegian foreign policies –including foreign aid- are 
                                              
30 Intpow. ―About us‖.Retreived 1 May 2011.  URLhttp://intpow.no/index.php?categoryid=1  
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structured towards the combination of national interests with the needs of the 
international society. Further, it is expected that foreign policy actions deliver 
results that help to strengthen the national resources. Economically talking, 
Norway‘s strategy seeks to enhance the competition of industrial sectors that 
could eventually make up for decreasing the income generated by the Oil & Gas 
sector. The Norwegian hydropower industry outstands internationally for its 
technical capabilities and expertise. Additionally the background of the industry, 
based on public ownership and social-orientation, makes it an attractive sector 
for Norwegian foreign aid policy. This industrial sector has competence on a 
renewable energy type, the habit of operating under clear social and 
environmental rules and it possess capital for investments.  
In the light of this chapter, the CEfD program has double strategy. In one hand, it 
has created a political platform to justify the assistance to the Norwegian 
hydropower sector in its internationalization endeavor. In the other, the CEfD 
puts the climate change problem in the center of the political agenda. Climate 
change demands quick solutions, among others, helping developing countries to 
increase their energy production from non-polluting sources. But as such 
countries often give priority to economic growth rather than to the global 
environment, incentives can be solution. The CEfD‘s incentive for augmenting 
the renewable energy production in the South is given to Norwegian companies 
through PFM so that firms have a financial back-up against market‘s risks. This 
example proves the emergence of a competition state in Norway, reflected in its 
international sphere. Foreign aid is provided through market-driven policies, 
instruments and institutions which have a double strategy: to serve the equity and 
the efficiency tasks of the state at the same time.  
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5. Norfund - Development Finances  
In the previous chapter I described and analyzed the reasons for establishing 
Norfund as PFMs for the CEfD. I also argued that the CEfD program has a 
connection with Norwegian interests in the internationalization of its energy 
sector, specially the hydropower cluster. In this chapter I contextualize Norfund 
as a benchmark institution for partnering with private actors looking for new 
markets. I also start developing the research question into operational analysis on 
what constitutes public finances to private sector, in other words how a 
Development Finance Institution (DFIs) operates, and how the political 
institution pursues a developmental public mission by operating under financial 
rules. In this chapter I also provide a detailed explanation of Norfund, their 
strategy, and operational routines.  In studying Norfund in detail, it is possible to 
see a clear reflection of how Norwegian realist policies combine altruistic goals 
with other national interests.  
5.1 Development Finance Institutions 
Since Bretton Woods, International Finance Institutions (IFIs) have been 
important actors in financing development projects in poor countries. They are 
represented by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), World Bank (WB), 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) – the World Bank‘s private arm. 
Nationally owned DFIs also emerged during the 1960‘s and 70‘s, and are 
publicly mandated bilateral institutions designed to provide long-term financing 
to private sector activities which have specific value-added international 
development objectives (Dalberg 2009:8).  Differing from the international 
counterparts, DFIs‘ strategy mobilize private investors and  co-operate with them 
to optimize their capability to deliver development-sound impacts needed to 
improve social and economic conditions in developing countries. Consequently, 
one can say that DFIs complement MDBs, which mostly loans to public actors, 
and together they represent contemporary IFIs.  
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In Norway, the national DFI is the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing 
Countries (Norfund), which has operated since 1997. The emergence of Norfund 
is the result of increased popularity of market-driven policies and instruments in 
Norwegian political circles. The materialization of the CEfD has implications for 
Norfund because the operations of the fund can be increased by serving as PFMs 
the foreign aid program. In 2011, the fund received extra budget allocations and 
the responsibility to channel ODA funds to clean energy projects mixed with 
development-related goals.  
5.2 The Norwegian Development Fund 
Norfund was established by the Norwegian Storting‘s ―Act relating to Norfund,‖ 
Act No. 26, 9 May 1997, and was mandated the fund to ―establish viable, 
profitable enterprises that would not otherwise have been established because of 
high risk
31‖. Furthermore, the fund was invested with a development-policy 
mandate by the Norwegian government
32
, which meant that Norfund should 
advance ODA‘s goals. These twofold tasks resulted in a double mandate, one of 
development financier and other of realizing development goals. If an analogy is 
made with the two main tasks of a state, Norfund is invested with both the 
efficiency and the equity tasks.  As a public finance institution, ―Norfund is 
owned by the Norwegian Government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) allocates annual capital grants through 
the development assistance budget
33‖. Public ownership requires that the fund 
fulfill the assigned mandate and reports to the respecting owner – the MFA. 
Norfund also defines itself as a ―state-owned company with limited liability‖, 
which is why Norfund operates under commercial settings (Vilsted, interview 
18.04.2011). Contrasted to traditional public institutions, this legal feature 
reduces possible political interference in the fund. Institutional theory supports 
that entities concerned with the goal of profit seeking or economic value ought to 
                                              
31Norfund. ― Mandate‖. Retrieved  22 September 2010. 
http://norfund.no/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=78&Itemid=252&lang=en  
32 Ibid 
33 Norfund. ― About Norfund‖. Retrieved 20 October 2010. 
http://norfund.no/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=76&Itemid=234&lang=en  
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be studied as ―organizations‖ because they do not respond to the task of 
increasing public goods (Scott 2008:19-46). Despite of this dichotomy, this thesis 
approaches Norfund as a public institution given its public mission characteristic.   
5.2.1 Preferred Investment Partner in Developing Countries 
Norfund is also a benchmark institution for investments in developing countries 
(Norfund 2002:15). Norfund wants to attract industrial parties who lack the 
experience in dealing with legal, economic and cultural challenges that are 
present in those emerging markets (Ibid). 
An important objective for Norfund is to stimulate Norwegian companies‘ investments 
in developing countries. Due to its internal competencies and an external network of 
experience from business operations, Norfund is a partner that makes projects possible 
where Norwegian companies would otherwise tend to be reluctant. (Norfund, 2002:15) 
To date, Norfund‘s partners have several nationalities, but cooperation with 
Norwegian industries is desired when specific expertise is required in the markets 
where the fund invests (Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011). In this way, synergies 
from a partnership can be exploited to provide developing countries with a 
needed good or service. In the light of the CEfD, companies in the Norwegian 
hydropower cluster would be attractive partners. 
The task of leveraging Norwegian investments in developing countries is realized 
in cooperation with other national institutions for export advising such as Giek, 
Innovasjon Norge, Veiledningskontoret. The previous explanation illuminates 
Norfund‘s rationale for partnering with Norwegian private actors in line with 
realist assumptions that inform Norwegian foreign policy. From this perspective, 
it can be said that Norfund assists Norwegian companies to penetrate and operate 
in new markets.  Hence, the representations of competition state practices are 
reflected in its operational model.   
5.3 Strategy 
Norfund‘s strategy consists of facilitating profitable business activities in poor 
countries. To materialize this, Norfund focuses on building up investment 
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expertise, dismantling the barriers to private investments, and providing risk 
capital to companies interested in operating in Norfund‘s eligible countries34. In 
fact, the success of Norfund relies on the expertise that the institution has of each 
particular market. Given that building up investment expertise is resource 
demanding, Norfund carefully selected markets that have the hardest time 
attracting private capital (Frengstad T, interview 15.04.2011). The fund‘s 
strategic geographical clusters are several less developed countries (LDCs) in 
East and Southern African, Central America, and the Mekong Area in Asia
35
. In 
addition, Norfund concentrates efforts in the renewable energy and the finance 
sector because they have great potential for starting lucrative projects and a 
facility to start partnerships with private actors. In short, Norfund aims at 
increasing the private sector in partner developing countries by attracting private 
firms in economic sectors that the institution considers financially-sound.    
5.3.1 A Strategy for Development? 
Some theorists view economic growth and increases in economic wealth                                  
as the key definition of ‗development‘. (Willis 2005:200) 
An analysis of Norfund‘s strategy permits to identify the efficiency goals of the 
institution which aim at removing markets‘ constrains to forge economic 
progress. Even if equity goals are less straightforward in this strategy; for the 
fund, the financial success of an investment itself provides a number of effects 
which are connected to the overall goals of Norwegian foreign aid policy.  
Norfund believes in the premise that increased commercial activities are good in 
[underdeveloped] countries…if you create one successful enterprise that [can] have 
positive effects in its local community. (Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011) 
This mindset is based on the idea that strengthening a country‘s economy, by 
creating firms, will produce trickledown-effects
36
. Thus, for the institution the 
                                              
34 Norfund. ―Strategy‖. Retrieved 3 April 2011. 
http://norfund.no/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=79&Itemid=253&lang=en  
35 Ibid 
36 Trickledown-effects is a concept in economics that refers to the spill-overs that company produce in the overall 
economy of a country given that companies‘ profts will trickle down to lower income individuals and to the rest of 
the economy.  Recent schoolarship proposes that companies will produce positive effects in local communities where 
they operate. Examples: job creation, improving supply chains and infrastructure, by educating the work force and by 
bringing products to markets (Welle-Strand et al. 2009:29).  Despite of the popularity of the concept among economic 
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concept of ‗development‘ is grounded in the market‘s capacity to indirectly 
provide equity tasks.  
The concept of ‗development‘ has a plurality of meanings according to diverse 
theories, ideas and aspirations (Willis 2005; Allen and Thomas 2000). Norfund‘s 
understanding of ‗development‘ is grounded on the ―dynamics of capitalist 
growth‖. It considers that market efficiency is the best way to ensure growth 
which ultimate benefit society at large (Allen and Thomas 2000:37). From this 
standpoint, enhancing the equity capacity of the market requires an active private 
sector. Norfund contributes to increase the private sector interest in welfare tasks 
by being catalytic and additional
37
. The former signifies that Norfund is willing 
to be a first mover in high risk markets, so that private partners are willing to 
enter underdeveloped markets. The latter justifies Norfund‘s expertise on 
identifying and structuring sustainable projects in risky markets; where 
sustainable refers to the equity aspects of its mission.   
5.4 How Can Investments Enhance Development? 
Norfund is concerned with development finance, which defines financial flows 
into development-sound projects which operate on the basis of commercial 
profitability (Hoffmann 1998). In achieving this task, profitability and 
sustainability are elements that help to define how public finances given in the 
form of investments to private sector can enhance ‗development‘. 
Profitability  
It is the ability of a company to generate earnings. Norfund assists companies to 
maintain their profitability over time, so that healthy operations of a company 
can be almost guaranteed (Frengstad T, interview 15.04.2011). On one side, this 
element makes DFIs different to traditional aid institutions. On the other, DFIs 
are unlike to commercial investors because they are willing to accept lower rates 
of returns and to invest in high-risk environments. Musasike (2004) explains that 
                                                                                                                                    
and business related disciplines, the trickle down effects are not always reflected in lower income spheres but rather 
the benefits are seen mostly by rich and wealthiest people of a society; therefore trickledown effects alone cannot be 
used as poverty reduction strategies (Basu and Mallick 2007; Schiffrin and Bisat 2004; Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2002) 
37 Concepts of Catalytic and Additional in development finances are further elaborated by Dalberg (2009).  
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DFIs appetite for high-risk opportunities is actually due to their understanding of 
how investments benefit poor and unrated clients.  
Sustainability 
Sustainability is related to assuring the provision of positive externalities 
resulting from private sector development, and is concerned with mitigating 
potential risks related to an industrial activity.  
A sustainable business means that a company could provide jobs with stable incomes, 
create extra activities for local suppliers, and pay taxes to the government, which could 
be used to generate public goods. Additionally, it assures that the activities of a 
company do not impose risks on surrounding population and environment. (Frengstad 
T, interview 15.04.2011) 
To achieve those elements in their investments, Norfund seeks to act as a 
responsible investor by establishing guidelines and the commitments that the 
organization has decided to undertake in order to secure good practices. 
5.4.2 Responsible Investment 
The investment code defines principles and management systems for sustainable 
and responsible investment with respect to the environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) matters (Norfund 2007:1). The guidelines for responsible 
investment practices state that Norfund and its partners have to act accordingly to 
national legislations, Norfund‘s guidelines on anti-corruption, IFC‘s 
environmental and social standards, as well as IFC‘s guidelines for health, 
environment and safety (HES). As a general rule, mutual agreement on the 
implementation of good corporate practices and the application of ESG standards 
constitute a good foundation for co-operating with selected partners
38
.  
Norfund‘s code is compatible with the Rome Consensus39,  an agreement that the 
European network of DFIs (EDFIs) have signed in order to harmonize ESG 
policies of development financiers (Rixen, E-mail 13.01.2011). This group of 
practices serves to improve performance, accesses new capital, and contributes to 
                                              
38 Norfund. ―Norfund as Responsible Investor‖. Retrieved 4 February 2011. 
http://norfund.no/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=86&Itemid=233&lang=en  
39 EDFI. ―Press Released: EDFIs Sign Principles of Responsible Financing (7 May 2008)‖. Retrieved 6 November 
2010. http://www.edfi.be/component/downloads/downloads/25.html  
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stakeholder relations. In emerging markets, this soft regulation structure 
encourages the establishment of integral capital markets, reduction of 
investment‘s risks, prevention of reputation risk, and the possibility to add value 
to the investment (Norfund 2007). This operational form reflects a depoliticized 
sustainability discourse in which ―sustainable development‖ is a matter of 
implementing good management practices in sound business decisions (Bøås 
2002, Wright 2006). Subsequently, a short introduction of Norfund‘s good 
practice guidelines will be presented. 
The IFC’s Health, Environment and Safety (HES) Guidelines 
This set of technical guidelines provides information about how to attain safe and 
healthy working conditions for employees and the contractors or sub-contractor 
of an enterprise. It also describes safeguards for those affected by business‘ 
operations
40
.  
Norfund Guidelines on Anticorruption 
The policy against corruption is devoted to the promotion of integrity, 
transparency, and accountability through all investments. The guidelines set 
requirements for risk assessments for partners, countries, projects, and companies 
throughout the whole investment cycle. It stipulates rules and consequences for 
non-compliance or breach of good practice policies (Norfund 2007b).  
Policy for Environmental and Social Conditions 
Within this policy framework, Norfund supports that its investments are to 
contribute to sustainable development (Norfund 2010:14). This concept ―means 
balancing economic, social and environmental conditions‖ (Riksrevisjonen 
2007:67). The IFC‘s Policy and Performance Standards on Social and 
Environmental Sustainability (IFC-PS) establish instructions that help companies 
to manage and improve their social and environmental routines through result-
based approaches and their respective monitoring processes (IFC 2006). The 
IFC-PS are eight main areas (Chart 2) based on the ―do not harm‖ rationale, in 
                                              
40 IFC. ―Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines‖. Retrieved 15 March 2011. 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/gui_EHSGuidelines2007_GeneralEHS/$FILE/Final+
-+General+EHS+Guidelines.pdf  
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which mitigation or compensation should be provided if negative impacts are 
unavoidable. 
Chart 2: The IFC Performance Standards 
 
The polices of IFC-PS engage private actors in respecting Human Rights, 
consulting local populations, and promoting corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) practices. The standards explain the conception of appropriated behavior 
or action. In the context of Norfund‘s sustainable guidelines, they define, 
regulate, and legitimate specific rules that invest actors with norm-following 
responsibilities. The institutionalization of soft norms by Norfund responds to 
their governance task, and the institution‘s concerns with the steering of actors 
towards collective goals.  
5.5 Portfolio 
The capitalization of the fund is provided by the Norwegian government. Annual 
refurbishments of NOK 500 millions are given, in addition to the initial share 
capital (NORAD 2010c:67). At the end of 2010, the capital base of Norfund was 
accounted for NOK 5,8 billion
41
, however, this amount increased with the extra 
allocation that the fund received in 2011 for clean energy investments. Despite of 
its young age, Norfund is now positioned as the largest development fund in the 
Nordic countries (Ibid), is primarily an equity investor. This implies that it 
invests directly in specific companies or through other funds. The operations are 
organized into four type of investments: Financial Institutions, SME (Small and 
                                              
41 Norfund. ―Portfolio‖. Retrieved 20 May, 2011. 
http://norfund.no/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=93&Itemid=229&lang=en 
PS  1: Social and Environmental Assessment and Management System 
PS  2: Labor and Working Conditions 
PS  3: Pollution Prevention and Abatement 
PS  4: Community Health, Safety and Security 
PS  5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement 
PS  6: Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource 
Management 
PS  7: Indigenous Peoples 
PS  8: Cultural Heritage 
 
Source: Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability (IFC 2006) 
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Medium Enterprises) Funds, Renewable Energy and Industrial Partnerships. As 
this thesis is concerned with an investment in the Renewable Energy sector, only 
that segment of the portfolio is presented.  
5.5.1 Renewable Energy in Portfolio 
Renewable Energy investments represent 44% of Norfund‘s total invested 
portfolio per 2009
42
, with the committed investments in this area accounting for 
NOK 2,349 billions. The portfolio is distributed geographically in this manner: 
7% of this has gone to Africa, 34% to Asia, and 59% to Latin America (Norfund 
2010:30). The rationale behind this commitment is similar to the idea behind the 
CEfD Initiative. Energy is requisite for development and so a ―reliable power 
supply is a prerequisite for establishing and developing the manufacturing and 
commercial sectors‖43 with electricity also playing an important role in 
increasing the supply of health services and education. Hence, this portfolio area 
has implicit social goals like health, energy access, and poverty reduction, as well 
as environmental goals such as reduction of emissions. So, one can say that the 
strategic focus of the renewable energy portfolio makes Norfund an attractive 
PFM for the CEfD initiative.  
The strategy of the fund is to leverage partnerships in order to deliver clean 
energy in developing countries (Norfund 2010:30). By mid-2011, twenty one 
projects had been directly financed by the fund (Davis, interview 18.04.2011) 
Norfund). The biggest partner of the fund is the Norwegian SN Power, but other 
partnerships exit with TrønderEnergi, E+Co and ToughStuff
44
.  
5.6 Operations: Investments Routines 
Norfund, like other aid assistance agencies, aims at achieving Norwegian 
Development Assistance‘s goals. However, the operational form of Norfund 
differs substantially from typical bilateral aid agencies. First, Norfund as an 
                                              
42 Norfund. ―Portfolio‖. See details in Chart: Committed portfolio by investment area. Retrieved 15 April 2011. 
http://norfund.no/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=93&Itemid=229&lang=en  
43 Norfund. ―Renewable Energy‖.  Retrieved 8 August 2010. 
http://norfund.no/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=97&Itemid=265&lang=en  
44 Ibid. Retrieved 15 May 2011.  
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institution for market-driven aid allocates economic resources into projects or 
enterprises that generate profitability and that boost private sector in developing 
countries. Second, Norfund co-invests with market actors, like enterprises, which 
leads to the use of private finances in aid-related projects or to the use of public 
funds in subsidizing private activities or specific companies.  Third, DFIs are 
managed with a business-related focus, in this case, as an investment fund. This 
section aims to describe the operational structure that Norfund works under. 
Knowledge of such processes is vital for understanding how Norfund 
materializes developmentally-sound goals through applying the market-driven 
methods of financial investments.   
5.6.1  Life of an Investment    
Norfund basically operates according to the routines described in the Norfund‘s 
investment manual (Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011). The manual describes the 
processes that take place in each phase of the ―life of a Norfund‘s investment‖. 
The four phases illustrate the cycle that investments go through from 
identification of potential projects until the exit of the fund (Diagram 3). 
Diagram 3: Norfund Life of an Investment 
 
Identify potential projects 
The aim of this initial phase is to identify projects and that they comply with 
Norfund‘s investment criteria. Therefore, preliminary assessment is done 
focusing on the project's development impact and potential risks to environment, 
social aspects, corporate governance and corruption. Also, the business idea and 
profitability are considered.  
The decision making process is initiated by an investment manager who screens 
proposals. Then clearance in principal is done by the Investment Committee which also 
provides the final approval after the potential for development effects and additionality 
have been valuated. (Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011) 
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If a project is found to be viable, a strategy for the ownership exercise is outlined.  
Invest 
Due diligence for investing is made in order to secure favorable terms for the 
investment. Due diligence is an investigation of a business or person prior to 
signing a contract. It considers economic, legal, social, environmental and 
potential corruption aspects of an investment plan. The disbursement then takes 
place. 
Own 
This process takes place when Norfund makes equity investments, so that they 
have the right to be a member of the company‘s board. The exercise of 
ownership refers to following of the project or company at all times, allowing 
Norfund proximity to the progress of a project. In this way, Norfund can secure 
that the practice of corporate governance goes according to Norfund‘s ESG 
guidelines. The fund explains that compliance with standards does not happen 
overnight, underscoring the importance of being a long-term investor (Vilsted, 
interview 18.04.2011). 
Exit 
In this phase an evaluation of the achievements is completed. The market value 
of the company is calculated so that it can be sold to potential buyers and an 
assessment about the most profitable exit is undertaken
45
.   
5.7 The Norfund Grant Facility 
Additional to the investments, Norfund has a Grant Facility.  The objective of the 
facility is to enhance sustainability and positive development effects of 
Norfund‘s current and potential investments (Fregnstad T, interview 15.04.2011). 
The Facility is grounded on the rationale of providing professional and technical 
assistance, beyond what is expected from a private investor, so that invested 
companies can increase their responsible practices and development effects.  
                                              
45 The detailed description of Norfund‘s life an investment was possible thanks to the contributions of Petter Vilsted 
from Norfund, interviewed on 18.04.2011.  
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The grant provides three types of soft loans. The first category finances loans for 
pre-feasibility studies that could not be realized otherwise, due to market barriers. 
Potential clean energy projects are assisted in progressing through this type of 
grant, and if the project materializes, the grant has to be paid back (Frengstad T, 
interview 15.04.2011). The second type funds programs to increase enterprise 
capacity in terms of ESG issues. The last type supports broader CSR initiatives 
initiated by the company that have as their major focus the well-being of the 
local community, employees and their families, and other parties affected by the 
company‘s operations46. Examples of CSR are contributions to healthcare, 
education, audits, etc. Through such examples, the fund argues its contribution to 
enhancement of the development-related outcomes of Norfund‘s investments. 
5.8 Evaluation 
Evaluations are important tools to assess what economic and development goals 
were achieved by an investment (Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011). Norfund has 
developed an ex post assessment system to measure indicators of development 
impacts in their four areas of investments. While the generic indicators collects 
data about amount of jobs, female employees, and tax contribution,  the energy 
related investments accounts for the capacity of power plant (in terms of MW 
and GWh), capacity/average consumption per inhabitant, and amount of 
reduction of greenhouse gases
47
. The data collected for evaluation purposes is 
publicized on the fund‘s Annual Report (Riksrevisjon 2007:68). For internal 
purposes at the project level, it is required to document a triple bottom line
48
 
report that informs about the application of ESG guidelines (Vilsted, interview 
18.04.2011).   
                                              
46 Norfund. ―Norfund Grant Facility‖. Retrieved 3 March 2011.  
http://norfund.no/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=91&Itemid=248&lang=en  
47 Norfund. ― Development Effects‖. Retrieved 26 February 2011.  
http://norfund.no/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=114&Itemid=250&lang=en  
48 Tripple Bottom Line is a concept that captures three types of values or criteria for measuring organizational success 
in terms of economical, environmental and social results. Its main proponent is John Elkington (1997) but the concept 
became popular together with the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility  and the ratification of United Nations 
Convention on Sustainability (The Brutland Comission).   
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Compared with other EDFIs, the assessment system of Norfund is rather general 
(Bracking and Ganho 2011). Counterpart development funds, like IFU/IØ 
Denmark, DEG Germany, FMO Netherlands, have effectiveness frameworks that 
rate the collected results such as the. However, this is not the case of Norfund. 
The Norwegian fund does not conduct formal ex ante assessments that adhere to 
predetermined goals or benchmarks, because they are not strictly formulated in 
the first place.  
In the aid world it is said that you should have a clear goal and to measure whether 
results were met. Norfund does not set targets so we cannot measure the success of the 
project against expected goals. We capture real data from our investments with the help 
of invested companies or through in-depth studies. (Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011)  
Norfund believes that through its narrowed down strategy and responsible 
investment operations, they can produce long-term development effects as 
explained in detail in the section 5.3 on Norfund‘s strategy.  
5.9 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have presented Norfund‘s mission and operational form together 
with the fund‘s own understanding of them. Norfund‘s operation style relates to 
banking. Moreover, the fund differs with traditional banks to the extend they 
have clear guides for environmental, social and governance aspects of 
investments, so that the fund can operate on an ethically or responsible manner. 
This has value, in the light of development finances, because the fund can play a 
protectionist or guarantor role of the local communities and environment in 
developing markets to some extend; task which is less inherent in conventional 
banking. An important aspect to highlight is that the double role of Norfund goes 
in line with theory of a competition state where the welfare goals are organized 
in two main groups, the equity and efficiency tasks. According to Norfund‘s 
strategy, it seems that both equity and efficiency goal go hand in hand. In other 
words, the market can enhance welfare. It remains to assess whether this holds 
true. Operational form of Norfund to partner with the private sector proves the 
existence of ‗competitive‘ approaches in Norwegian institutions.  
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6. Public Finances to Private sector– The case 
of Norfund in Bugoye   
In the previous chapters I have explained how Norfund operates in the context of 
Norwegian foreign aid and specifically as PFM for the CEfD program. In this 
chapter I explore how Norfund functions in a particular intervention within its 
clean energy portfolio. This chapter constitutes the most narrowed part of the 
case study and it should contribute to exemplify how the institution collaborates 
with private actors in a concrete investment. The study of this intervention should 
allow in detail contextualizing the research question regarding do public finances 
or PFMs to the private sector promote the goals of Norwegian foreign aid- 
namely ‗development‘.  
What is the Intervention? 
The concrete case to study is the investment realized by Norfund with the 
Norwegian regional company TrønderEnergi AS to create the firm Trønder 
Power Ltd which was commissioned with the construction of a 13 MW 
hydropower plant in Uganda.  
6.2 Uganda, Country Profile 
Uganda is an African land-locked country gifted with fresh water resources from 
the Nile River and Lake Victoria. Ugandan population is estimated as 32.9 
million people
49
, and is principally rural, with women constituting majority in 
most areas. Ever since the, now former President, Mr. Yoweri Museveni took 
political power in a coup in 1986, the country has achieved significant 
improvements in the political, economic and civil structure. Uganda has been one 
of the few successful stories of robust economic improvement in Africa.  
Regardless of  slower economic growth in the of the 90‘s; during the last decade, 
the country has experienced robust rates of growth, averaging 7% GDP per capita 
thanks to consolidation of the export sector (fish, flowers and coffee), the 
                                              
49 World Bank,. ―Country profile Uganda‖. Retrieved 3 May 2011. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/UGANDAEXTN/0,,menuPK:374871
~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:374864,00.html 
61 
 
recently discovered oil, the increase of foreign direct investment, and to 
macroeconomic  and pro-private sector oriented reforms undertaken during the 
eighties
50
. Economic growth is constrained by the improvement of public 
financial management, strengthening of financial markets, and inadequate 
infrastructure (NORAD 2001), especially in the energy sector (Byakola 2007). 
Significant economic growth has not been reflected in poverty reduction. The 
country is ranked on the 143
st
 position of 169 countries on the UNDP Human 
Development Index
51
. In 2009, twenty five per cent of the country lived in 
poverty but this number has halved compared with 1992 rates
52
. While the 
country has advanced significantly towards the Millennium Development Goals 
of universal primary education, gender parity, and combating HIV/AIDS; other 
goals remain a challenge i.e. completion of primary education, child and 
maternal mortality, access to reproductive health, incidence of malaria and other 
diseases
53
. The current social situation difficult Uganda‘s aspiration to become a 
middle-income country during coming years and it undermines Uganda‘s image 
as a ‗capitalist development‘ model in Africa. Something that cannot be 
improved without overcoming a major vulnerability, the high corrupt public 
sector which fails to deliver equity goals, i.e. education, health, rights protection.    
6.2.1 Ugandan Energy Sector 
The Ugandan state has potential to foster a model of environmentally friendly 
growth within its capitalistic approach given the richness of its natural and 
energy resources (water, oil, sunshine, and forests). However this has not been 
the case yet. The energy sector relies vastly on biomass and on costly import of 
oil which account for environmental damages such as deforestation and 
greenhouse gasses. Besides, those energy sources do not have capacity to supply 
an increasing demand of a rapid growing economy. To date, less than ten per 
                                              
50 Ibid  
51 UNDP. ‖Human Development Indicators – Uganda, based on 2010 Report‖. Retrieved on 5 May 2011. 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/UGA.html  
52 World Bank. ‖Uganda Country Brief‖. Retrieved  3 May 2011. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/UGANDAEXTN/0,,menuPK:374947
~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:374864,00.html  
53 Ibid 
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cent of the population is supplied by the national grid, which does not reach rural 
areas, and power tariff remain the highest in the region (Kålsås et al. 2011:15).  
Given the energy constrains of the country; the 2002 National Energy Policy 
aspires to improve energy production and access from petroleum, atomic energy 
and renewable sources. Its main policy goal is to, ―meet the energy needs of the 
Ugandan population for social and economic development in an environmentally 
sustainable manner
54‖. This indicates the political interest on expanding the 
energy sector by taking some environmental considerations.  
In 2007 the government of Uganda launched its Renewable Energy Policy, 
having an overall goal to ―increase the use of modern renewable energy, from the 
current 4% to 61% of the total energy consumption by the year 2017
55‖. The 
policy stress the use of solar, bio fuel and bio mass technologies; but the country 
has so far put much effort into hydropower given its lower costs and other related 
benefits, like, improvement of air quality and livelihoods of surrounding villages. 
Construction of major projects are under way, i.e. Bujagali (250 MW), Karuma 
falls (700 MW) and Ayago (500MW). Smaller projects have also been 
considered. The Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) listed, at least, forty six 
potential project sites
56
. To access projects, there is an institutional framework in 
place that joints several authorities: ERA is responsible for processing 
applications and issuing permits and licenses; the National Environmental 
Management Agency (NEMA) awards environmental clearances and reviews 
EIAs; and  the Water Resources Management Department (WRMD) awards 
surface water and construction permits. To build a small hydropower system, 
private companies must apply for various permits before starting construction.  
6.2.2 Uganda-Norway Relationships  
Diplomatic relations between Norway and Uganda were established in 1964, 
been Uganda one of the first main partners for Norwegian foreign aid. After a 
                                              
54 Rural Electrification Agency, Uganda. ‖Energy Policy for Uganda 2002‖. Retrieved 15 March 2011. 
http://www.rea.or.ug/userfiles/EnergyPolicy%5B1%5D.pdf  
55 Rural Electrification Agency, Uganda. ―The Renewable Energy Policy 2007‖. Retrieved 10 March 2011. 
http://www.rea.or.ug/userfiles/RENEWABLE%20ENERGY%20POLIC9-11-07.pdf  
56 Electricity Regulatory Authority. ‖Small Hydropower Development in Uganda, 2007‖. Retrieved 27 April 2011. 
http://www.era.or.ug/Pdf/ERA%20Small%20hydro%20power%20book.pdf  
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cessation in diplomatic relations during Idi Amin‘s rule, they were re-established 
in the latter half of 1980. Since the 90‘s, Norway has increasingly committed 
resources to support Uganda in terms of economic development and trade, 
emergency relief, environment and energy, good governance, health-education-
social sector areas, and HIV/AIDS (Annex 8). During the 90‘s, NORAD has 
spent at least NOK 400 million in electricity assistance to Uganda (Mæstad 
2003:1). In that period most of the allocation was used to co-finance hydropower 
projects for improving the physical infrastructure of the country and to support 
institutional capacity building. The following decade started with low 
expenditures on energy infrastructure but it reached a peak in 2009 with NOK 
101 millions (Annex 8). Norway has historically showed a commitment to 
advance energy infrastructure projects in its Energy and Environmental portfolio.  
As of 2006, Norway launched a strategy for environment in foreign aid based on 
national priorities, coordination with other donors, and provision of Norwegian 
value added support in areas like energy (MFA 2006). A key element of this 
structure is the mobilization of commercial investments and capacity building for 
energy infrastructure. Since then, Norwegian state actors and firms have been 
active in the Ugandan hydropower, oil & gas, and bio energy sector. Examples of 
the former are: Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kampala, NORAD, Norfund and 
Giek. And representing Norwegian firms TrønderEnergi, Norplan, Jacobsen 
Electro, Green Resources (Kålsås et al. 2011:15). Among the most commonly 
known projects is the Bugoye power plant, resulted from the Public-Private-
Partnership TrønderEnergi - Norfund.   
6.3 TrønderEnergi, the private actor 
TrønderEnergi AS (TE) is a regional Norwegian utility group with headquarters 
in Trondheim, Norway. The identity of the Group is given by the vision 
―Powerful and energetic. Building a better society through clean energy and 
industrial development
57‖. The company is publicly owned by 22 municipalities 
                                              
57 Presentation by Bernhard Kvaal from TrønderEnergi at the conference ―Energibistand og forretningsmuligheter i 
Afrika‖ 11.11.2010 at Håndverkeren. Permission obtained through E-mail conversations on 8.04.2011. 
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in the Sør-Trondelag (Norwegian region) and by the company Normøre 
Energiverk AS. The business group is organized into 12 subsidiaries operating in 
the hydropower, wind, and energy distribution sector. Trønder Power Ltd. (TPL), 
established in Uganda, is the first international subsidiary of the group and is co-
owned with Norfund
58
 through a PPP.  
During 2008, the group worked widely to develop a business strategy in which 
the international expansion of the group‘s activities is an important element. In 
line with this strategy, the board of directors defined ethical guidelines to be used 
in the activities of the whole group, especially in international operations. The 
guidelines were established according to the 10 principles of the United Nations 
Global Compact
59
, and it is expected they will direct the business‘ foreign 
operations,  covering human rights, labor, and environmental issues
60
.  
TE‘s motivation for starting operations in Uganda was because they saw an 
opportunity that could not be rejected. The project sounded profitable despite of 
the risks and the Norwegian government had demonstrated support to it, 
something important for an inexperienced company in transnational operations. 
We also saw a very positive attitude from the Government of Norway, and got strong 
cement to support this project. We had the Government of Norway behind us through 
Norfund, the Embassy in Kampala and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which were very 
eager to support and help. (Værnes, interview 21.10.2010) 
At the time, the opportunity was seen as a ―reputation project‖ (Malmo, 
conference 27.10.2010) in which the power company could exploit its core 
activity and to contribute with something to benefit Uganda: clean power 
production and, to some extent, poverty reduction
61
. TE abroad first consolidated 
activity in the company TPL, which is responsible for building and operating the 
Bugoye hydropower plant.  
                                              
58 Facts about TrønderEnergi. Accessed on 2 April 2011.  http://www.tronderenergi.no/english.aspx  
59 The United Nations Global Compact is an initiative to encourage business on a global base to adopt sustainbale and 
socially responsible policies and to report on the implementation of such policies given by 10 principles in the areas 
of Human Rights, Labor, Environment and Anti-Corruption.   UN Global Compact. ―About Us 10 Principles‖. 
Retrieved 4 March 2011. http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html  
60 Message from CEO Rune Malmo. Accessed on 2 April 2011. http://www.tronderenergi.no/message.aspx   
61 Presentation by Bernhard Kvaal from TrønderEnergi at the conference ―Energibistand og forretningsmuligheter i 
Afrika‖ 11.11.2010 at Håndverkeren. Permission obtained through E-mail conversations on 8.04.2011.  
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6.4 Hydropower Plant in Bugoye 
Bugoye is a district situated in Western Uganda, close to the city of Kasese, in 
the Mubuku Valley. It shelters rural people, whose main subsistence comes from 
the fertile land and water which is readily accessible to most parts of the valley, 
and who cook with firewood found nearby (Pritchard, interview 7.04.2011). TPL 
is the only private operator in the Bugoye district; on the same river system are 
two other hydropower plants, Mubuku 1 and Mubuku 3, which are owned by the 
state-owned mining companies Kilembe Mines (Værnes, interview 21.10.2010). 
The local communities live on a traditional way and foreigners are symbols of 
―money and progress‖ (Sylvian, interview 14.04.2011). The central government 
of Uganda expected to obtain, from the foreigner company, kilowatts for its 
national grid. But local people did not know how the power project would benefit 
them as rural electrification was not part of the agreement between Ugandan 
government and TPL.  
When Norfund and TE had agreed to build the hydropower plant (HPP) in 
Bugoye, the objective of the project delineated a contribution to Ugandan efforts 
to supply the country with nature friendly and reasonably priced electricity.  
The primary objective of the project is to supply affordable electricity and contribute to 
environmental and economical sustainability for the population of Uganda. (Document 
Courtesy TrønderEnergi)  
This goal has two inherent aspects: the efficiency task of creating cost-
effectiveness in a power plant; and the equity task concerning environmental 
protection for current and future citizens.  This two-fold goal reflects the double 
mission of Norfund in this specific intervention.  
6.4.1 The Project 
This section explains all the processes required to bring about the Bugoye HPP. 
The explanation is structured according to the ―hydropower project life cycle‖62, 
                                              
62 Many thanks to Anders Søreide, consultant and Manager at Vattenfall Power Consultant, who dedicated time to 
explain me all the proccesses required to build a hydropower project. Value free information was received given that 
this company was not involved in the studied project.   
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process commonly used in engineering planning. Simultaneously, I portray the 
role of Norfund in maturing the project financially. 
To deliver a hydropower plant, financial and technical elements are organized in 
the form of a project. The ‗project phases‘ define moments that allow to take 
important decisions about how to proceed and whether to continue with a project 
or not, by considering financial and technical risks (Søreide, interview 
5.05.2011). 
Diagram 4: Hydropower Project Life Cycle 
 
Normally, national guidelines regulate the processes that construction firms 
undertake in each project phase. In Norway, the Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Directorate (NVE) regulate the use of water, dam construction; and it 
stipulates rules for environmental and social impact assessments. In most cases, 
developing countries do not have such regulations in place, therefore, 
international guidelines have generally oriented building firms in those instances 
(Ibenholt et al. 2011). If projects are financed by public institutions –namely 
development finances, financiers defines which guidelines are applicable.  
By studying the Bugoye project life cycle, it is possible to study close how the 
Bugoye HPP came about. It also permits to analyze the implementation of 
environmental and social standards. Those standards guide builders on their            
do-not harm (local communities and environment) task which represents the 
‗sustainable‘ element of hydropower projects for engineers.   
6.4.2 Pre-planning Phase 
The pre-planning phase of project is concerned with assessing and screening 
risks and opportunities in the environmental, social, technical, and economical 
aspects of a prospect project. A review of country information and risks, together 
with evaluation of possible financing opportunities are key aspects of this phase. 
67 
 
(Søreide, interview 5.05.2011). SN Power, a Norwegian company co-owned by 
Norfund, developed all pre-feasibility studies. SN Power also applied for and 
obtained the required licenses to build and to operate in Uganda.  
Entry Point of TrønderEnergi 
After SN Power obtained licenses to build Bugoye HPP, the company decided to 
sell them because SN Power launched a strategy focusing only on Asia and Latin 
America. Norfund considered Bugoye a good project in terms of aid assistance, 
therefore, the fund committed itself to realize the project (Vilsted, interview 
18.04.2011). Norfund searched for potential partners in Norway who could 
replace SN Power. Normally, Norfund assess projects suggested by companies. If 
energy projects are approved, the fund undertakes a partnership with the firm. 
But the withdrawal of SN Power from the Bugoye project placed Norfund under 
an unconventional situation of having a hydropower project in quite an advanced 
phase without having a technical partner. This signified that Norfund had to look 
for a private partner with expertise in the hydropower sector and with interest to 
invest in such a project, something very unusual for the Norwegian fund.  
After exploring different partnerships options, Norfund approached the regional 
Norwegian company TE, which earlier had demonstrated interest in starting 
operations abroad. Closing an agreement was not an easy process given financial 
challenges related to a high risk project. The final decision came from TE after 
the Norwegian government decided to provide additional financial support to 
mitigate financial risks of the private partner (Værnes, interview 21.10.2010). It 
was the Norwegian MFA which provided a financial contribution of USD 8,9 
millions (NOK 60 millions) to the project which was channeled through Norfund 
but it was legally accounted as a grant to the Ugandan state in terms of bilateral 
aid relations (NORAD 2010b:33). It could be said that the Norwegian 
government had a double interest in realizing the project. One interest concerned 
to helping a developing country partner to ease its energy constrains; the other, 
assisting its national company in the internationalization venture.  
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With the provision of the Norwegian MFA to the project, the investment 
opportunity reached a potential rate of return of 20% for invested equity of TE, 
something economically reasonable for the company. Subsequently, TE accepted 
the proposal of Norfund and TE bought the license and the pre-feasibility study 
of the project from SN Power. Additional to commercial interests, the Bugoye 
project responded to other important considerations for the company. TE had 
projected its internalization strategy based on the idea of contributing to easing 
energy constrains in developing countries; something that could be done in the 
same way the company had contributed to the development of its home region; 
through commercially sound projects (Værnes, interview 21.10.2010). Thus, the 
interests of the energy group were said to be altruistic, as well.  
TE and Norfund established cooperation, with the partnership consolidated in a 
special purpose project vehicle under the Ugandan registered company Trønder 
Power Ltd. The establishment of TPL corresponds to Norfund‘s investment 
stage. With this partnership TE had a guaranteed partner with financial expertise 
and country knowledge. With a (technical) project developer in place, the project 
of the Bugoye plant could be taken into the next phase.  
6.4.3 Preparation or Planning 
The preparation phase is concerned with making a project ready for its 
implementation or construction. To achieve construction stage, various plans 
covering the technical, economic, and social and environmental aspects are 
realized and consolidated in a feasibility study. Such a study ―aims to objectively 
and rationally uncover the strengths and weaknesses of a project, as well as 
opportunities and threats, the resources required to carry through, and the 
prospects of success‖ of an intended project (Ibenholt et al. 2011:123). The main 
elements considered by the feasibility study conducted for the Bugoye project 
are: technical aspects, project financing and, Social and Environmental 
screening
63
.   
                                              
63 Thanks to John Einar Værnes of TrønderEnergi and Gunnar Salsauguen of Trønder Power Ltd who provided 
documentation concerned the Bugoye project. Some of the documents were classified for ―internal purpose‖,  others 
69 
 
Technical Aspects   
The plant built in Bugoye is a run-of-the-river scheme with a capacity of 
approximately 13,5 MW, which represents some of 7% of Ugandan power 
supply.   As a run-of-the-river plant, it captures water from the Mubuku River 
and its feeder, the Isya River. After that, the water is transported through a 6 km 
canal. Then it is diverted into a penstock before it reaches the powerhouse where 
two 6,5 MW Francis turbines convert the water‘s power in electricity. Finally, 
the water is discharged back into the Mubuku River. Moreover, the project 
included the construction of a 6 km transmission line because Ugandan law 
requires that power plant owners pay for connecting the plant to the national grid 
(Salsauguen, 27.10.2010). Something that enlarged the construction area and 
TPL‘s responsibility on the project‘s construction.  
Project Financing  
There are different methods to finance infrastructure projects. All previous 
investments taken up by TE had security on the group‘s headquarters. 
Nevertheless, the new venture in Bugoye was financed by a method called non-
recourse project financing. This system entails that the project itself has to 
provide full security to lenders; so, guaranteeing income from production and 
reduction of risk were necessary elements for finding an additional lender (Davis, 
interview 18.04.2011). In the case of a hydropower project commercial, 
construction, and hydrological risk mitigation had to be documented.  
Success of project financing relies on putting in place a structure that assures 
commercial viability and the reduction of project related risks.  Project financing 
is required in all commercial financial activities in order to document the 
bankability of the project. It is the ability of a project to pay the loan back, in the 
case of energy infrastructure, from earnings made by selling the electricity 
generated. Chart 3 introduces the main contracts for the project‘s bankability; 
detailed description in Annex 9.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
documentation was  used as applications for permissions and licenses. So, I will refer to information extracted from 
such documentation as: courtesy material from TPL.  
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Chart 3: Bankability Elements of Bugoye HPP 
Commercial Construction Hydrology 
Power Purchase Agreement  
Tariff: 12, 9 USD 
cents/kilowatt hour (c/kWh) 
during the first three years 
and 7,2 c/kWh thereafter.  
Guarantee payment for 
deemed energy.  
 
Ugandan government 
guarantee  
Buy-out clause in cases of 
non-payment of the 
transmission company.  
 
Separated contracts 
including guarantees 
with all outsourcing 
companies:  
 
- Civil works 
- Electro-mechanical 
- Control & switchyard 
- Transmission line  
 
TPL provided a 
guarantee capped at 
around 10% of the loan 
to cover failure to pay in 
case of little water flow 
that prevents the power 
plant to meets its 
production goal.    
Source: Documentation courtesy of TPL 
 
Bankability is usually achieved through obtaining various legal contracts from 
eventual buyers of the electricity and guarantees from project suppliers of parts 
and services. For the project, TPL negotiated a Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) with Ugandan government, construction guarantees with its sub-
contractors through legal agreements. TE also obtain a guarantee from the 
Norwegian GIEK to invest in TPL and the Bugoye project (NORAD 2009:141).  
Chart 4: Financing Structure of Bugoye HPP 
Financing USD Million 
Equity  
TrønderEnergi                     68%        
Norfund                               32%  
19.7 
Grant form Government of Norway*  8.9 
Debt from the EAIF  32.0 
TOTAL  60.6 
*Structured as zero interest loan to be transferred as equity to the 
Government of Uganda in 2034.    Source: NORAD 2010a, Box 7.1.  
After bankability documentation was in place, the financing of the project was 
achieved thanks to equity contributions done from Norfund, TrønderEnergi, a 
senior debt with the Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF), and the grant 
provided by the Government of Norway. The additional financier, the EAIF is a 
publicly owned fund financed by several European foreign aid agencies and it 
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has a mandate to support infrastructure projects that promote economic growth 
and that target poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa
64
. 
Financing aspects of the project is of importance because it commits the project 
owner (TPL) to take special consideration for sustainability and good governance 
issues, aspects discussed on section 5.4.  For the EAIF, investments are required 
to ―adhere to local and international environmental, social, and health and safety 
standards
65‖ according to EDFI rules. Norfund requires that companies and 
projects where the fund invests adhere to their sustainability guidelines which are 
also prescribed according to EDFI‘s parameters and the IFC-PS, discussed in 
section 5.4. In this regard, publicly-owned financiers have power vis à vis 
investee companies to hold them accountable for responsible operations 
according to established sustainable and good governance standards.  
Social and environmental aspects  
In the case of Bugoye HPP, Ugandan guidelines had to be followed regarding 
local ownership of electricity-generation company, private property rights, 
permissions for the use of the land and water, energy concessions, environmental 
permissions, etc. Moreover, as TPL is owned by a Norwegian company, which 
built its expertise by using the Norwegian NVE guidelines, application of that 
framework was a natural section to extend to the Bugoye project. For TPL, the 
NVE framework provided additional security to the project design and technical 
aspects (Værnes, interview 21.10.2010). Furthermore, the founders required the 
application of the IFC-PS and international guidelines on HES which demand the 
preparation of an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA).  
The ESIA is a tool for assessing and managing environmental and social impacts 
in infrastructure projects. In the preparation phase of a project it is necessary to 
conduct an analysis of potential environmental impacts and to consult local 
population (Søreide, interview 5.05.2011). In order to comply with the stated 
guidelines, TPL hired the Ugandan consultancy company Newplan which 
                                              
64 EAIF. ―About Us‖. Retrieved 15 April 2011.  http://www.emergingafricafund.com/about-us.aspx  
65 EAIF. ―Investments Policy‖. Retrieved 15 April 2011.  http://www.emergingafricafund.com/policy-and-
procedures/investment-policy.aspx  
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elaborated the ESIA and other required IFC-PS i.e. the Environmental and Social 
Management Plan (ESMP) and the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP).  
Infrastructure projects like Bugoye require extensive civil works that typically 
affect local communities and the environment. Also, hydropower projects are 
traditionally known for leaving relatively large footprint on the surroundings. 
However, with a run-of-the-river design, the Bugoye project is not involved in 
the construction of dams, which have accounted for these major problems 
throughout hydropower development history (Usher 1997; Anthony 1997; 
Scudder 2005; McCully 2001). In the phase of project preparation and as part of 
the ESIA, key stakeholders were consulted in seven villages in the Bugoye 
Valley (Sylvian, interview 19.04.2010). The consultations were done through a 
formed structure, the Bugoye Participatory Committee (BPC). During 
consultations, no disturbances or protests were encountered. According to Irene 
Sylvian, consultant from Newplan responsible for the Bugoye project, the 
community responded positively about the works and company. She also 
commented that local people expected to profit from the construction of the 
project.  
According to information provided by TPL, the main issues resulting from the 
conversations in the BPC were: a) the use of land and resettlement; b) access to 
water; c) movement across project site; and, d) traffic, noise and dust
66
.  The 
issues identified by the BPC were incorporated in the ESIA, ESMP, and RAP, 
which constituted the base for the construction phase of the project. The stated 
plans delineated the responsibilities of different actors (construction company, 
designers, and consultants) in terms of implementing the ESMP and HES 
guidelines. Norfund in cooperation with NORAD sent an officer to Uganda who 
was in charge of monitoring the implementation of the social and environmental 
plans and their respective mitigation strategies in the case of a damage or a 
                                              
66 Document coutersy TPL.  
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potential harm. The resulting monitoring costs were covered by a grant provided 
by Norfund to TPL under the technical assistance facility
67
.  
6.4.4 Implementation 
At this stage, the construction works and all related activities to implementing the 
designed project starts. Social and environmental aspects, including monitoring 
and reporting, together with execution of HES guidelines take place in this phase 
(Søreide, interview 5.05.2011). To build the power plant in Bugoye, TPL sub-
contracted the company Noremco for all construction related work. Noremco is a 
construction company, part of the leading Scandinavian construction group 
Veidekke, with head offices in Tanzania and operations in East and Central 
Africa
68
. Construction materials were mostly bought locally and taxes were paid 
according to Ugandan law for imports of the turbines and electrical machinery. 
The power house and the canal accounted for the civil works, and this had to be 
synchronized with the delivery of imported materials, which were delayed in 
Ugandan customs due to lack of clarity of tax payment issues.   
Construction was rather difficult. The valley is hilly and there are high ground 
water levels in some areas. Additionally, the area was densely populated, making 
it important to design the canal with good structural support and to solve the 
issues of land acquisition in an appropriate manner to avoid further legal 
conflicts and to comply with Norfund‘s standards (Værnes, interview 
21.10.2011). Construction went according to plan except the difficulties 
experienced with stolen materials i.e. sand, bricks, cement, cables, oil; problem 
that may have incremented the final costs of the project itself (Silvian, interview 
19.04.2011).  
Additional infrastructure improvements, like construction of a road, to access the 
project site were built for the realization of the project and after that maintained 
for the public use of locals. During the construction period some 425 employees 
(Norfund 2009:4-5) were hired locally, some of them received training and all of 
                                              
67 Document courtesy Norfund.  
68 Noremco. ―Who are we‖. Retrieved 12 May 2011. http://www.noremco.se/who-we-are.htm  
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them had access to the clinic installed for the duration of the construction. 
Despite infrastructural and geographical challenges the power plant was 
delivered beforehand. Something that can be considered successful given the 
poor conditions of infrastructure and communications in Uganda.  
Implementation of Social and Environmental Aspects  
This section will describe the social and environmental (S&E) procedures that 
took place during the construction of the project. Clarity of those aspects permit 
to assess if the investment in Bugoye was sustainable and conducted under 
responsible actions according to Norfund requirements to infrastructure projects. 
The issues elaborated in this section resulted from the consultations in the BPC 
and on the ESIA. The respective management of those topics account for 
management of S&E‘s Action Plans.  
In terms of land use, the Ugandan law requires cash-for-land compensation; 
though, the project negotiated a land-for-land compensation and offered 
additional land and assistance with registration of land title. Assistance with legal 
aspects to local owners, was claimed to, provided a considerable increase of land 
value, especially for women (Sylvian, interview 19.04.2010). In the light of this 
procedure, women were assumed to be the head-of-the-family because in the 
local society tribal traditions allow man to have several wives, and therefore men 
are not invested with parental responsibility to sustain the family: wife and 
children. This cultural practice allows males to, both, host family members or to 
turn them away from his house at any time, leaving family members without a 
place to live. With the inclusion of the gender element in land ownership, women 
could obtain land or houses to host their families.  
During the resettlement process, all 34 affected families (Norfund 2009:4-5) 
were given new houses. According to the IFC team that visited the project site, 
―replacement houses are substantially bigger and of better quality than affected 
houses
69‖. Additionally, locals were given the opportunity to choose their own 
compensation land. In many cases families were relocated to areas close to other 
                                              
69 MIGA. ―Bugoye ESRS final‖.  See pag 5. Retrieved 10 September 2010. 
http://www.miga.org/documents/Bugoye_ESRS_final.pdf  
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family members, the road or other important daily community infrastructure. 
Furthermore, compensation payments for land and crops were arranged with 372 
families (Norfund 2009:4-5). In compliance with IFC-PS 8: Cultural Heritage, 
TPL relocated graves, an aspect of relatively serious importance to the traditions 
of these tribal cultures
70
.Regarding these actions, the general response from 
affected families was positive
71
. 
Concerning access to water, community had a major worry. However, the design 
of the project allows running a minimum water flow in the river, so that local 
people can collect the source when needed. Additionally, TPL financed two other 
solutions for helping the community to have water at hand; the initiatives will be 
described in the next session 6.5 because they do not respond to the obligations 
of the company but to voluntary gifts. The BPC also discussed the mobility 
problems caused by the 6 km long canal that impeded traditional paths of 
movement. This issue was resolved by asking the community to identify suitable 
crossing points, so that TPL could arrange the construction of 10 crossing points 
or bridges.  
The last issues of the BPC were the traffic, noise and dust concerns. Information 
provided by TPL confirmed that this was a challenging task because in many of 
the cases it was necessary to regulate the working hours of sub-contractors. 
Something that could have cause delays in the construction of the power plant.  
Large levels of noise were produced by crushing stone locally. To mitigate this, a 
special site was selected for that task by considering the possibilities of 
minimizing noise and dust, and monitoring of such actions was also undertaken.  
TPL also had to implement international HSE standards and guarantee labor 
conditions after Ugandan law. However, most of the implementation of this set 
of standards was done by the civil contractor, Noremco. The supplier of civil 
works was contractually bound to prioritize local recruitment, which resulted in 
the employment of approximately 425 local employees (Salsauguen, interview 
                                              
70 Ibid.  
71 Document courtesy TrønderEnergi.  
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27.10.2010). A close follow-up to sub-contractors was done at the request of 
TPL. Very few incidents took place but none of them were fatal.  
6.4.5 Operational Phase 
This final stage describes the existence of a working hydropower plant. During 
the hole operational life of a project complete evaluations should be undertaken 
(Søreide, interview 5.05.2011). The Bugoye HPP started operations in October 
2009 and after 25 years of service for TPL, it will be handed out to the Ugandan 
government.  The project has also been approved for validating the reduction of 
carbon emissions, earnings that will be used for improve the rentability of the 
project and 60% will be given to the Ugandan government. After opening, 
machinery was synchronized for smooth operations; thereafter, the plant has been 
producing electricity according to expectations. In fact, unexpected increases in 
water levels have led to slightly increase on production since the middle of 2010 
(Salsauguen, interview 27.10.2010). This aspect is welcomed by the private 
investors given the increases on their earnings.  
6.5 Corporate Responsibility initiatives.  
While the subscribed IFC-PS are about securing living conditions of local 
people, there are neither national nor international binding rules that guide 
companies in terms of supporting local communities for improving livelihood 
conditions. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) ―is concerned with treating 
the stakeholders of the firm ethically or in a socially responsible manner… The 
aim of CSR is to create higher and higher standards of living, while preserving 
the profitability of the corporation‖ (Hopkins 2007:9). Voluntary initiatives of 
this sort were not required by Norfund, but the development fund suggests to 
their invested companies initiate socially responsible programs.  
Governments of developing countries can be very engaged in procuring 
electricity, but they often lack frameworks that require project developers to 
provide minimum considerations for the well-being of local communities and 
institutions that secure this equity task, as in Norway and most of the global 
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North.  In the light of ineffective or non-existent frameworks that could guide 
private sector interventions for enhancing local livelihoods, CSR has emerged.  
In the case of the Bugoye HPP, TE‘s board of directors was highly concerned 
with reputational aspects of the group initiating operations in a country with 
corruption risks
72
. However, other politically ethical concerns were raised for 
starting CSR activities given the character of the board members of TE.    
―… the members of TE‘s board are local [Norwegian regional] politicians and they are 
interested in taking CSR issues seriously. TE wants to contribute to developing 
countries‘ economies by bringing electricity, but we also want to raise the living 
standards in the places where we develop projects as we have done in our home 
country‖ (Værnes, interview 21.10.2010). 
Furthermore, Mr. Værnes emphasized the thought that CSR is also a part of the 
company‘s strategy for increasing the rate of return on their investments. The 
believe is that TE can make money and by making money we support the local 
communities where TE is present (Værnes, interview 21.10.2010). In fact, TE is 
used to the fact that some part of the project money goes to supporting the local 
community and showing them benefits that the hydropower plant will bring to 
them due to Norwegian regulations of benefit sharing.  
Conversely, this was not the case in Bugoye because all the energy generated 
will be delivered to the national grid due to a decision of Ugandan national 
government. In the absence of obvious benefits or direct effects from the power 
plant to the local community, TPL wanted to provide other opportunities that 
could help to generate a good relationship with their local neighbors, so that 
locals could see that the project was bringing some good to them as well. The 
following CSR programs were developed in cooperation with the BPC, the social 
consultant from Newplan, and a local NGOs, as TPL was committed to 
widespread efforts to increase the number additional of benefits to the local 
community. 
                                              
72 TrønderEnergi. ‖Om TrønderEnergi i Afrika, Bugoye‖ Retreived 23 March 2011. 
http://www.tronderenergi.no/bugoye.aspx  
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In the health area, resources were provided to local NGOs to conduct HIV/AIDS 
awareness and a malaria prevention program. Treated nets were distributed to 
pregnant women and small children, as they are the major sufferers of malaria. 
The local clinic was reconstructed, and new buildings to house the maternity 
ward and out patient department were donated. TPL also arranged electricity 
access for medicines
73
.  In regard to water use, several access points to water 
along the power plant‘s canal were built in order to improve access to water for 
the community. Additionally a co-financed initiative, with the European Union in 
cooperation with the Austrian Development Agency, built pipelines in the valley 
for supplying drinking water to local communities.  
The last voluntary initiative in the Bugoye community was the provision of 
economic support to the local non-governmental organization Community 
Development Through Sports (CDTS) which conducts programs of social 
development through sports-based activities
74
. The organization CDTS, uses 
football and netball as an avenue to gain the trust of the community, so that they 
can provide health and sanitation education
75. CDTS‘s activities also contribute 
to building healthy self-esteem of children and youth in this impoverished 
society, reducing the levels of prostitution, alcoholism, and domestic violence 
(Pritchard, interview 7.04.2011). CDTS obtained help from TPL to mobilize the 
sub-contractor Noremco, which built a football ground in the Bugoye town.  
Besides the CSR programs directly focused towards the affected population, TPL  
decided to contribute with the Mababali Memorial School for Orphans. The 
school takes care of a total of 264 children, nearly half of whom are orphans
76
. 
The provision of assistance covers the administration costs and some 
infrastructure improvements, like the construction of a new kitchen. Even though 
this school is located near Kampala and not in the Bugoye area, it is believed that 
                                              
73 Presentation by Bernhard Kvaal from TrønderEnergi at the conference ―Energibistand og forretningsmuligheter i 
Afrika‖ 11.11.2010 at Håndverkeren. Permission obtained through E-mail conversations on 8.04.2011. 
74 Presentation by Bernhard Kvaal from TrønderEnergi at the conference ―Energibistand og forretningsmuligheter i 
Afrika‖ 11.11.2010 at Håndverkeren. Permission obtained through E-mail conversations on 8.04.2011. 
75 CDTS. ―About us‖  Retrieved 29 March 2011. http://www.cdtsuganda.org/about_us.php  
76 TrønderEnergi. ‖Press released: Nå sponser vi ungene på Mbabali-skolen‖. Retrieved 12.04.2011. 
http://www.tronderenergi.no/nyhet/na-sponser-vi-ungene-pa-mbabali-skolen-59.aspx  
79 
 
benefits from the Bugoye project should be shared with the broader Ugandan 
population.  
The CSR strategy for the Bugoye case was done to build the reputation of the 
company by strengthening the social and environmental commitments of the 
company with project financiers as Norfund and the EAIF; it also seems to be 
influenced by Norwegian regional politicians concerned with the tasks of firms in 
the equity role of the state even if the publicly owned company operates in a 
foreign country. 
6.6 Existing Assessments  
The intervention of Norfund in cooperation with TE for the realization of Bugoye 
HPP has been assessed once by Norfund in 2009, and twice externally by 
NORAD (2010a, 2010b). In both evaluations, the assessments were based on the 
goal: ―Help meet the energy needs of the Ugandan population to promote 
environmentally sustainable social and economic development‖(NORAD 
2009:83).  Assessments concluded that the project, in addition to helping ease 
energy constrains in the African country, was catalytic, additional, and of high 
relevance for Norwegian development assistance (NORAD 2010b:34).  Despite a 
generally positive assessment, two main issues have prompted important 
discussions in the light of the replicability of the model. Directly from the project 
itself, the price of the electricity is contentious. Secondly, the indirect 
intervention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a positive influence in the 
project financing.   
The Issues of the Price 
Assessments concluded that the agreed price for selling the electricity to the 
Ugandan transmission company was too high; in the light of Norwegian aid, 
some economic interests may have prevailed over aid goals. An evaluation 
determined that the tariff structure was the result of an asymmetrical negotiation 
and positioned the Ugandans in the middle of an energy crisis and weak. The 
price paid to the Bugoye plant is USD 12,9 c/KWh. By 2007, the price of the 
80 
 
electricity in Uganda was USD 0,24 c/KW/h (Byakola 2007:6). Compared with 
polluting thermal power (USD 28 c/KWh), Bugoye‘s offer is good. But, if it is 
compared with recent medium hydropower projects financed by other 
development banks, like Mpanga, Bugoye‘s price is twice as much (NORAD 
2010b:33). In the light of Norwegian reports, the Bugoye project is not a cost-
effective solution for Ugandans who have to pay a higher price for energy 
produced in a cheaper manner.  
The issue of the Grant Pprovided by the Norwegian Government 
Bugoye ―is a wholly-owned Norwegian company partially funded by a grant 
taken from a country allocation to Uganda‖ (NORAD 2010b:34). Public finances 
in the Bugoye project comes from two separate areas of the Norwegian aid 
budget: from the economic development assistance area and from the bilateral 
budget. NORAD‘s evaluator committee considered that a rule was break when 
the MFA used bilateral sources to finance the Bugoye project. In the view of 
ODA‘s rules this is problematic because it reduced the possibilities of the 
Ugandan state to have some ownership of the project from the beginning 
(Ibid:33).  Moreover, the financial resources were channeled through an 
assistance facility in Norfund, an unconventional practice, because political 
routines in Uganda did not accepted a direct grant to support a private project.  
The evaluators concluded that NORAD, as the directly responsible for allocating 
ODA resources, demonstrated to have a need for policies that prescribe a process 
where public allocations are used to finance private projects with a development 
purpose. From the view of the Norwegian Embassy in Kampala (Uganda), the 
Norwegian government as a donor has certain power to influence the procedures 
for development cooperation. However, this power should be used for being a 
model rule-follower, rather than acting according for its own benefit (NORAD 
2010a: 28). Summarizing, while the Bugoye project has accomplished Norfund‘s 
mandate of additionality, relevance, and is catalytic, administrative issues 
concerning the management of ODA require attention.  
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7. Development Provision?  
The theory chapter introduced the role of the state as connected with the main 
tasks of efficiency and equity. It was also argued that the perceived new role of 
the state, as a competition state, inclines towards market-driven approaches to 
achieve public goals. In the case of Norwegian foreign aid, Norway aims at 
assisting developing partner countries in their task to reduce poverty, to ensure 
economic growth which at the same time protects the environment, human rights, 
and gender equality. All of this done according to good governance models 
which can also improve the country‘s work towards Millennium Development 
Goals. All of the above mentioned public objectives constitute the equity and 
efficiency  tasks of Norway, as donor country.   
A way to achieve those goals through a market-driven institution, Norfund, was 
introduced in chapter five. And a particular example of an intervention in the 
Clean Energy for Development Program was studied in chapter six. The 
intervention is of particular interest because, as opposite to traditional 
intervention state-to-state, a state agency co-operates with a firm to deliver the 
public goals of Norwegian foreign aid. As this thesis examines whether 
‗competitive‘ modus operandi of states can achieve public goals, this chapter 
examines the significance of the results delivered by Norfund‘s intervention in 
the Bugoye hydropower plant. Existing assessments of the intervention in 
Bugoye have proven that Norfund‘s task was catalytic, additional, and of high 
relevance for Norwegian foreign aid. This chapter, however, pretends to revise 
the development-related equity goals delivered by the project. A threefold 
assessment method is used. It looks at the social and environmental aspects of the 
Bugoye project and contrasts the delivered results against the claims of 
Norwegians CSOs, which in this study are assumed to be the voice of the 
Ugandan people.  
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7.1 The Concept of Development  
The concept of ‗development‘ is rather broad and a well debated one among 
social and economic disciplines. Historically, Norwegian aid has mixed the 
phrases of ―development relevant‖ with ―aid relevant‖; making it difficult to 
assess the effects of aid interventions and policies (Simonensen 2008:98). I see 
‗development‘ ―as a vision, description of the state of being of a desirable 
society‖ (Allen and Thomas 2000:29). Whereas ‗aid‘ is something given in the 
form of a gift with the purpose of assisting the receiver in its tasks. In 
international relations, aid or foreign aid is defined as  
… a voluntary transfer of public resources, from a government to another independent 
government…[with] one goal of which is to better the human conditions in the country 
receiving aid. (Lancaster 2007:9) 
Concretely, the OEDC/DAC states that the objective of foreign aid or official 
development assistance, as they conceptualize it, is ―the promotion of the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective
77‖. So ‗development‘ in terms of foreign aid is related to economic 
growth and welfare increase; in other words, with the equity and efficiency tasks 
of a state. Hence, transferred resources are supposed to assist the receiver country 
in its tasks of economic development and welfare creation, which ultimately 
account for a country‘s own idea of development.  
Even if ‗development‘ can be seen as a society‘s owns aspiration, this evaluation 
will consider the concept of ‗development‘ from the political view of foreign aid 
which is interrelated with the applied theory. My understanding of concepts can 
be polemical in the light of debates about self-interest of donors, promotion of 
economic interests or the advance of a capitalist development paradigm 
(Lancaster 2007; Mavrotas 2010; Moyo 2010). However, it is useful as a starting 
point for conceptualizing elements of the assessment.  
                                              
77 OECD ‖Developemnt Co-opration Directorate – Officual development assistance- definition and coverage‖ 
Retrieved 5 March 2011. See point ii. Details of transactions. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34447_46181892_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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Material perspectives in institutional theory see organizational behavior 
subordinated to the mandates of institutions. As such, a mandate is intrinsically 
connected to the idea of desired development of a country. If an institution 
fulfills its mandate, it contributes to the realization of the final aspiration. From 
an institutional stand, I see, foreign aid is organized in the way that country A 
(donor) mandates its aid-related institutions to provide assistance to country B 
(receiver) to realize country B‘s mandated development ambitions.  
In this case, Norway mandates Norfund to assist the government of Uganda to 
persuade the Ugandan goals on renewable energy through incentivizing firms to 
co invest in clean energy projects in Uganda. Certainly, the first mission of the 
development fund is the mobilization of private partners and enterprise creation. 
But Norfund is also invested with a ―development mandate‖ mandate which is to 
contribute to the goals of Norwegian foreign aid and to avoid negative impacts of 
business‘ operations. The understanding of Norfund‘s mission to contribute to 
the receiver‘s own development is rather laden towards the donor‘s goals.  
7.1.1 What is a Successful Energy-Related Public Investment? 
A way to bring in the developmental goals of the receiver country is to consult to 
CSOs, which in the Norwegian aid system have serve to legitimize the 
Norwegian model of aid delivery (Tvedt 2009). Institutions need acceptability 
and credibility to survive and prosper (Scott et al. 2000:237). Such conditions are 
given by legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate with...[the] constructed systems of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions.‖ (Suchman 1995:574) 
With this, CSOs have given a value to Norwegian aid policies and interventions. 
By consulting the ideas of CSOs of what constitutes a successful market-driven 
intervention in the energy sector of developing  countries, I gather the 
perceptions of what is considered as the appropriate mode of action of Norfund 
in this intervention. Bringing in the voice of the receiver country through 
consulting Norwegian CSOs raises questions. Interviewed organizations are not 
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directly entrusted to act on the behalf of the government of Ugandan or its 
peoples but the primary mission of interviewed CSOs is to represent the interests 
and the rights of people in developing countries when they cannot do it by 
themselves. Besides, CSOs can be seen as international actors when they operate 
on an international arena, as foreign policy; CSOs are also legitimate when they 
do not represent the specific interests of a state or a firm but when they advance 
the ideal of equality (Arts et al. 2001; Lewis and Kanji 2009; Mattli and Woods 
2006; Van Ham 2010).   
Now, Norfund have based their course of actions on Ugandan national policies 
that call for implementation of renewable energies to improve energy constrains 
of the country and thus boost economic growth.  It is possible to claim that 
Norfund‘s reason to intervene is legitimate in the light of Ugandan rules. Is this 
intervention legitimate in the eyes of CSO actors? I found that the general 
position of surveyed organizations revealed that clean energy aid in the form of 
public investments in profit-oriented actors was positively received. 
Nevertheless, concerns were directed to the form of how projects are managed. 
In line with this, attention was given to the rights of local populations, especially 
if indigenous people were involved; natural resource protection; holistic project 
planning; standard application lifting; and the role of private sector acting as aid 
actor. Annex 10 presents the data collected from informants.   
In terms of successful hydropower projects that the foreign aid finances, CSOs 
agreed that projects should be planned holistically. To the question: what should 
be considered as a successful hydropower plant built with public finances in 
developing countries? The respondents answered that project feasibility studies 
should equally balance the economic, technical, social, and environmental 
aspects (See Chart 5). Public financiers should be responsible for raising the level 
of applied standards and for following the life cycle of invested projects.  
After the intended objectives of the project and the concept of desired 
development were presented in this section, it is possible to realize an assessment 
of the results delivered by Norfund in the Bugoye intervention.   
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Chart 5: What is Considered as ‘Succesful’ Hydropower 
Project?  
       Topic    
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Project proposals should include the right cost-calculations that 
provide the companies with the most economic gains but such 
calculations should include the costs of applying the highest possible 
standard.   
We push for public financing institutions that can raise the level of 
standards as much as possible, and that they follow a life cycle 
perspective of the projects. 
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The industry is not so good at analyzing the environmental and social 
consequences. This is something very important because in many 
developing countries there are pre-existing conflicts between the 
society and the state; this is something that can be reflected and affect 
negatively projects.  
From our experience with infrastructure projects, companies are 
neither really prepared, not well informed about the markets and 
societies where they will invest. 
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We in Fivas are concerned with a holistic planning process for single 
projects. We want that the project is considered equally towards 
financial, social and economical considerations.  
Normally, technical and economic plans predominate the project 
assessments. We are for integrating Social and Environmental 
aspects of project assessments and planning from early stages. 
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A project with a good design that considers the affected groups. This 
can be achieved through good planning and inclusive processes and 
compromise.  
Public funders should clarify that the company is legally entitled and 
responsible to ensure that their subcontractors follow international 
conventions and guidelines. 
7.2 A Running Hydropower Plant in Bugoye 
The first goal of Norfund was achieved by getting TrønderEnergi involved in the 
realization of a hydropower in Bugoye, Uganda.  Second, the cooperation 
between public institution and energy company resulted on bringing about a 
green-field-project for a hydropower project. This means that nothing existed 
before in and now a power plant that delivers energy to the national grid is in 
place and running (Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011). Among the aspects of success, 
it is possible to mention that the project was completed six months ahead of 
schedule and within budget (NORAD 2010b:33). Relatively high project 
performance is actually challenging given the constrains met in the Ugandan 
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local settings, including problems with imported supplies held up in customs, and 
land ownership certificates delayed by the respective authorities (Salsaugen, 
interview 27.10.2010). Despite complexities, TPL proved that it is possible to 
realize a small-scale power project in a developing country.  
The factor of success for Norfund was to take a project off the ground and help 
through to its realization. According to NORAD, Bugoye HPP is a foundation 
stone in Ugandan energy infrastructure history ―because it is the first hydropower 
facility completed with commercial finances‖ in the country (NORAD 
2010a:28). Commercial finances are used in this context because the plant is 
owned by a private company (NORAD 2010b:34), TPL; and it was funded with 
the project financing method used normally by commercial and not by public 
entities.  
This initial adventure was a big learning experience for the Norwegian company. 
The success on TPL strengthened the group‘s desired to continue operating in 
Uganda in line with the group‘s planned expansion. Until 2010, four extra 
projects are being explored in Uganda: the renovation of Mubuku 1 and Mubuku 
3; and the development of new stations in Kikagati and Nsongezi
78
. With an 
initial demonstration project, the Ugandan clean energy infrastructure market is 
now more attractive to potential investors. If one foreigner company could built a 
hydropower plant on time and within budget, other firms could do so.  
Electricity Delivery  
All the electricity produced by the power plant is delivered to the national grid. 
Therefore, the Norwegian CSO FIVAS wonders why the power plant delivers 
electricity to national grid instead of supplying the local community (Preston, 
interview 4.11.2010). The answer to this question is explained by the plans of 
Ugandan government, for in the concession it was stated that all the electricity 
was to be delivered to national grid. TPL informed me that when they asked the 
government if there was a plan to supply local communities, the answer was no 
(Værnes, interview 21.10.2010). The Ugandan energy sector is divided into 
                                              
78 Presentation by Bernhard Kvaal from TrønderEnergi at the conference ―Energibistand og forretningsmuligheter i 
Afrika‖ 11.11.2010 at Håndverkeren. Permission obtained through E-mail conversations on 8.04.2011. 
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several clusters therefore it would create an organizational conflict if TPL were 
to be involved in tasks of energy transmission when the company is registered as 
an energy producer. In a near future TPL can expect to collaborate with other 
energy actors to supply the Bugoye community with electricity (Salsaugen, 
interview 27.10.2010), but this is a project of a different nature. In light of 
national rules, a question remains: should private companies or the Norwegian 
aid institution be held accountable for this type of decision?  
7.3 Norfund, the Equity task  
The Bugoye HPP is in place and operating. What does this signify for the local 
community and environment in terms of providing equity benefits? This section 
presents the assessment of equity goal achievement in the Bugoye project. Annex 
11 contains the collected data related to the results of the Bugoye intervention 
organized according to IFC-PS DOTS framework. In this section, I discuss what 
the results indicate for the equity task of Norwegian foreign aid‘s goals by 
bringing in environmental and social analysis according to the proposed 
assessment method. Equity goals are assessed against Norfund‘s concept of 
sustainability as risk management and towards the contribution of the 
intervention to the goals of Norwegian foreign aid goals.  
7.4 Environmental Aspects  
The initial rationale of Norwegian government with the CEfD is to help 
developing countries to produce energy from clean energy sources in order to 
reduce global green house gasses. Additionally, Norfund‘s sustainability 
guidelines hold the fund responsible for environmental damages caused by the 
operations of an investee company.  
7.4.1 Sustainability Management 
For the realization of the power plant, the project followed all Ugandan 
regulations and included the nationally required ESIA. Also IFC-PS was 
undertaken. Such studies were prepared by the Ugandan consultancy company 
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Newplan and were approved by the Ugandan environmental authority NEMA. 
The ESIA follows international guidelines and illuminated potential 
environmental and social impacts of the Bugoye plant. Thus risk management 
plans were supervised by Norfund‘s local officer in Kampala. Having an ESIA 
and management a plan, the TPL was compelled to comply with Norfund‘s 
sustainability. In addition monitoring reports were provided to Norfund 
according to the demands of the financier.  
During the construction phase, some environmental challenges were present. 
Unexpected floods caused water pollution in the river downstream. Moreover, a 
landslide destroyed some portion of the civil works and caused crop damages in 
neighboring areas. Contingency measures for affected people and environment 
were taken in order to alleviate these unforeseen events (Sylvian, interview 
19.04.2011). The consultant added that they planted trees in order to improve the 
quality of the terrain and cash compensations were given for lost crops. Whilst 
the former mitigation measures have environmental importance in terms of 
terrain stability, the latter has a social significance because agriculture is the main 
source of food for local people in the valley.  
Environmental sustainability, in this case, has two extremes. One is concerned 
with the technical ideal of not-harming by undertaking impact assessments and to 
mitigate harms according to action plans. The other relates to political processes 
of imposing rules on behavior, like Norfund‘s sustainability guidelines invest 
actors with a responsibility to act according to rules. In the Bugoye intervention, 
both approaches are interrelated. Norfund impose rule following for 
environmental protection and such processes are arranged according to technical 
tasks. The praxis of this is idea of sustainability mixes the technocratic and 
political processes in one where none of them seem to prevail over the other. 
This operational form can be considered as ―depoliticized‖ (Bøås 2002:435) 
because the decision-making is not guided by specific political interests but on 
the technical idea of greater common good for the project as a hole.  
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7.4.2 Climate Friendly Hydropower Plant 
As a hydropower scheme, the project counts as a GHG mitigation project 
according to the OECD scheme for project categorization (Norfund 2009: 4-5). 
The contribution of Bugoye HPP to Uganda was to augment the country‘s 
capacity to produce clean energy. The power plant does not replace polluting 
sources as such but it increases Uganda‘s energy production capacity by 7% 
without incrementing the emissions of CO
2
. The project applied successfully as 
certified emissions rights, for within this framework, it is expected that the power 
plant will replace 54 349 tones of CO
2
 annually
79
.  Certification for reduction of 
emissions is welcome by investors because it is source of additional income from 
the project. Demonstration that certification as a mechanism to control GHG 
serves to prove that this instrument function in a market-friendly manner; 
therefore, replication of this instrument is possible.  
7.4.3 Environmentaly Friendly? 
Renewable energies as a mitigation source have zero or low GHG emissions. 
Hydropower is nevertheless the most debated production source. On the one 
hand, hydropower production can produce energy releasing nearly zero 
emissions. In the other hand, they can alter water ecosystems and disrupt habitats 
and communities (International Rivers 2004, World Commission on Dams 2000). 
The EIA‘s findings concluded that natural habitats are modified by previous 
human use and fish migration was already altered by a power plant located up-
stream
80
. As a result, Bugoye cannot be held  directly responsible for biodiversity 
loses in the water system. This type of effect has been described by WWF as a 
―justified intervention‖ because ―in the light of pre-existing projects there was no 
untouched nature‖ in the project site (Norris, interview 12.05.2011).  
The plant in Bugoye is a run-of-the-river scheme with a component that allows a 
minimum water flow in the river. With run-of-the-river designs, the project is not 
involved in controversial dam constructions. ―In theory, run-of-the-river systems 
                                              
79 UNFCCC. ―Project Design Document for Bugoye‖. Retrieved 22 October 2010. 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/ETB0SH6WY5OIG2VPC9Z1RNAD783LXF  
80 Document courtesy TPL.  
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would have minor environmental impacts but the company should be willing to 
pay for mitigating measures (Norris, interview 12.05.2011). However, it is 
unclear the type of mitigation measures that should be taken into account because 
IFC standards are too general for hydropower projects (Norris, interview 
12.05.2011; Preston, interview 4.11.2010). For Bugoye, it was possible to 
identify at least one mitigation measure related to environment and TPL decided 
to approve it. The company permitted a minimum water flow in the river, even 
though IFC-PS standards did not require it. Best practices for the company go in 
line with Norwegian NVE guidelines.  
By including in our design a minimum water flow, we wanted to ensure sufficient water 
stream year round in the river. We have done the same in our projects in Norway and 
our experience tells us that is a good thing. Therefore, this element had to be included in 
Bugoye as well. ( Salsaugen, interview 27.10.2010).  
Previous experience of the company in their home country has taught engineers 
to follow best practices at all times for common benefit. TPL showed a genuinely 
compromise with standard application given that previous experience of the 
company at its home country has demonstrated the importance of rule following.  
If the presented results are contrasted to Goodland‘s concept of environmental 
sustainability, the power plant can be catalogued as sustainable. It mitigates 
potential GHG and it helps sustaining the menaced atmosphere‘s carrying 
capacity. The capacity of water to serve as a productive input is better because no 
pollution results from the production of energy from hydropower. However, in 
terms of biodiversity, holistic national planning is needed to mitigate potential 
impacts of uncoordinated private interventions on Ugandan natural ecosystems.  
7.5 Social Aspects 
Poverty reduction and contribution to Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
are desired goals for Norwegian foreign aid. Additionally for CSOs, it is 
important that the opinion of local communities is keeping into consideration 
from early phases of the project. Goal-achievement, in this section, considers the 
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application of social standards connected to Norfund‘s requirements for project 
financing. 
7.5.1 Social Impact Assessment  
During the pre-feasibility phase of the Bugoye project, local population was 
informed about the construction of the plant; however, this happened while SN 
Power owned the project so TPL could not provide details (Salsaugen, interview 
27.10.2010). Norwegian CSOs would expect that local communities are 
consulted rather than informed about a potential project, so that local 
representatives can discuss with the project developers prior approval of the 
concession. As Norfund operates according to IFC‘s standards, they do not set a 
requirement for pre-consultations that include prior community consent, like the 
World Commission on Dams standards suggests. Legally speaking, according to 
the soft-rules imposed to the private actor, the company (SN Power and 
TrønderEnergi) followed the rules of Norfund and the legally binding norms of 
Uganda.  
When TPL took over the project, the second phases of consultations were 
directed to ―inform[ing] the population of what TPL‘s aims were and how they 
intended to do the project‖ (Pritchard, interview 7.04.2011). With this action, 
TPL proves to have a respect for the local community. Subsequently, the social 
impact assessment realized for the Bugoye project delineated risks of affecting 
the neighbors of the project in terms of resettlement and the socio-cultural 
implications for such a process (Salsaugen, interview 27.10.2010). Thus, the 
BPC was formed to consult local population about potential issues that the power 
plant may cause. Additionally, the first stage of the BPC served as a vehicle to 
solve the resettlement of affected families.  
However, the local CSO, CDTS described that the initial phase of the BPC did 
not work as expected by TPL and Newplan because local political leaders used 
BPC as a tool to obtain personal gains without the consent of the company or the 
local citizens (Pritchard, interview 7.04.2011). An initial failure led TPL to 
rethink a working strategy with the community. The resulting approach 
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demanded a higher involvement of the local people and of the advisors of 
Newplan. Then, Newplan supported by TPL, took more responsibility for 
organizing the grassroots existing in the communities. As a result, a more 
transparent resettlement process and other benefit sharing activities could be 
done (Pritchard, interview 7.04.2011). To a great extend, the lack of trust in 
public authorities meant that much of the benefit sharing activities outlined in the 
BPC memorandum of understanding were channeled through the local CSO. 
After, the new working framework was decided, further processes were clear and 
successful (Salsaugen, interview 27.10.2010). As suggested in the theoretical 
framework, governance models that include the government, CSOs, and the 
private actors are the suggested frameworks for market-driven activities.  
7.5.2 Reduction of poverty?  
The Livelihood framework requires that studied interventions fulfill the physical, 
financial, human, natural capital, and social aspects of poverty reduction 
approaches. From breaking down the chart in Annex 11, we find proof that all 
the suggested aspects of the livelihood framework are covered by the Bugoye 
project in various ways.  
Reading the UNDP‘s livelihood checking list, certain evidence stands out. First, 
the provision of physical infrastructure was clear in the Bugoye intervention. 
Examples of this were: the improvement of the access road, the upgrade of a 
local hospital, construction of water pipelines, and the construction of the 
football field. Additionally, all the restored houses were bigger and of a higher 
standard than the affected buildings (Salsaugen, interview 27.10.2010). The legal 
rights of ownerships were given to the women as heads of households
81
. This 
shows that gender equality aspects were taken into consideration as well.  
 The second element in the UNDP list is finance. In the contract with the civil 
works subcontractor, TPL established a list of demands connected to the well-
being of local employees. Noremco then hired most of the employees for civil 
                                              
81 Presentation by Bernhard Kvaal from TrønderEnergi at the conference ―Energibistand og forretningsmuligheter i 
Afrika‖ 11.11.2010 at Håndverkeren. Permission obtained through E-mail conversations on 8.04.2011. 
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works from the local community and nearby vicinities (Sylvian, interview 
19.04.2011). Additionally, they were provided a minimum legal wage and female 
staff accounted for about 11% of total local employees (Norfund 2009: 4-5). The 
female team was charged with ―more appropriate tasks‖ such as administrative 
assistants, store keepers, data registrations, cooks for the cantina, and nurses for 
the on-site clinic (Sylvian, interview 19.04.2011). While these results were the 
most concrete practices related to income provision and employment 
opportunities, they cannot be analyzed as permanent benefits because many of 
these jobs were available only during the construction period.  
The third component in the livelihood framework is the human element. This is 
concerned with the improvement of the skill base of the poor. TPL required to 
their sub-contractors to undergo vocational training. As a result, 10% of total 
employees received training certification as construction operators (Norfund 
2009:4-5). I did not encounter the reasons why the amount of trained staff was so 
low if this aspect is of relevance for increasing trickledown effects of the project. 
Other courses on HSE were also held for all the staff (Salsaugen, interview 
27.10.2010). Under the MoU, TPL was also committed to providing education 
related to HIV/AIDS and malaria. This was done through sponsoring courses 
arranged by CDTS.  
Fourth, natural capital is related to better or more productive use of nature. 
Besides of reduction of CO
2
 emissions, concrete activities that impacted the 
locals were not found.  But it can be argued that the environmental mitigation 
measure of leaving a minimum water flow in the Mubuku river allows the local 
community to keep supporting livelihoods from it. Aspect of incidence for a 
community whose subsistence depends on agriculture and collection of available 
eatable plants and animals in the valley. The decision to provide resettlement 
compensation based on land-for-land is equally important in this matter.  
Fifth, social aspects dedicate attention to strengthening community networks and 
organizations to support the people. In the BHHP, the Bugoye Participatory 
Committee (BPC) was a project element that contributed the most to reinforce 
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the capacity of the local community to organize themselves. The aim of the BPC 
was to liaise between the project representatives, local officials, local community 
leaders, and other stakeholders in monthly meetings. Female and traditional 
elderly community chiefs had a participatory place as well (Sylvian, interview 
19.04.2011), with the organizational arrangement considering the traditional 
community organization. For Osborne, public-private projects commissioned 
with public goals can enhance the legitimacy aspect by involving directly 
participants from the local community rather than only democratic 
representatives (Osborne 2000:21).  
The committee was an important channel for complains and comments from the 
community to the project developers. It also was permitted to set the goals for 
both obligatory mitigation practices and voluntary CSR contributions.  
Initially, the BPC suggested several items that required a mitigation measure by the 
project. Mentioned aspects were selected by listening the demands of the community 
and by asking them about their every day routines. In addition, an executive BPC team 
had the responsibility to propose a list about needs common for all the villages, so that 
TPL could assess benefit-sharing initiatives. In this process, we experienced that the 
villages had difficulties to encounter common needs. Therefore, we [social consultants] 
starting to survey among the different interests until we could find some commonalities. 
(Sylvian, interview 19.04.2011)  
Giving a voice to the involved stakeholders served the project‘s task of 
identifying the needs of the impacted community. Theisohn and Wignaraja 
(2007) had suggested that successful interventions to target the social aspects of 
poverty reduction help local communities to build ―appropriated capacities‖ of 
problem solving and function performance. By actively involving the local 
communities in decision-making and goal setting, the BPC played a role in 
enhancing the capacities of the communities.   
Poverty reduction assessed under the livelihood approach makes clear that 
analyzed processes and activities helped to alleviate poverty levels to some 
extend.  Some of the impacts on poverty alleviation for the majority of local 
community are temporarily constrained by the duration of the construction of the 
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plant. Examples of this are construction employment, clinic on project site, 
capacity building to local representatives. Permanent impacts on poverty 
alleviation are given by improving the skills of the poor due to training. This 
element could, nevertheless, be increased in terms of quantity of trained people. 
Other positive aspect is the balanced gender inclusion in the livelihood‘s 
components and the intervention‘s provision of alternatives to use the natural 
capital. Long term trickledown effects of the project are yet to be seen in the 
local community. Would the trained employees find suitable work, will the 
resettlement houses be maintained, and will civil society use their abilities to 
organize themselves in other situations? 
7.5.3  Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)  
Collected data in the IFC-PS chart shows that additional and voluntary assistance 
of TPL to the community count as direct contributions to MDG
82
. The CSR 
initiatives point to assistance to realization of the goals MDG 5, MDG 6, and 
MDG 7. MDG 5 aims for improvements in maternal health. Maternal mortality 
ratio can be reduced in the Bugoye community thanks to TPL donation of the 
maternity ward to the local clinic. The donation also included all necessary 
equipments to run this section and the training to local nurses (Sylvian, interview 
19.04.2011). This aspect can be accounted as significative advance for closing 
the rural-urban gap in skilled care during childbirth in Bugoye.  
The MDG 6 targets the combat of HIV/AIDS and malaria, among others 
diseases. While IFC-PS demanded TPL to have HIV/AIDS health services in the 
clinic based for duration of the construction of the project, TPL donated funds to 
a local CSO to raise awareness on the disease. The project clinic offered free 
HIV/AIDS tests and treatment for all members of the local and surrounding 
communities (Sylvian, interview 19.04.2011). This intervention has a 
temporarily limitation because such services were not kept after the finalization 
of the construction project. Nevertheless, the awareness raising programs for 
HIV/AIDS arranged by CDTS can be accounted as an initial step in reaching 
                                              
82 UN-MDG ―Millennium goals‖ Retrieved 4 August 2010. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml  
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youth and female groups in the area. The provision of treated mosquito nets 
accounts as a achieving a target itself towards the prevention of this disease.  In 
the MDG 7, environmental sustainability, the target of increasing the access of 
drinking water was covered by co-financing the construction of pipelines that 
provide drinking water in various communities of the Bugoye valley.  
Contribution to ameliorate partner‘s countries capacity to respond effectively to 
MDG is a goal of the Norwegian foreign aid. And the intervention of the public-
private financed company TPL contributed to some of the goals in a rural 
community in Uganda. It is possible to say that TPL, a private actor, was 
commissioned with a public task of equity provision. Yet many questions remain 
about the maintenance of these initiatives, such as how will the clinic run in the 
future?, or how will HIV/AIDS patients continue with the treatment?, or a 
hospital that requires permanent provision of medicines. This raises questions 
about the limits on the social responsibility of companies versus the 
responsibility of national governments to provide public goods. From a 
theoretical stand, how will the competition state guarantee sustainability of 
physical public goods that require special supplies and maintenance?  
7.6 Understanding the Development Effects 
Being said that ‗development‘ in foreign aid is concerned with enhancing 
economic growth and welfare in the receiver country, this assessment concludes 
that equity goals of development are provided by the market-driven intervention 
in Bugoye realized by Norfund. The first mandate of the development is 
enterprise creation and, in the case of CEfD, delivery of a hydropower plant. 
Bringing about the hydropower plant in Bugoye through co-investing with a 
private actor demonstrates that Norfund fulfilled its initial mission by creating 
the incentives for foreign investment in Uganda. Second, regards Norfund‘s 
developmental mission, this assessments finds that the commercially driven 
institution has capabilities to deliver equity goals as well.  
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Making an analogy with the welfare state, Norfund, is committed to provide an 
‗equitable society‘ in the communities where it invests. Norfund‘s equity tasks in 
the Bugoye project has reduced the levels of insecurity and guaranteed minimum 
live standards of local populations. I also protect the nature. All this was 
achieved through risk management policies established in Norfund‘s 
sustainability guidelines. Contractual regulation of private property, job, 
environmental aspects were present in the intervention. The project provided in 
kind benefits to residents in the Bugoye district in terms of ―better‖ quality of 
resettlement houses and benefits resulting from MDG programs. Consultations 
for social management plans gave a voice to the local communities. And poverty 
levels, in terms of livelihoods, were alleviated during the construction of the 
power plant. Further effects on poverty alleviation aspects are yet to be seen.  
Norfund‘s working processes relate to the equity task of a state. Equity 
development effects achieved by Norfund are little understood by public 
stakeholders probably due to the use of a rather different terminology and 
methods than ones prevailing in traditional aid-related jargon. Much of the 
sustainable project management of Norfund is similar to typical aid program‘s 
management systems. Public-private investments, like Bugoye, in renewable 
energies projects are founded the technical rationale of environmental and social 
impact assessments (ESIA) which operate accordingly the idea of not harming 
the environment or the local society.  In political terms, the essence of ESIA 
involves the intergenerational and the intergenerational elements of equity 
described by Goodland‘s discourse about sustainable development (Goodland 
1998:71). In line with Bøås (2002) argument, ESIA also remove the political 
self-interest character of decision-making by operating under the name of a 
greater common good; or at least what consultants believe its is better as a hole. 
This technocratic operational model not only favor the rich, as it is claimed, but it 
opens a door for more equitable development alternatives according to the 
knowledge system and values of a capitalistic political economy which it 
supports.  
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As an aid institution, Norfund contributed to realize Norwegian foreign aid goals.   
The possibilities to increase equity benefits are, however, constrained by the 
donor-receiver logic of operation. Norfund, representing the donor country, could 
not intervene in the decisions of the Ugandan authorities to enhance welfare. An 
example of this is the Ugandan decision related to the energy concession which 
stated that electricity generated by the project had to be delivered to national 
grid. Another feature is the pre-existence of hydropower plants in the Muboku 
river, something that in the view of CSOs weakened the real possibility of 
environmental management routines to protect existing ecosystems. Furthermore, 
Norfund is not entitled to account on the financial resources paid to the Ugandan 
state i.e. taxes, fees; which are an important element in measuring the real 
outcomes of the trickledown effects of investments. Consequently, defining the 
limits of the responsibility of actors in market-driven aid is difficult.  
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8. Development, The Efficiency Task 
In the previous chapter, my argument was that Norfund contributes to the 
realization of Norwegian foreign aid goals and that equity objectives of a state 
were achieved by a market-driven intervention in Uganda. Pre-existing 
assessments of Norfund‘s operation in the Bugoye project points that efficiency 
tasks are found with regards the mobilization of foreign direct investment to 
Uganda (chapter five). I have argued that Norfund is a market-driven institution, 
with many elements that indicate the avenue of operational forms of a 
competition state in Norway‘s international sphere. By studying whether the 
achieved equity goals in the studied intervention can be attributed to Norfund‘s 
operations, it is possible to shed light on the perceived new role of Norway as a 
competition state reflected in Norfund.  
8.1 Norfund’s Efficiency Task  
The efficiency task of Norfund is determined by its mission of enterprise creation 
in less developed markets, and by its goal as a PFM. As a Public Finance 
Mechanism in the CEfD program, Norfund was encountered catalytic. Public and 
private partners contributed to build a project worth USD 60 million. By 
analyzing the financial structure, it is possible to say that Norfund had a direct 
leveraging effect
83
 of 10:1 in this project, meaning that for every USD million 
contributed by Norfund, ten UDS millions were provided in total. With this 
Norfund fulfilled its task as a PFM.   
Commercially speaking, each month the power plant produces power worth USD 
1 million (Salsaugen, interview 27.10.2010). TE, the private shareholder, 
anticipated a 20% return on the investment. Until the first quarter of 2010, TE 
only received 15% on dividends; something considered by the company as low 
due to the high risk involved in assets (Salsaugen, interview 27.10.2010). During 
the third quarter of 2010, an increase in dividends had place given that the 
                                              
83 Ratio for leveraged capital is calculated by diving the total invested amount divided into the public contribution 
amount. So, in millions USD 60,6 / 6,3 = 9,6 (Ratio). Rations can be approximated to the closest digit. In this 
calculus I approximate the final 9,6 to 10.  
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anticipated water levels were higher than projections, thus more energy was 
produced. TPL expects that high production remains constant, but for the 
company the most important aspect is the proved real profitability of such a risky 
project (Værnes, interview 21.10.2010). The private investor proves its 
understanding of the market reality. In fact, ongoing projects show the 
willingness of the company to continue operating in the Ugandan settings.  
The achievement of financial, economic and catalytic and additionality goals 
shows Norfund‘s intrinsic preference for market-based mechanisms to deliver the 
economic goals in a competition state. The task of bringing companies into 
foreign investments, signifies that Norfund plays the role of a commodifying 
actor in projects and companies for determined markets. With such a role, 
Norfund has influence in deciding what companies, what projects, what sectors 
and what countries are suitable to receive Norwegian foreign aid. Something that 
cannot be done without understanding the capabilities of Norwegian firms and 
the need‘s of developing countries‘ economies.  
8.1.1 A Public Private Partnership (PPP)  
The Bugoye hydropower plant is the result of cooperation between Norfund and 
TE through the project vehicle Trønder Power Ltd (TPL). This collaboration 
required capital ready to invest in a high risk market, technical known-how, and 
market expertise. Co-operation between a public and a private actor, in the aid 
sector, with the objective of realizing a common goal is defined as partnership 
(Tesner with Kell 2000, Nelson 2002) or as a public-private partnership (PPP) 
(Bull and McNeil 2007).  
When Norfund operates, it plays the role of an investor placing demands on the 
invested company. Nevertheless, in the investment to build the Bugoye plant, 
Norfund has also contributed to take the project forward. Thus, acting as a 
partner represents an additional feature of Norfund in this case of study.  
Bugoye is a little bit special in that we [Norfund] have both roles; one role as an 
investor requiring things from TE, but also as a partner helping to develop the project, 
assisting with all the financial sides of coordinating with other investors, and explaining 
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TE about how to go about various processes in Uganda. We had a mix of roles in the 
Bugoye and this is special. We worked much more with Bugoye than normally a DFI 
would do. (Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011) 
This operational mode can be explained in the light of Norfund as a competition 
state institution that intends to take full advantage of the synergy between the 
public and private actors in order to deliver its mission. According to Cerny 
(2008), these special-purpose bodies combine traditional features of public 
institutions with characteristics of the private sector in order to enhance public-
private cooperation.  Partnership theorists have identified several forms of 
combining public and private resources, with the object of their study being the 
nature of collaboration in schemes that involves funding from a public agency to 
mobilize private capital to realize public objectives (Osborne 2000, Bull and 
McNeil 2007). What shape does this competition governance form have between 
Norfund and TE to deliver the above mentioned public results?  
8.1.2 Getting a Partner 
To start a partnership, an initial requirement should be to find a partner. The 
establishment of the studied partnership depended greatly on the financial 
structure of the investment for the project. TE did not commit itself into the 
project until the MfA approved the grant. This grant was presented as 
controversial in previous evaluations (section 6.6). In this case, Norfund cannot 
be held responsible for a decision made in higher levels of the government or by 
other institutions.  
PPP and the Competition State 
From the competition state theory, the MfA grant represents the willingness of 
the Norwegian state to facilitate the conditions that determine the competitive 
advantage of this strategic industrial sector. In the example of the grant, TE 
needed to reach an acceptable rate of financial return on their investment. If this 
holds true, political reasons exist to believe that the grant to the PPP Norfund-TE 
should have come from a different budget than the foreign aid one. Political 
maneuvers to support Norwegian industry were combined with Norwegian 
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foreign aid. If this type action continues to happen in future market-driven aid, 
there is risk that Norway as a donor repeats the mistakes occurred in energy aid 
during the 80‘s. Usher (2007) identified that Norwegian aid to the energy sector 
favored Nordic energy related industries more than to developing countries. 
Political debate is, then, necessary when it concerns whether or not a realistic 
foreign aid budget should bear the cost of adjustments of the Norwegian 
hydropower industry penetrating new markets. And if Norfund‘s partnerships are 
to serve industrial policy goals as well.  
Instrumentalist Partnership 
After financial structure was in place, TE accepted inclusion in the partnership. 
The terms of engagement in this PPP are purely instrumental. On one side, 
Norfund searched or mobilizing private capital with expertise in hydropower. On 
the other, TE needed to enter to a foreign market with the help of a capable 
partner that could contribute with market information and advice. 
Selecting TrønderEnergi as a partner was a matter of good timing. We were looking for 
a private partner that could replace SN Power in the Bugoye project; but we wanted a 
Norwegian company with long experience in the hydropower sector and TE had it 
(Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011).  
Instrumental reasons for PPP engagement had been visible in empirical research 
(Bull and McNeil 2007). The process of mobilization implied the identification 
of potential partners with capabilities and needs that permitted most synergies. 
By appointing a PPP, Norfund as a public institution puts in evidence an 
organizational manifestation of the idea to combine the added value of 
governmental interference with the qualities of market-oriented parties, as Klijin 
and Teisman (2000:84) has described partnerships.  
In fact, the interest of Norfund to operate as a partner was enhanced by the 
incentive of Bugoye being a referential project, and the commitment of 
Norfund‘s CEO Kjell Roland to deliver concrete results.  
Bugoye was so important as a reference project to show that it is possible to create these 
kinds of investments in a sustainable manner. Our CEO is so concerned with actually 
creating real results, that is why he finds ways of providing developing countries with 
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more electricity. He is not stuck in the traditional mindset of a CEO of a DFI. He is 
willing to listen to the company; to find ways of working together. (Vilsted, interview 
18.04.2011) 
Therefore, the participation of Norfund in Bugoye is the result of the action of a 
political entrepreneur engaged to discover new forms of cooperation with 
emerging groups of interests such as the Norwegian hydropower sector and with 
other government agencies for foreign aid.  
8.1.3 The Structure of the Relationship 
To understand a partnership, McQaid (2000) proposes to consider the flows of 
resources, power, and information. To build a hydropower plant with commercial 
finances, it is first necessary to bring the pre-feasibility assessments of the project 
into a bankable stage. The process of project financing was unknown for TE, 
thus, the company needed to learned it. One can argue that this fact situated TE 
in an underprivileged position vis á vis the public institution. Unfamiliar with 
project finance, the company did not have much opportunity to negotiate the 
clauses but to follow Norfund‘s ‗advices‘. Despite of TE unbalanced position, the 
firm experienced that Norfund helped them to realize the project; something of 
the interest of the company.  
Without Norfund‘s many hours committed to assisting us, we would not have achieve 
Bugoye. (Værnes, interview 21.10.2010) 
Norfund transferred expertise to TE for conducting particular processes. The 
company has now learned the ‗Norfund‘s style‘ for bankability routines. This is 
of particular interest because standard application goes hand-in-hand with 
bankability‘s demands in development financing. Thus, through information 
sharing, Norfund has influenced the operations of the private partner. A form of 
‗soft power‘ was exercised by Norfund to influence the operational forms of TE. 
Soft power, defined by Joseph Nye (2004), is the ability to obtain desired aspects 
through attraction. 
It has been so good working with TrønderEnergi because they have been so humble and 
always asking what they needed to learn. We [Norfund] have had projects were the 
private partner wanted to push the costs down; but Trønder has been so sincere on that 
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they wanted to build a project they were proud of. Hope that for future projects, Trønder 
will be more confident on what they have learn from our team on how to do business in 
the Ugandan settings (Vilsted, interview 18.04.2011) 
The eagerness expressed by Norfund to help the company reflected the moral 
authority of the institution by possessing a particular expertise and by engaging 
the private actor in learning processes that will, ideally, be replicated in future 
operations. Nonetheless, it is not possible to assess whether Norfund could 
influence private partners which do not have much need for their ‗advises‘, 
experienced and bigger partners like Statkraft in the SN Power partnership. 
Experience have proven that the interest of a firm in operating responsibly or not 
can influence the outcomes of market-driven aid. 
Further, Norfund‘s ownership exercise involved the institution in cooperation for 
decision making, in technical terms, throughout the project lifecycle. In fact, 
Norfund‘s local officer in Kampala was sent with the rationale to follow-up all 
TPL actions related to the project implementation, specially those concerned with 
social and environmental risk mitigation. Decision making in infrastructure 
projects has proven to be challenging (Klijin and Teisman 2000) and a 
hydropower plant is no exception. Norfund‘s ESG rules demonstrated to have 
capacity to regulate the processes of the private actor. The environmental and 
social successes, described in chapter seven, are consequences of clear demands 
from Norfund to the private partner. The investment code used by Norfund states 
the obligations of the company to comply with the ESG guidelines and reporting. 
Whether consequences of non-compliance are difficult to exert in investments, 
private investors are also motivated by protecting their finances.  
In this case, the synergies of the cooperation were achieved due to the open 
nature of interactions and transparency through the whole course of action, from 
planning to implementation of the project. In consequence, the practice of a 
horizontal governance approach is explained by the teamwork between the 
organization and the institution for decision making regarding issues that affected 
third parties- local communities. This form of cooperating among the partners is 
one of the tendencies imposed by a competition state model. Norfund have the 
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task of monitoring and supervising the production of public services in Uganda, 
as well as helping to leverage the capacity of the Norwegian national industry to 
operate in foreign markets.  
8.2 The Role of the Company Into Aid Delivery 
By attracting a firm into a PPP, Norfund engages the company in the production 
of public goods, basically, energy production. Moreover, in chapter six and seven 
it was presented that TPL contributed to enhancing the welfare of Ugandan rural 
population in Bugoye. Even though the company was not formally required to 
do, it was decided to share the benefits of the Bugoye project with the locals.  In 
this regard, Norwegian CSOs expressed concern with the emergent role of 
private actors as providers of public goals in the South; in other words, as aid 
actors. In the case of international operations of a business group, scholarship 
addresses research about poverty alleviation as business strategy (Kolk and Van 
Tudler 2006 and Wilde-Ramsing 2009). TPL, actually, engaged in benefit 
sharing activities because it was natural and because the company wanted to 
improve their relations with their near neighboring communities. TPL 
contributed to the local community after public consultations were undertaken or 
after getting familiar with the needs of the locals. In fact, the core idea of the 
CSO NCA to have a triangular benefit-sharing decision was present.  In the case 
of study, the goals of Norwegian foreign aid were enhanced by  private initiatives 
undertaken in the Ugandan context.  
From Hopkins (2007) view of CSR, presented in section 6.5, TPL‘s intentions 
were to create higher standard of livings to some of the company‘s stakeholders 
while preserving the profitability of the company. The potential of TPL in the 
Bugoye intervention to contribute to poverty alleviation does not rely on pure 
philanthropic activities but on a holistic CSR practice that also makes economic 
sense.  In Norway, the headquarters of TE had reasons to engage in CSR due to 
employee retention and to continue playing its traditional role as a provider of 
public goods. The group‘s subsidiary in Uganda, TPL was mostly concerned with 
bottom line reputational risks. This reflected that both TPL and TE see CSR as a 
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corporate strategy (Fombrun and Shanley 1990) that also can fulfill the 
expectations of some stakeholders (Freeman 1984).  In this case, a company got 
engaged in CSR practices because it made economic sense and because it was 
part of the corporate identity, as a publicly owned company. Indeed, TPL 
engaged into benefit sharing activities because the headquarters have 
traditionally commanded to operate under this model in the home country. CSR 
decision-making is, in the case of TPL, influenced by the pre-existing co-
operational frameworks between public and private actors in Norway. 
The competition state theory suggests that state-based activities increasingly turn 
into ‗marketized‘ ones. In the case of Norwegian foreign aid, this case shows that 
the market delivered public goods (aid goals).  As the Norfund can guide 
companies on how to operate ‗responsibly and socially‘ aware, it does not 
constitute a rule per se because it is not a binding part of the partnership. 
Nevertheless, CSR actions have proven to be beneficial for achieving the goals of 
the political institution. Thus, this potential deserves to be explored in future 
partnerships undertaken by Norfund in the energy sector. Such type of aid 
projects has less straightforward results and benefits for local communities if 
electricity is delivered to national grids. Finding evidence of competitive 
practices in the Norwegian foreign aid, the engagement of private actors in public 
tasks, namely aid provision, deserves further research.  
8.3 Competition State, a Double Way? 
Norway, as a competition state will engage in the promotion of economic 
activities in order to remain relatively competitive to other states. According to 
Norwegian global realism, way to do this is arranging the delivery of public 
goods together with assisting competitive national industries to get international. 
Does this case shows evidence of Norfund acting as an export promotion actor? 
I have argued that Norfund, by committing additional efforts into the Bugoye 
project, have contributed to the promotion of Norwegian exports. Indeed, a 
strong commitment of Norfund in the partnership with TE generates expectations 
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among other companies interested to co invest with the fund, in that Norfund will 
be eager to assist companies in a safe internationalization ventures to developing 
markets. Business as usual for DFIs is not solely invest but they usually do not 
assist partners. If Norfund is not sure whether they will continue playing a double 
role, how asserted is the hypothesis made about Norfund as a partner for 
exporting the Norwegian hydropower industry?  
Export Promotion 
From the perspective of Intpow, the successful internationalization of the 
Norwegian renewable energy industries is measured in terms of augment in the 
volume of exports and companies abroad. Certainly, a result of Norfund‘s 
investment in TPL was the creation of the first international subsidiary of TE, 
which can be counted as a new company abroad. This fact changed the identity 
of the company from a regional status to an international group. However, the 
volume of exports of TE was not increased. TE, instead of selling a service or 
Norwegian produced electricity, was investing capital into a company or project.  
A second assessment question for Intpow is the quality of exports of the sector as 
a cluster. The aim of the business organization is to get project‘s owner 
companies to purchase supply products and services from their Norwegian 
counterparts. To date, there are no indications that TPL have bought the majority 
of their supplies from other Norwegian companies. Besides the Norwegian 
Multiconsult, which was awarded the contract for the design of the project, I did 
not find evidence of other Nordic companies involved in the procurement for 
Bugoye. However, it is possible to identify a trend of supplier companies 
partially owned by Norwegian shareholders. Newplan Uganda, for example, is 
40% owned by the Norwegian Norplan AS
84
. Noremco, outsourcer of civil 
works, is a subsidiary of the Swedish group Veidekke
85
. Further research should 
give attention to this tendency. Is this a strategy of Nordic companies to obtain 
contracts in developing markets by establishing local subsidiaries? Do local 
content requirements of public financiers can be accounted if outsourcer 
                                              
84 Newplan. ‖About us‖ Retrieved 30 April 2011. http://www.newplan.ug/index.php/about-us.html  
85 Noremco. ‖About us‖ Retrieved 29 April 2011. http://www.noremco.se/who-we-are.htm  
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companies are registered in the developing country but owned by other 
international companies? Does this strategy signifies transfer of knowledge to the 
poor?  
Even if the industry organization Intpow disagree that Norfund contributed to 
increase the exports of the Norwegian industrial sector (Hagen, interview 
5.05.2011), in practical terms the assistance provided to TE in this initial 
endeavor was of high value. Without the help, the first internationalization 
experience of TE would have been longer and costly. Should other Norwegian 
regional companies expect the same role from Norfund? The institutional 
informant responded that this is still unclear.  
If you want Norwegian hydropower companies to go out, I think that [companies] 
expect and want that role of Norfund [as investor and as a partner]. I am not sure if we 
are able to do that every time but there will definitively be an expectation. There is a 
desired to see Norwegian regional hydropower companies investing in developing 
countries but they should also be willing to take on the same role as TE. (Vilsted, 
interview 18.04.2011) 
The valuable cooperation and help from Norfund to other Norwegian companies 
interested to export will have a price. And that price is determined by the 
challenge to engage in responsible corporate practices according to Norfund‘s 
ESG rules. The co operational rule is given by Norfund‘s terms of engagement. 
The Norfund‘s team is, hence, committed to lead efforts in assuring that investee 
companies are sustainable and responsible.  
The Ugandan Competition State 
Besides the findings about Norfund as an economic instrument of the Norwegian 
competition state, I also encountered two aspects for which I can support that 
competition state characteristics are visible in the Ugandan state. First, the 
electricity sector in Uganda is diversified and privatized. Privatization of the  
production of common goods, like electricity, is an aspect of competition state 
policies. The role of the government is actually to commission companies to 
produce, transmit and deliver electricity, and to regulate the operation of this 
sector. In fact, by organizing the energy market in an specific way, the 
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government acts as a commodifying actor deciding that companies can operate in 
one part of the value chain.  
Second, the Ugandan government did not show interest for rural electrification 
during its negotiation with TPL for the energy concession. The reason of the 
government to demand TPL to deliver all electricity to national grid was because 
national industry requires electricity in order to growth. The Ugandan 
government has targeted economic growth because its effects will trickledown, 
thus impact the rest of the population. This rationale reflects a capitalistic model 
of thinking. Something that can be alleged to economic globalization which 
transmits the neo-liberal model. In the light of global forces, it remains an open 
question whether a national institution such as Norfund can have influence over 
global discourses or messages.  
8.4 The Public Role of a Market-driven Institution – 
Reinventing Governance  
Market-driven institutions combine business based procedures with  traditional 
features of public institutions to achieve public goals. From analyzing the 
operational mode of Norfund in this intervention, I identified five tasks of 
Norfund as a market-driven public institution. The following practices produce 
and reproduce competition state forms in Norway. The identified actions are: 
mandating, facilitating, partnering, endorsing, and accountability. 
Mandating: Norfund defines the goals of investments with its partners. It also 
delineates the accountability mechanisms of public financing institutions to 
private sector which are given by the ESG rules. Well established goals, policies 
and guidelines permit to increase national industry competitiveness in 
international markets and to persuade companies to operate responsibly for 
economic reasons. As a provider of foreign aid, Norfund contributes to economic 
growth in developing countries and at the same time it enhance the capabilities of 
the market to provide welfare or social benefit; something other public 
institutions can learn. In taking on a mandating role, governments must be 
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conscious about striking the right balance between economic competitiveness 
and environmental and social protection. 
Facilitating As a commercially oriented institution, the capacity of Norfund to 
enforce rules is restricted. In the case of non-compliance withdrawing 
investments is not usually a financially wise decision given the identity of 
Norfund as a long term investor. In stead,  Norfund prefers to enter into a 
dialogue with its investee company in order to improve actions. Norfund 
assumed the role as facilitator by a) providing knowledge and expertise about 
social and environmental challenges presented in the market; b) defining clear 
expectations about ethical and sustainable operation criteria; c) providing 
additional financial incentives to engage the private partner in welfare related 
actions. The facilitation role in the Norfund case is mostly concerned with 
assisting and guiding the private actor so that the overall intervention could 
achieve the expected public goals as well as the private ones. Public goals are 
related to facilitate the construction of a renewable energy plant that did not harm 
local nature and people. Moreover, the Norfund grant is a financial assistance 
aimed to influence companies‘ interest to engage in CSR activities, which were 
proven to have a high impact in the achievement of other aid goals.  
Partnering General preconditions for successful partnerships are the terms of 
engagement and the cultural traditions of collaboration among different actors of 
a society. The success of the partnership between Norfund and TE is a reflection 
of the pre-existence of a long tradition of collaborative modes between public 
and private sector in Norwegian culture. On one hand, the historical tradition of 
the Norwegian publicly owned hydropower sector has educated companies to 
take part in defining socioeconomic goals and on operating under traditional 
public tasks such as consulting stakeholders, or providing some public goods 
such as bridges, roads, etc.  In the other, Norfund is a relatively young 
organization and much of its operation rationale is based on contemporary tends 
on how efficiently co-operate with private sector. While Norfund do not have a 
long collaborative tradition, their expertise is inherent in the institution‘s identity, 
something that can compensates for a lack of ‗experience‘. Matching partners 
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with an overall understanding of the implications of a public-private partnership 
eases the realization of public and private goals and opens opportunities for 
considering the role of a market-driven intervention in the delivery of the equity 
goals.  
Endorsing Norfund operates under the ESG rules which emerged from the 
EDFI‘s Rome Consensus. By attaching to such rules, Norfund, reaffirms the 
legitimacy and moral authority of the promoted guidelines, which represent a 
norm. The Rome Consensus is derivate from discussions undertaken in the 
European network of DFIs. This normative system has not emerged from 
traditional rule-making of states but attaching to an international normative set 
gives legitimacy to the rules. Policy networks are a concept that emerged in the 
core of a competition state‘s theoretical approach; however, it remains an open 
question whether or not such policy networks are politically accepted as 
legitimate rule-making processes. Global governance calls for a triangular model 
of governance where public actors, private actors and CSOs are represented; 
however this is not the case of the Rome Consensus. While Norfund endorses a 
set a rules, the mechanisms for creating them challenges the legitimacy of a 
triangular governance.  
Accountability The type of economic partnerships in which Norfund is 
involved is characterized by several tasks which have different lines of command 
and responsibility. In addition to being a donor and facilitator, Norfund is also 
monitors the correct progress of an investee. Even if the rationale behind the 
monitoring process as an exercise of ownership, given the natural interest to 
secure the invested capital, permits a closer intromission for accountability on 
partner companies. Exercise of ownership is also done with the thought of 
monitoring the development effects of investments. Development in terms of a 
project is seen as risk management and compliance with conditionality imposed 
by the donor. Thus, accountability secures that minimum risk mitigation 
practices and compliance with ESG aspects have been carried-out by a project. In 
the foreign aid sector, this mechanism proves to be of utility because it allows a 
closer follow-up of the intended intervention. Actually what Norway is really 
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exporting is nation-state model which sees economic and equity objectives as 
complementary. This case study of Norfund demonstrates how the integration of 
both objectives is happening successfully in development assistance.  
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
Political institutions in the center of a competition state seek to lead the 
cooperation processes so that the partnerships can achieve the right synergies 
with the private sector while public goals also materialize.  The experience of 
Norfund proves that the above-mentioned five tasks can assist public institutions 
in finding the appropriate balance for goal-achievement. Successful channels of 
public finances to private sector for development, in this case, prove that finance 
provision is only one task among a myriad of governance tasks that public 
founders conduct. With the demand for active public institutions concerned with 
public finances to private sector, the state is brought back into the scenario.  
In the implementation of the Bugoye HPP, additional functions of Norfund have 
been capacity building, accountability, and standards raising. Elements that were 
argued to have a positive impact in the developmental mission of the fund. DFI‘s 
literature has identified that the development assistance role of development 
banking is related to the additional tasks of improving information flows, 
enhancing borrower capacity, and improving forecast of debt servicing 
(Musasike 2004). This case study has proven earlier findings true. Additionally, 
this public role is provide a leveled playing field, in countries that lack 
regulation, for companies to operate. This should establish clear operating 
standards and guidelines for a responsible business environment, which considers 
public welfare and quality of life for the various stakeholders. 
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9. Conclusion 
Market-driven, according to Colin Leys‘s definition (2001), are emergent 
political practices that combine traditional institutional features with business 
oriented procedures and reasoning. In the Norwegian foreign aid, the institution 
Norfund operates under such a rationale by providing public finances to the 
private sector in order to fulfill public goals, namely development. I define 
market-driven aid as a form of giving aid that mixes public and private goals, 
interests, roles and operational forms. This model differ substantially from 
traditional aid provision by involving private (commercial) actors in public tasks, 
as such, it deserves to be recognized and studied. To learn more about the nature 
of this phenomenon, I have examined one institution in the Norwegian aid 
system and one particular intervention. I have analyzed the case of Norfund‘s 
intervention in the Bugoye hydropower project and whether this ‗investment‘ had 
the ability to deliver development outcomes. With this case of study, I expected 
to enhance understanding about market-driven practices in the Norwegian 
foreign aid sector. In chapter four, I presented the contextual background of the 
emerging aid model, the Norwegian global realist foreign policy. In chapter five, 
I introduced Norfund, its goals, mandates and operational style. Chapters six was 
dedicated to the Bugoye hydropower project. Subsequently, chapter seven and 
eight evaluated the results delivered by the intervention in Bugoye. In this 
chapter, I will summarize my conclusions. 
9.1 Market-Driven Aid Providing Development 
This study defined ‗development‘ from the foreign aid stand. It concerns with 
helping a developing country in achieving economic growth and welfare; 
missions which ultimately account for the efficiency and equity tasks of a state. 
From this position, the intervention of Norfund in the Bugoye hydropower plant 
delivered public goals. Bugoye provided Uganda with 7% additional energy from 
a renewable and non-polluting source. Such energy is said to be used to revitalize 
the Ugandan private sector development which requires electricity to prosper. 
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Construction of energy projects have historically been catalogued by 
international CSOs as dangerous for local communities and environment. 
However, the Bugoye hydropower plant was built with careful mitigation of 
environmental and social risk during the construction period.  Risk mitigation 
had place according to Norfund guidelines for sustainable practices in the 
companies where the fund invests. In addition, the international company 
commissioned with the construction and operation of the plant, TPL, created 
strategies to share the economic benefits with the local community because direct 
benefits from the power plant were less straightforward for the locals since all 
electricity generated is delivered to national grid.  
One Development, Several goals 
To assist a partner country in ‗getting developed‘, the Norwegian foreign aid 
policy has defined several goals that constitute important elements in achieving 
the final task of development provision. While the main purpose of the Bugoye 
hydropower was to assist Uganda to generate electricity in a clean and 
sustainable manner, the project also achieved additional goals of the Norwegian 
foreign policy i.e. contribution to MDG, gender equality, etc. With this, I 
attribute to Norfund the achievement of the main goal of the project –clean 
energy provision- because the development fund incentivized a firm to invest in 
Uganda. Thus, Norfund fulfilled its mission as public financing mechanism. 
Nevertheless, other achieved goals that impacted the Ugandan settings cannot be 
attributed to the direct operations of Norfund because the results account for 
CSR‘s initiatives of TPL, something under the realm of businesses. If Trønder 
Power Ltd is analyzed as a PPP between Norfund and TrønderEnergi, one can 
say that the additional equity goals achieved in Bugoye are attributed to Norfund. 
From a PPP approach, the market-driven intervention delivered both efficiency 
and equity tasks of the Norwegian foreign aid for the benefit of Uganda.  
Market-driven and Global Realist 
The research question was answered above but what does a market-driven 
intervention signify for Norway? During the thesis, I had argued that market-
driven practices and institutions have a double political role –combining 
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industrial policy with welfare or aid policies. The first refers to the efficiency 
task and the other to the equity tasks of Norway as a state. From the Norwegian 
position, Norfund‘s double mission was argued to enhance competitiveness of 
national industry and to deliver public goals in developing countries. Whereas 
Norfund‘s fulfilled its equity task by delivering ‗development‘ in Uganda, I did 
not find evidence of Norfund directly enhancing the international 
competitiveness of the hydropower sector as a cluster according to the position of 
the interviewed business organization Intpow. If an efficiency role for the benefit 
of Norway can be attributed to Norfund, it should be the assistance provided to a 
company to start international operations like teaching TE to get a project 
bankable. However, this modus operandi also benefited Norfund‘s interests for 
advancing public goals. As a consequence, the case of study has proven to be 
market-driven but not fully competitive, in terms of a Norwegian competition 
state.  
In fact, what Norway, as a nation does, is exporting is its operational forms of 
collaborating with the private sector in order to achieve a state‘s efficiency and 
equity goals. Bugoye has established a moral setting in Uganda. TPL has proven 
that it is possible to build hydropower projects without harming local societies 
and environment. What is more, TPL has demonstrated that a commercial energy 
project in Ugandan settings can be profitable, to the extend that benefits can be 
shared with the society as a whole. With such an example, the Ugandan 
government and CSOs can raise the demands to future commercial investors in 
line with the demonstration effects delivered by TPL in Bugoye. Such an 
operational morality of benefit sharing and responsible operations is credited to 
the traditional forms of cooperating among public and private actors in Norway; 
which in the studied example were exported to Uganda. In the words of the 
Norwegian global realism, I encountered that in the example of Bugoye, Norway 
as a nation operated in the international arena based on the two main questions of 
global realism: is this important for Norwegian interests and if Norway can make 
a difference? Concretely, foreign aid public finances co-invested with Norwegian 
private sector can make a difference in energy related aid projects.  
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9.2 The Competition State Explaining Norwegian Aid  
A second major objective of this thesis was to enhance the competition state 
theoretical approach. In line with that goal, I used a case study as methodology of 
research which is particularly useful for theory testing. My findings points that 
there are three general levels of pattern matching between the collected empirical 
evidence of the Norfund‘s case in Bugoye and the proposals of the competition 
state theory.  
From general to particular, a Norwegian foreign policy delineated by global 
realism is subordinated to the neo-liberalist doctrine to the extend that it seeks in 
the long term to strengthen economic, political and human Norwegian resources. 
All elements are part of an all encompassing strategy necessary to remain 
competitive relative to other states. A neo-liberalist policy also supports and 
advances this role model of development in poor countries by giving aid 
assistance to private sector development, economic growth and other market 
efficiency tasks on partner countries; topics that were traditionally outside the aid 
agenda (until midst 90‘s). Indeed, the Norwegian Clean Energy for Development 
program offers aid under the rationale of finding markets for the structured 
Norwegian industrial cleantech (energy) sector. Aspect that is visible in the grant 
given to the Bugoye project by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the 
export guarantee issued by Giek. PFMs actually back up private investments in 
risky markets; in other words, the state creates conditions for the industry to 
penetrate global markets. Even if I did not find evidence of this assumption in the 
studied case of Norfund, it does not mean that the assumption is not valid in 
more general contexts. Therefore, an assessment of the nexus between the 
industrial and the aid policy is required on the CEfD program.  
Theoretical propositions serve to explain Norfund‘s main mission of enterprise 
creation in developing countries which is concerned with the task of addressing 
coordination problems that inhibit the growth of (developing countries‘) private 
sector. In the view of foreign aid, this efficiency task is innovative because 
traditional Norwegian aid has been mainly given for equity goals. Then, in aid 
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terms the question is not whether or not financing developing countries‘ 
economic growth, but under which conditions this type of aid should be given? 
Further, the modus operandi of Norfund based on contractualization, semi-legal 
or soft regulation and monitoring is explained by the used theory. Norfund 
established a partnership and operational rules under an investment contract. The 
ESG guidelines of Norfund are inspired in semi-legal rules for market actors to 
operate, to be precise investee companies. And Norfund‘s ownership exercise 
essentially monitors the production of public goods in a developing country. 
However, the task of Norfund –as an foreign aid institution- is constrained by the 
rules of aid delivery.  
The Bugoye project was the result of a partnership in which my findings show 
that public goals depended on the nature of the collaboration among public and 
private actors, the nature of long-term goals as energy investments is and the type 
of interest of public and private actors. In my case of study, successful 
achievement of public goals was greatly determined by the identity of the private 
actor. Therefore, Norfund should be alert at selecting future partners. In the 
analysis of how a market-driven institution deliver public results I encountered 
necessary to find support in additional scholarly on partnership. The competition 
state theory provides a more general framework for explaining the case as a 
whole but it missed elements of guiding more concrete analysis. From a different 
perspective, the case of study did not respond to all the proposals of the 
competition state. I did not find evidence of an open dialogue among the public 
institution, the private company and Norwegian CSOs. Having no proved of a 
triangular governance, there is a need to make a call for open processes of rule 
making, standard setting and accountability. Also, the studied Norwegian CSOs 
need to create institutional positions about how to collaborate with the private 
sector, to establish clear demands and routines if Norwegian global realism is to 
be advanced as a competitive model or even as a relational state representation.  
Theory Testing and Possibilities of Generalization 
Based on the cited pattern-matches, I sustain that the competition state theory is 
supported. This theory actually worked to explain real life situations. In my 
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particular case of study I discover that competition state theory serves better 
studies at national levels of the state. I uncovered some weaknesses of the 
theoretical approach to explain in detail operational forms of competitive 
institutions. This limitation can be overcome by applying additional theories 
designed to realize analysis in lower political levels, concretely institutions 
operating under market-driven conditions. An example of complementary 
theories is the partnerships or CSR theories.   
Generalization from case study research is a challenging task. In my study, I 
support that generalization of results have place given that the studied theory was 
sustained. Additionally, my assessment method allowed me to discover general 
positions of what constitutes a legitimate and acceptable public investment in a 
company to build an energy project in a developing country. I, conversely, argue 
that the capacity of the generalization of the case is limited to the specific 
settings of industrialized states with similar interests, values and characteristics. 
So, public equity and efficiency goals can be delivered by market-driven 
interventions when the relations among public-private actors function under clear 
semi-contractualized rules, the goals have an inherent long-term aspect and the 
private partner operate under ethical stands inherited from previous practices.  If 
such aspects are in place in market-driven intervention, then, the possibilities of 
success are likely.  
9.3 Methodological Considerations 
I believe that no research is conducted without methodological challenges. 
During the duration of my research I experienced that some tasks were difficult 
and they deserve attention. First, during the initial stages of the research I defined 
my project under the domain of political science discipline. As the research was 
advancing, I realized that a single discipline was not enough for understanding 
the research phenomenon. Therefore, I started to see it as a research that was 
found support in several disciplines. Conducting a multidisciplinary research 
demanded great attention to discover which disciplines served my study, to 
identify the main discourses of each discipline and to find commonalities among 
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disciplines to explain my case of parts of my case. Doing all those tasks required 
the use of additional time because I needed to learn about new disciplines 
through extra readings or informal conversations with my sources.  
Second, selecting a contemporary research topic, where the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and its context are not clear, calls for special efforts in terms of 
delineating limits of what constitutes the phenomenon, its elements and its 
context. In terms of fieldwork, I spent time to find concrete material on the 
phenomenon of study especially because authors define it differently. 
Empirically, it signify that during my field work I did not encountered official 
positions about the desired type of results or the type of demands that should be 
imposed on Norfund. This aspect required me to expand my assessment 
methodology and to incorporate additional evaluation aspects. Equally important 
to study a contemporary phenomenon is the issue of timing and ethical use of 
material. Towards the last months of my study I found much relevant material 
but, in occasions, I was compelled to wait for official publication of documents. 
This aspect also impacted the time used to deliver final results. Although 
multidisciplinary was an important tool for my research, it is essential to consider 
that its time demanding; aspect that can be improved in future research projects.  
9.4 Closing Remarks 
In this thesis I have discussed theoretically and empirically the phenomenon of 
what I call market-driven aid in the example of public finances to private sector 
for public goals. The primary mission of Norfund, as a market-driven institution, 
is to enterprise creation in developing countries with public finances to firms. 
With this task, the institution has to facilitate the provision of capital in difficult 
context but that will help to improve living conditions of the poor. The role of 
companies is very different. To evaluate the outcomes of market-driven 
intervention, I have distinguished between the immediate outcomes of the 
intervention, the operational forms that produced the effects and the meaning of 
such results and processes for an emerging model as market-driven aid which 
gains popularity. The immediate results of the intervention showed that it is 
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possible to deliver public and private goals. In fact, when both type of goals 
overlap the possibilities to increase public goals are bigger.  The governance 
system used to manage public-private relations is determined by the existence of 
clear operational rules, the nature of long-term goals and the identity of involved 
actors. Advancing market-driven aid practices has a potential to engage private 
finances in public tasks and with this bringing additional private finances to aid 
delivery while companies have a partner for doing business in difficult settings of 
developing countries. However this strategy does not guarantee the delivery of 
public goals per se but it is conditioned to the relations, capabilities and identity 
of the involved parties.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1: News Coverage of the Bugoye 
Hydropower Plant  
Bistandsaktuelt. ―News: Opening of power plant in Uganda‖. Retrieved 5 
September 2010. Own translation. 
http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/Nyheter+og+reportasjer/Arkiv+nyheter+og+report
asjer/%C3%85pnet+kraftverk+i+Uganda.136441.cms  
Bistandsaktuelt ―Press released: Norfund i førersetet for ren energi‖ Retrieved 20 
August 2010.  
http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/Nyheter+og+reportasjer/Arkiv+nyheter+og+report
asjer/Norfund+i+f%C3%B8rersetet+for+ren+energi.205494.cms  
Bistandsaktuelt ―Press released: Trønderpenger bak ugandisk kraftverk‖. 
Retrieved 20 August 2010.  
http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/Nyheter+og+reportasjer/Arkiv+nyheter+og+report
asjer/Tr%C3%B8nderpenger+bak+ugandisk+kraftverk.135276.cms  
E24 ―Stolt av å være nærigsvennlig‖. Retrieved on 29 August 2010. 
http://e24.no/naeringsliv/stolt-av-aa-vaere-naeringsvennlig/3310705  
Global. ―Forsatt gode tall for Norfund‖. Retrieved 22 August 2010. 
http://global.no/nyheter/arkiv2/april_2010/fortsatt_gode_tall_for_norfund  
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ―Press Release: Stronger focus on 
climate change in development policy‖ published on 5 October 2010. Retrieved 
20 February 2011. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2010/budsjett
_klimaprofil.html?id=619025 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ―Press released 12.10. 2009: Solheim 
opened power plant in Uganda‖  Retrieved 3 September 2010. Own translation. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/nyheter/2009/uganda.html?id=5815
04 
NORAD. ―Press released: The Minister of the Environment and International 
Development, Mr. Solheim, opened Bugoye power station in Uganda‖. Retrieved 
3 September 2010. 
http://www.NORAD.no/en/About+NORAD/News+archive/The+Minister+of+th
e+Environment+and+International+Development,+Mr.+Solheim,+opened+Bugo
ye+power+station+in+Uganda.136510.cms  
Teknisk ukeblad . ―News 5.10.2009:  Big success in Uganda. Norwegian power 
plant opened several months before schedule. And more plants can come‖  
Retrieved 6 October 2010. http://www.tu.no/energi/article225034.ece 
123 
 
Annex 2: IFC’s Development Outcome Tracking 
System (DOTS) 
The International Finance Corporation, the World Bank‘ private arm, has a 
Development Outcome Tracking System (IFC-DOTS) that permits a more 
comprehensive assessment of project‘s contribution to development (IFC b).  The 
IFC DOTS organizes ‗development outcomes‘ of an investment into four areas 
that are supposed to cover projects many-sided contributions to developing 
countries. The four performance areas are financial performance, economic 
performance, environmental and social performance (ESP), and private sector 
development (PSD) (IFC a). 
Outcome 1- Financial performance aims at assessing the costs and benefits to 
project financiers because meeting the cost of capital is a necessary requirement 
for a healthy and sustainable development of private sector.  
Outcome 2- Economic performance sees to assess the project‘s impact on all of 
society i.e. characteristics of new products or services in the market and how they 
benefit main stakeholders like customers, employees, governments and suppliers.  
Outcome 3- It looks at a project‘s contribution beyond the implementing 
company. Indeed, contributions to the national private sector development like 
changes in regulatory frameworks. Competitors, producers of complementary 
products and new entrants are some of the analyzed indicators.  
Outcome 4- Environmental & social performance is concerned with assessing a 
project‘s effects (benefits or hazards) on neighboring communities and the 
environment. This is done based on compiling with IFC‘s Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessments, which provide information about which risks should 
be managed in order to improve existing conditions, or to avoid or mitigate 
eventual harms.  
Annex 3: The Five Assets of the Livelihood 
Framework 
A Livelihood refers to the means of living of people and it comprises capabilities, 
assets, and activities required to obtain such means. A livelihood contains five 
essential asset components: natural, physical, human, financial, and social 
capitals (Chambers and Conway 1992:7, Scoones 1998).   
Physical capital is related to infrastructure improvements.  
Financial capital is connected to programs or activities that focus on the 
provision of different types of finance or income.  
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Human capital refers to the activities that improve the skills base of the poor, 
such as education or training.  
Natural capital is the natural environment and resources which surrounding 
communities are endowed to make use of it to sustain themselves.   
Social capital refers to the networks and organizations that support people. 
Source: Chambers and Conway 1992 
Annex 4: List of Attended Public Arrangements 
During My Fieldwork 
31. May 2011 – ―Investing in private sector development: What are the returns?‖ 
at Litteraturhuset, Oslo (Norway).  
23. May 2011 – ―The sustainability challenge to business and society‖ at Old 
Ceremonial Hall University of Oslo, Oslo.  
19. May 2011 -  ―Changing aid: Towards a new model for development 
assistance‖ at Håndverkeren, Oslo (Norway).  
3. May 2011 -  ―Changing aid: Chinese Investments  
12. April 2011 -  ―Changing aid: Thinking strategically about Norway‘s donor 
role‖ at Håndverkeren, Oslo (Norway).  
8. April 2011 – ―The World bank and Human Development with focus on 
Africa‖ – at NORAD, Oslo (Norway).  
29. March 2011 – ‖Changing aid: Towards a new consensus in aid policy?‖ at 
Håndverkeren, Oslo (Norway). 
22. March 2011 – ―Changing Aid: Does strong African growth spell an en to aid 
as we know it?‖ at Håndverkeren, Oslo (Norway). 
26. January 2011 – ‖Local impacts of big projects: the role of strategic 
community investment and local capacity building‖ at  NORAD, Oslo (Norway) 
21-22. January – ― Exploring sustainability‖ at Losby gård, (Norway) 
9. December 2011 – ‖Social reporting: why and how?‖ at BI, Oslo (Norway) 
17. November 2010 – ‖Utenrikspolitikk i forandringenes tid‖ at Litteraturhuset, 
Oslo (Norway) 
11. November 2010 – ‖Energibistand og forretningsmuligheter i Afrika‖ at 
Håndverkeren, Oslo (Norway) 
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8. November 2010 –  ‖Green economy, why should developing countries 
embrace it?‖ – at Felix conference center at Oslo (Norway) 
27. October 2010 – ‖Energidagen‖ at University NTNU, Trondheim (Norway) 
18 October 2010. ‖Africa Economic Development‖. Ulandseminaret at Blindern, 
Oslo (Norway) 
22 September 2010. Conference ‖Promoting Clean energy: what role for the 
Norwegian Pension Fund‖. Organized by Leve, Etikk Programmet, Finansfondet 
and Polytekniskforeningen at Litteraturhuset, Oslo (Norway).  
19. September 2010 – ‖Politics and Aid‖ at NORAD, Oslo. 
10 February 2010- Africa – A continent of opportunities? Conference for 
Supporting Businesses (Nærignslivets Bistandskonferanse) Arranged by NHO, 
Innovasjon Norge, NORAD and UNDP at NHO Conference Center, Oslo 
(Norway) 
Annex 5: Conducted Interviews 
Archer, Eivind: Special Adviser at Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Oslo, 21 
April 2011.  
Damman, Siri: International Policy Adviser at Regnskogfondet Norway. Oslo, 4 
May 2011.  
Davis, Mark: Head of Department Renewable Energy at Norfund. Oslo, 18 April 
2011.  
Frengstad Tsujimoto, Maria: Grant Facility Manager and Development Advisor 
at Norfund. Oslo, 15 April 2011.  
Hagen, Line Amlund: Regional Director of Intpow. Oslo, 5 May 2011. 
Norris, Stefan: Energy Adviser at World Wide Fund for the Nature (WWF). 
Oslo, 12 May 2011.  
Preston, Andrew: General Manager at Foretningen for Internasjonale 
Vannstudier (FIVAS). Oslo 4 November 2011.  
Pritchard, Stephen: Manager at CDTS Uganda. Telephonic conversation, 7 April 
2011.  
Rixen, Jan: General Manager at EDFI. Interview through E-mail. Answers 
received on 13 January 2011.  
Salsaugen, Gunnar: General Manager at Trønder Power Ltd. Trondheim, 27 
October 2010.  
Sylvian, Irene: Social and Environmental Adviser at Newplan Uganda. Oslo, 19 
April 2011.  
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Søreide, Anders: Consultant and Manager at Vattenfal Power Consultant 
Norway. Oslo, 5 May 2011.    
Vilsted, Petter: Sustainability Adviser ESG at Norfund. Oslo, 18 April 2011.  
Værnes, Jon Einar: Vice President International at TrønderEnergi. Oslo, 21 
October 2010.  
Annex 6: Norwegian Policy papers 
Concrete examples of policy process to adapt national foreign aid policies in 
globalized settings can be studied in: 
 Globalization (Report No. 19 to the Storting 2002-2003) 
 Fighting Poverty Together (Report No. 35 to the Storting 2003-2004) 
 Norwegian Public Study -NOU 2008:14 —Coherent for Development? 
 Interest, Responsibilities and Opportunities (Report No. 15 to the Storting 
2008-2009 
 Climate, Conflict and Capital (Report No. 130 to the Storting 2008-2009)  
 Corporate Social Responsibility for a Global Economy (Report No. 19 to 
the Storting 2008-2009)  
 (Report No. 23 to the Storting 1961-1962)  
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Annex 7: Norwegian Budget –Recent Years 
 
Figur 1: Norwegian Foreign AId as Percentage of National 
GDP 2001 - 2010 
 
Source: NORAD ―Norskbistanditall‖. Retreived 5 January 2011. http://www.NORAD.no/norskbistanditall/ 
 
 
Figur 2: Norwegian Aid distributed by Sector 
 
Source: NORAD. ‖Norsk bistand i tall – Statistiskvisning‖.  Retrieved 22 February 2011. 
http://www.NORAD.no/Norskbistanditall/Statistikkvisning 
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 Commentaries
86
 
Aid Budget for 2010 corresponded to 1,09% of Norwegian GDP.   
NOK 4 529, 1 millions were given to the sector Environment and Energy. This 
accounted for 16% of the total aid budget.  
Norwegian Aid Budget in 2011.  
To the date of the publication of this thesis the Norwegian National Budget 
presented the following information:  
Aid Budget in 2011 corresponds to 1,02% of Norwegian GNP.   
In 2011 the budget for Clean Energy for Development Program will be doubled 
from NOK 800 millions to NOK 1,6 billions. From the increase, NOK 425 
millions will be directly used for Public Financial Mechanisms through Norfund. 
This allocation to Norfund comes in addition to normal allocations to the  
development fund. 
  
                                              
86 Norwegian Department of Finances. ―National Budget 2010‖.  Own translation.  Retreived 5 October 2010. 
http://www.statsbudsjettet.no/Statsbudsjettet-2010/Dokumenter/Fagdepartementenes-
proposisjoner/Utenriksdepartementet-UD/Prop-1-S/36140/36147/ 
 
Norwegian Department of Finances. National Budget  National Budget 2011. Own translation.   Retreived 3 May 
2011. http://www.statsbudsjettet.no/Statsbudsjettet-2011/Dokumenter/Fagdepartementenes-
proposisjoner/Utenriksdepartementet-UD/Prop-1-S/48306/48313/ 
 
 
129 
 
Annex 8: Norwegian Expenditure on Bilateral Aid 
to Uganda. 
Figure 3: Historical development of Norwegian Aid to Uganda in 
the sector: Energy and Environment  between 1990-2010 
 
Source: NORAD. ‖Norsk bistand i tall – Statistiskvisning‖.  Retrieved 22 February 2011. 
http://www.NORAD.no/Norskbistanditall/Statistikkvisning 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Norwegian Aid to Uganda between 1990-2000. 
Distributed by areas in the sector Energy and Environment  
 
Source: NORAD. ‖Norsk bistand i tall – Statistiskvisning‖.  Retrieved 22 February 2011. 
http://www.NORAD.no/Norskbistanditall/Statistikkvisning 
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Figure 5: Norwegian Aid to Uganda between 2000-2010. 
Distributed by areas in the sector Energy and Environment 
 
Source: NORAD. ‖Norsk bistand i tall – Statistiskvisning‖.  Retrieved 22 February 2011. 
http://www.NORAD.no/Norskbistanditall/Statistikkvisning 
 
 
Figure 6: Historical development of Norwegian Aid to Uganda in 
the sector: Energy and Environment  between 2000-2010  
 
Source: NORAD. ‖Norsk bistand i tall – Statistiskvisning‖.  Retrieved 22 February 2011. 
http://www.NORAD.no/Norskbistanditall/Statistikkvisning 
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Annex 9: Detailed Bankability Process for the 
Bugoye Hydropower Project. 
There are different methods to finance infrastructure projects. One of them is 
non-recourse project financing. This system entails that an infrastructure project 
itself can provide full security to lenders. Success of project financing relies on 
putting in place a structure that assures commercial viability and the reduction of 
project related risks (Davis, interview 18.04.2011).  Project financing is required 
in all commercial financial activities in order to document the bankability of the 
project. It is the ability of a project to pay the loan back, in the case of energy 
infrastructure, from earnings made by selling the electricity generated. 
Bankability is usually achieved through obtaining various legal contracts from 
eventual buyers of the electricity and guarantees from project suppliers of parts 
and services. In the case of a hydropower project commercial, construction, and 
hydrological risk mitigation had to be documented. 
For reducing commercial risks, the project acquired a contract called Power 
Purchased Agreement (PPA) from the Uganda Electricity Transmission 
Company Ltd (UETCL). With such an agreement, the Ugandan part is committed 
to buy the electricity produced by Bugoye HPP at a tariff of 12,9 USD 
cents/kilowatt hour (c/KWh) during the first three years and 7,2 c/KWh 
thereafter (NORAD 2010b:33). The PPA also guarantees payments for ―deemed 
energy‖ if the plant is prevented from delivering power to the grid (Information 
provided by TPL). This last element is particularly important in countries where 
the electricity grid is weak, because producers can face the risks of discontinuing 
their production. In the case of hydropower, water –raw material- cannot be 
stored therefore it would have to be let flow. Thus, causing non-production loses 
to the plant.  
Furthermore, UETCL was said to be in bankrupt therefore this risks had to be 
managed as well. This was achieved through a guarantee provided by the 
Ugandan government. It normally do not offer guarantees for small scale 
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hydropower projects, but in the light of an energy crisis the government was 
invited to negotiate (Davis, interview 18.04.2011). The support contract 
negotiated included a ‗buy-out‘ clause in case of non-payment on the part of 
UETCL and established that the Ugandan government would receive 60% of 
certified emissions right‘s income (Document courtesy TPL). By those means, 
permanent income from the project was secured by guaranteeing sales of the 
power.  
When it comes to mitigating construction risk, the developer had to come with a 
creative solution. In Norway, it is usual to undertake an overall contract for all 
necessary services with one outsourcing company. This is called Engineering, 
Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract (Søreide, interview 5.05.2011). 
However, this was not possible to achieve in the BHPP. The initial EPC contract 
negotiated by SN Power was too expensive in the view of TPL. Such difficulty to 
close and EPC agreement resulted on a split contract basis.  Four types of 
outsourced services were contracted: civil works, electro-mechanical, control & 
switchyard, and transmission line (Salsaugen, interview 27.10.2010). Without 
this structure, the project would not have been possible. Split contracts in this 
type of investment required the project and the lenders to assume more risk that it 
is usual. Despite of an increased risk, the lenders were decided to support the 
project. A possible explanation to this can be given in the light of the nature of 
lenders concerned with development finances.  
In the side of hydrological risks, it is possible to say that they remain an open 
question that in countries like Norway are assessed due to the existence of public 
statistics. Normally one of the difficulties that developers met in Africa is the 
inexistence of such records, making difficult to estimate the production according 
to hydrological seasons (Søreide, interview 5.05.2011). Given the context of 
Uganda, the BHPP is in an advantaged position due to the existence of 
hydrological records of the rivers where the plant is supplied from. Existing 
hydropower plants, both, upstream and downstream, have kept track of 
hydrological records since they started production in 2009. By using this 
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hydrological information, reliable production estimates could be done for BHPP. 
For financial support, the developer provided a guarantee capped at around 10% 
of the loan to cover failure to pay in case of poor hydrology (Information from 
TPL).  
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Annex 10: Data Collected from Norwegian CSOs  
       
Topic / 
 
CSO 
 
WWF, Norway.   Stefan 
Norris, Energy Adviser 
Regskogfondet. 
Siri Damnman, International 
Policy Adviser 
FIVAS. Andrew Preston, 
General Manager 
NCA.  Eivind Archer, Special Adviser 
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We welcome all sources of 
clean energy. Even if  clean 
energy projects have natural 
and social risks, we see that 
those risks are manageable 
compared with the dangers 
caused by fossil fuels energy 
production.  
We agree that it is important 
to get private sector included 
if the goal is to promote more 
environmental friendly energy 
offer. But , there should not 
be a secret agenda where 
aid agencies says that the 
clean energy initiative is a 
development program when 
it really is a way to obtain 
contracts for the Norwegian 
companies – if this is the 
case, it would be unfortunate.  
Clean energy for development is 
an interesting aid  model that 
allows contributing to 
development from the South’s 
premises.  
 
 
Welcome the Clean Energy 
Initiative but we expect to see 
a Norwegian effort towards 
supporting energy sources 
that are the best solution 
according to the different 
settings. We hope that there 
is not single attention to 
capacity of production only 
from hydropower source.  
We wish at all Norwegian 
actors are committed to used 
high level standards in 
hydropower projects in 
developing countries. But, if 
there is aid money in the 
context then it is more 
important that public aid 
institutions that provide the 
finances are held responsible 
for ensuring the quality of 
standards application in such 
projects. 
We are positive to energy-related 
investments because there is a big 
need in developing countries for 
energy, something that contributes 
to poverty reduction and private 
sector development. 
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Social studies have identified 
that the concept of desired 
development depend on the 
type of society. Diverse types of 
community groups will have 
different reactions and 
expectations to an infrastructure 
project. Companies should 
consult local communities and 
do not try to impose 
development according to our 
“western” conception of a 
capitalist society. 
 
Each particular situation should 
be treated according to the 
various local realities and 
according to the desired 
“concept of development” of the 
social groups existent in an 
intervened area.  
  
NCA is concerned with the rights of 
indigenous people. Indigenous 
peoples is difficult to conceptualize, 
this creates a difficult situation. First, 
it is difficult to recognize the 
existence of indigenous people; and 
second, to identify them juridical. 
Generally speaking, indigenous 
populations or ethic minorities are 
people that live in a traditional 
manner and usually have their own 
language and social structure. 
African tribes can be considered one 
example of this.  
 
Normally, states should be held 
accountable for indigenous people’s 
rights but when the state has not 
done its job, companies cannot be 
held responsible for that.  It is 
difficult to say who is responsible in 
cases of negligence of the states. 
However, it is necessary that 
companies improve their operational 
routines so that indigenous rights 
are taken into consideration.  
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Project proposals should 
include the right cost-
calculations that provide the 
companies with the most 
economic gains but such 
calculations should include 
the costs of applying the 
highest possible standard.   
We push for public financing 
institutions that can raise the 
level of standards as much 
as possible, and that they 
follow a life cycle perspective 
of the projects. 
 
 
The industry is not so good at 
analyzing the environmental and 
social consequences. This is 
something very important 
because in many developing 
countries there are pre-existing 
conflicts between the society 
and the state; this is something 
that can be reflected and affect 
negatively projects.  
 
From our experience with 
infrastructure projects, we have 
seen many cases where 
companies were not really 
prepared to meet conflicts in 
developing countries. The 
question is not about good or 
bad intentions, but a more 
realist concern is that 
companies are really prepared 
and are well informed about the 
markets and societies where 
they will invest. 
 
 
We in Fivas are concerned 
with holistic planning process 
for single projects. We want 
that the project is considered 
equally towards financial, 
social and economical 
considerations.  
 
Normally, technical and 
economic plans predominate 
the project assessments; and 
the social and environmental 
respects are relegated to a 
secondary aspect. We are for 
integrating  Social and 
Environmental aspects of 
project assessments and 
planning from early stages.  
 
 
A project with a good design that 
considers the affected groups. This 
can be achieved through good 
planning and inclusive processes 
and compromise.  
Public founders should clarify that 
the company is legally entitle and 
responsible to secure that their 
subcontractors follow international 
conventions and guidelines.  
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WWF do not seek to promote 
an specific set of standards 
but we wish to raise the 
quality of any type of 
standards used by projects. 
Therefore, we want to have 
the an open door in case by 
case, to comment on projects 
and to adjust the criterions 
and recommendations 
according to each country 
situation.  
 
 
IFC Standards has gaps for 
states that do not do their work. 
This creates conflicts and 
questions about the 
compensation levels, lack of 
trust of society on their 
authorities.  To avoid such 
difficulties, we support a WCD 
because of the “Free-prior-
inform-consent”  where project 
developers contact the 
respective stakeholders in order 
to come into an agreement 
whether the project will be 
realized and under what kind of 
terms a project could take place.  
 
 
Fivas argues that WCD is the 
best existing guideline for 
manage hydropower 
infrastructure building in 
developing countries 
because of two reasons.  
The first is because the 
recommendations of the 
WCD are the results of a two 
years stakeholder 
consultations, analysis of 
research results, and case 
studies. The standards have 
a higher legitimacy than other 
standards because all kind of 
interested groups that were 
related to hydropower 
projects in the last 50 years 
were consulted. 
The second is that standards 
are free-will, but there are not 
binding criterion. WCD 
recommendation proposed 
binding criterion like 
agreements with local 
communities, and the HHRR 
approach is stronger and 
clear about the positions of 
rights and risks approaches. 
  
 
We support the WCD because it is 
the standard that deals with 
questions related to the rights of 
indigenous populations.  We 
perceive a general tendency where 
the international hydropower sector 
slips away from this 
recommendations on the WCD. 
Probably because the guidelines 
suggests quite long processes to 
incorporate social participation in 
project planning.   
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It is problematic that private 
enterprises would profile 
themselves as aid actors. Such 
behavior generates 
expectations; however, they do 
not have the expertise about 
development assistance.  
 
Focus on benefit sharing is 
essential but taxes that go to 
components to local 
development are desired.  
Such contributions by no 
means should replace the 
company obligations with 
affected communities and the 
environment.  
 
The concept of benefit sharing is 
rather problematic. NCA basic 
position is that the state is 
responsible for delivering public 
goods to their citizens. Therefore, it 
is unnatural that private companies 
have this responsibility.  It is not a 
good solution that companies use 
private money to operate as aid 
actors. But if companies want to 
contribute with something, there 
should be a component of 
democratic control where three 
parties: local representatives, an 
international organization and a 
representative of the company follow 
the transparency of a benefit sharing 
process.  
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Annex 11: IFC Development Outcome Tracking System for Bugoye 
(N.A: Information not available) 
Financial 
Performance 
Economic Performance Environmental & Social Performance 
Private Sector 
Development 
Project 
Company 
Financiers 
N. A 
Customers 
- New service: Electricity to 
national Ugandan grid.  
 
- Quality of service: N.A 
 
Expected Price 
A lower price was expected. The 
PPA agreement was evaluated as 
non cost-effective if compared 
with other small-hydropower 
development in the area. But the 
price of 12,9 -7,2 c/kWh is cheap 
compared to other type of energy 
production i.e. thermal power.  
 
Implementation of Standards 
 
IFC’s Env & Social Mgmt:  Yes 
IFC performance standards from 1-8, except PS 7 since 
indigenous communities were not involved.  
 
- ISO 14 000:   Yes 
- National standards:   Yes 
 Norwegian NVE Guidelines  
 Ugandan national rules and procedures.  
 
- International HSE Policies: Yes, IFC HSE.  
 
- Management of risks:  Yes 
 
Corporate governance 
N. A 
 
Financial Rate 
of Return 
N.A 
Government of Uganda 
- Tax revenue: N.A 
Taxes were paid for registrering 
company, import tax, consession, 
employment taxes.  
 
Additional:  
60% of earnings from the CERs 
will be given to the government. 
 
Neighbors 
No direct benefits from the BHPP were encountered to 
benefit the community given that the power plant delivers all 
the electricity production to the national grid.  
However, local employees were hired during the 
construction process and additional programs  
  
Linkages,  knowledge 
transfer  
 
Training Ugandan local 
team for running the 
power plant.  
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Return on 
Equity 
N.A 
Suppliers 
- Securing demand of their 
products and services:  
 
Newplan (Ugandan) 
Noremco (Ugandan) 
Group 4 Securicor (International) 
 
- Local vs. Imported:  
Turbines – Belgium 
Stone- crushing (local)  
Environmental aspects 
Environment 
a) Hydropower design: Run of the river design with a 
component that ensures sufficient year-round water flow in 
the river. 
 
Biodiversity conservation 
Studies reported that habitats have been modified by 
previous human use. Fish migration is prevented from other 
hydropower plants placed upstream. Therefore, BHPP was 
not encountered as cause of loses of biodiversity.  
 
Reduction in emissions 
GHG emissions: 54 349 tones CO2. 
 
Demonstration effects:  
Trønder Power as a new 
entrant in the market. 
This can be considered 
materially important 
because of the observed 
success.  
Given a positive 
experience, Trønder 
Power is planning other 5 
hydropower projects.  
 
Morality setting -  for 
benefit sharing of 
projects 
Return on 
Invested 
Capital 
 
TrønderEnergi 
expected 20% 
return on 
invested 
capital. 
 
From 2009 to 
2nd quarter of 
2010: return of 
15-17%.  
Employees 
No. of places: Approx. 425 local 
employees were hired during the 
construction phase.  
 
75% local employees: Bugoye 
area. 
 
11% female employees 
 
18 permanent employees in TPL.  
 
Wages:   National legal wages 
 
Training:  All local workers 
received vocational training and 
education in health, safety and 
environment (HSE). 
Community Development Program  
 
Community engagement: Bugoye Participatory Committee.  
The local community identified issues that could be difficult 
and all of them were managed and monitored.  
Issues: a) the use of land; b) access to water; c) movement 
across project site; d) traffic, noise and dust. 
 
Involuntary resettlement 
a) It was negotiated a land-for-land compensation and 
offered additional assistance with registration of land title.  
 
b) 34 households were resettled close to main infrastructure 
and/or relatives.  
 
c) According to IFC representative visit the restituted 
houses were substantially bigger and of better quality.  
 
Investment climate 
Changes in Ugandan 
settings cannot be 
assessed by this study.  
 
Norwegian companies 
are learning from the 
experiences of 
TrønderEnergi in a 
developing country. The 
case of Bugoye is used 
in conferences for 
promoting the 
internationalization of the 
Norwegian hydropower 
sector.  
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Protection of rights of vulnerable groups  
a) Participation, consultation.  
 
b) Land titles, property rights:  Women were considered as 
the head of the family since tribal traditions permit that man 
can have several wives.  
 
c) Compensations:  
372 families received one time compensation payments for 
land and crops.  
 
Cultural heritage  
Reallocation of graves took place and some payments were 
done to cover the expenses of “moving funerals”.  
 
  
Voluntary contributions to the Community –CSR Initiatives- 
–Direct contributions to MDG–  
MDG 5: Construction of a maternity ward in local clinic.  
MDG 6: Provision of funding for a HIV/AIDS awareness 
program. 
MDG 7: Construction 10 of water access-points.  
Support to an EU/UN potable water supply project.  
 
Improve the local clinic and provision of an out patient 
department.  
Provide access to electricity in the clinic for storing 
medicaments.  
Malaria prevention program and donation of mosquito nets.  
 
- Other important contributions-  
Donation of a football ground and support to a local NGO: 
Community Development Trough Sports.  
Changes in legal and 
regulatory framework 
Ugandan legal and 
regulatory framework 
remained the same. 
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